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Introduction: New Horizons of Derecho Indiano
The historiography of derecho indiano – a term traditionally employed by 
legal historians to refer to norms that were used in the overseas territories of 
the Spanish Crown in the early modern period – was essentially a creation of 
the Argentine historian Ricardo Levene (1885–1958). His first publication 
on Spanish colonial law, Introducción al estudio del derecho Indiano (1916), can 
largely be viewed as a foundational work for the discipline in conjunction 
with subsequent publications that further elaborate on this topic (e. g. Le-
vene 1918, 1924). Between the late 1930s and 1940s, other scholars, like 
Rafael Altamira (Altamira 1938, 1939, 1948), Jorge Basadre (1937), Ots Cap-
dequi (1943), and Manuel Belaunde Guinassi (1947), took it upon them-
selves to build on the notion of derecho indiano and in general on Levene’s 
work, which itself had been influenced by his own teachers and developed in 
close collaboration with other jurists and historians (Levene 1953; Tau 
Anzoátegui 1990, 2006). From the 1950s on, Alfonso García-Gallo of Spain 
emerged as the leading scholar in the field (García-Gallo 1951, 1952, 1953, 
1955). For the next three decades, his writings would set the agenda for legal 
historical studies on the overseas territories of the Spanish crown. Together 
with Alamiro Ávila-Martel and Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, García-Gallo 
founded the Instituto Internacional de la Historia del Derecho Indiano 
(IIHDI) in 1966. With his keynote address entitled Problemas metodológicos 
de la historia del derecho indiano (García-Gallo, 1967), held at the first interna-
tional meeting of legal historians working on the derecho indiano, he set the 
agenda for further research. In his subsequent works, he presented impor-
tant reflections and advances in research methods and key topics concerning 
derecho indiano (García-Gallo 1970, 1972, 1987). In this regard, the manifold 
contributions of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic cannot be empha-
sized enough, for it is no exaggeration to state that for more than two 
decades, both Latin American and Spanish scholarship relied on the episte-
mic framework delineated by García-Gallo, to which leading scholars of the 
subsequent generation, like Tau Anzoátegui (1993), Martiré (1996), and 
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Sánchez Bella (1996), testify. Moreover, since its foundation, the IIHDI has 
been organizing a series of congresses at locations alternating between Spain 
and Latin America. This has helped to build a transnational scholarly com-
munity that serves as a forum for debates and scholarly exchanges. The 
published acta of the IIHDI conferences provide an excellent window to 
the state of the research within the field between the 1970s and the 1990s 
(De la Hera et al., 1989).1
Nearly thirty years later, in 1995, the 11th Congress of the same Institute, 
held in Buenos Aires, heralded the revival of the discipline, when the Argen-
tinian legal historian, Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, seized the opportunity to 
address questions on methodology and on the future orientations of the 
discipline. In so doing, he also invoked the writings of European legal 
historians like Paolo Grossi, Antonio Manuel Hespanha, Bartolomé Clavero, 
and others. At the same time, he drew on his own intense legal historical 
research carried out in the previous decades, starting with research on the 
codification of civil law in Argentina (Tau Anzoátegui 1977) and working his 
way through to the foundational structures of derecho indiano (Tau Anzoá-
tegui 1992), demonstrating sound historiographical reflection (Tau Anzoá-
tegui 1990, 1993, 1996). His inaugural lecture at the 11th Congress, which 
was published in 1997 under the title Nuevos Horizontes en el Estudio Histórico 
del Derecho Indiano (Tau Anzoátegui 1997), can be considered part of a 
broader tendency to revisit and reflect upon the early scholarship on derecho 
indiano undertaken by the first two generations of legal historians from 
Latin America and Europe, especially from Spain, that generated compre-
hensive bibliographical studies in the 1980s and the 1990s.2
At the outset, Tau Anzoátegui proposes going beyond conceiving the 
paradigm of legal history purely as a history of legal norms. He first describes 
the Methodenstreit of the 1970s, which had considerable influence on how 
legal history – and Spanish colonial law – was understood, in that either 
1 For a list of the Congresses with a complete digital library of all the publications of the 
Congress see: http://web.ua.es/es/institutoderechoindiano/.
2 Outstanding in this context is the work of Dagrossa (1998); see also Bernal Gómez
(1989); De la Hera et al. (1989); Floris Margadant (2000); González (1995); Mariluz 
Urquíjo (1990); Martiré (2003); Muro Romero (1996); Salinas Araneda (1984, 1994, 
1998); Sánchez Bello (1989, 1990); Tau Anzoátegui (1996); Zorraquín Becú (1995), 
(1997).
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some scholars emphasized the character of the discipline as a legal science 
(García-Gallo, Zorraquín Becú), while others, mainly Spanish scholars, such 
as Francisco Tomás y Valiente and Bartolomé Clavero, chose to situate legal 
history within a social science framework. Tau Anzoátegui now linked the 
methodological development of legal history to what he called “the posture 
superseding rational and statutory state law,”3 so that normativity, as it was 
now being conceived by scholars, related more to the autonomy of different 
levels of social organization, different modes of normative creativity, diverse 
notions of law and justice, the jurist’s position as an artifact of law, and the 
casuistic character of legal decisions. All of these, according to Tau Anzoá-
tegui, were now to be seen as alternatives to the old conception of law as a 
matter of state hegemony. This changed conception of modern law opened 
up new horizons for legal historians and scholars of Spanish colonial law, 
aiding them to broaden their understanding of the workings of previous 
laws.4 But the wider conception of normativity advocated by Tau Anzoátegui 
also led him to make an appeal to the legal historians to use a broader array 
of sources in the study of legal norms than just the textual sources. Scholars 
had to “substitute the legalist culture for a juridical culture, which would 
permit [the scholar] to place the law in its proper place within the [social] 
system, depending on the substance and the epoch, and which would enable 
an ‘intelligent reading’ – which is neither ingenuous nor malicious – of the 
legal texts, asking them questions in the light of a wide conception of the 
legal phenomenon.”5
Furthermore, Tau Anzoátegui elevated certain areas of Spanish colonial 
law, which he thought deserved more attention than they had hitherto 
received. One such area was the history of the learned jurist, or the letrado, 
who was to be studied within the social, political, economic and bureau-
cratic context. Another neglected area that Tau Anzoátegui identified was 
book history: the circulation of printed books, libraries, and the different 
3 « […] una postura superadora del dominante Derecho racional, estatal y legal. », Tau 
Anzoátegui (1997) 20.
4 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 19–20.
5 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 43. « […] reemplazar la cultura legalista por la cultura jurídica, 
que permita colocar a la ley dentro del ordenamiento en su verdadero lugar, según la 
materia y las época, y que posibilite una ‘lectura inteligente’ – que no es ingenua ni 
maliciosa – de los textos legales, interrogándolos a la luz de una concepción amplia del 
fenómeno jurídico. »
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interpretations of legal texts. Provincial and local derecho indiano had 
received scant scholarly attention, so that even a “microhistory” was well 
within the scope of the endeavor. And last but not least, Tau Anzoátegui 
wished to see more scholarship on the “continuities and ruptures” of colo-
nial legal legacy in the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the colonial 
period.6
Tau Anzoátegui’s “new horizons” were thus wide open: even if he had not 
envisaged a comprehensive revolution of the field, his program paved the 
way for revising the history of Spanish colonial law in order to gain a 
radically new understanding of it. While his positions were far from radical 
as far as historical scholarship was concerned, within the mainstream Latin 
American legal history and derecho indiano, his voice was authoritative. There 
is no doubt that areas of research in many fields that Tau Anzoátegui iden-
tified as important have witnessed major progress in the ensuing two dec-
ades.
However, in the seventeen years that have passed since Tau Anzoátegui’s 
programmatic declaration first appeared, new challenges have also emerged. 
The challenges of globalization are felt both in the historical and the legal 
sciences, and thus, unsurprisingly, also in the field of legal history. Broader 
issues have experienced resurgence as a result, for instance, the importance 
accorded to religious normativity within the normative setting of societies is 
a direct result of that. They have raised awareness of the need to reconceive 
the circulation of ideas and juridical practices, and reiterated the significance 
of drawing attention to the layers of cultural translation that these ideas 
underwent in the process of reinterpretation in different contexts. Not least, 
the growing consciousness of and the strong call to reconsider and inter-
rogate colonial history from the postcolonial perspective unexpectedly neces-
sitated a thorough reexamination of the foundational concepts of the disci-
pline. What concept of law best serves our historical studies in consideration 
of the multinormative settings? How do we define the spatial dimension of 
our work? How do we analyze the entanglements in legal history? Even if 
the answer may at first glance seem rather easy, endless controversies have 
erupted every time scholars have tried to redefine these pivotal terms.
The aim of this volume is not to serve in the same capacity as Tau Anzoá-
tegui’s book from 1997, which essentially reoriented a whole discipline’s 
6 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 57–126.
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research agenda. Rather, it draws rich insights from Tau Anzoátegui’s work 
in order to address some new challenges confronting the discipline. Not 
least, it hopes to help to integrate the study on derecho indiano into a broader 
field, especially with research in the English-speaking world. It starts and 
ends with some considerations regarding the historiography of derecho In-
diano: Luigi Nuzzo’s introduction reflects upon the history of the historiog-
raphy, and Ezequiel Abásolo offers a dedication to Tau Anzoátegui’s work. 
Richard Ross, Tamar Herzog and Heikki Pihlajamäki present three studies, 
which integrate derecho indiano into an Atlantic perspective. Brian Owensby, 
Marta Lorente and Víctor Tau Anzoátegui take up key aspects that Tau 
Anzoátegui had raised in his Nuevos Horizontes.
Together, the contributions, which were the result of a small workshop in 
Berlin, in June 2012, show that many of Tau Anzoátegui’s wishes, which he 
expressed in Nuevos Horizontes in 1997, have indeed borne fruit. But even if 
considerable results have been achieved. It is equally clear that new demands 
are being placed on the study of derecho indiano. Some of the new questions 
have been treated in this volume, but much remains to be done. Twenty 
years after the 11th Congress of the IIHDI, where Tau Anzoátegui presented 
his reflections on Nuevos Horizontes, many of these challenges will have to be 
discussed on a global scale. If this volume helps to shed light on these New 
Horizons, its goal will have been achieved.
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Richard J. Ross
Spanish American and British American Law
as Mirrors to Each Other: Implications of the 
Missing Derecho Británico Indiano
Most of the essays in this volume, proceeding in the spirit of Victor Tau 
Anzoátegui’s distinguished scholarship, pursue “new horizons” in the study 
of Spanish American law. Co-editors Thomas Duve and Heikki Pihlajamäki 
charged me with a different mission. They asked me, a student of British 
North American law in an Atlantic framework, to compare the legal history 
of the Spanish and British empires with one eye on Tau Anzoátegui’s work 
and the other on the papers produced for the volume.
If there is a concept central to both Tau Anzoátegui’s writings and to 
many of the essays in this volume, it is the derecho indiano – its meaning, 
implications, development, and variability, and the changing ways that 
scholars have understood it. From the perspective of the English Atlantic, 
what stands out is the lack of an analogous notion that refers to the collective 
legal order of the British North American colonies.1 Section I of this essay 
will explore why scholars of the English Atlantic do not think in terms of a 
derecho británico indiano. Its absence has powerfully shaped scholarship on 
the intellectual history of law (Section II) and on the trajectories of change 
perceived in the legal development of the two empires (Section III).
I. Derecho Indiano and the (Missing) British American
Continental Legal Order
Historians of Spanish American law have put the concept of the “derecho 
indiano” at the center of their field. This is true whether they treat the term 
restrictively as a shorthand for legal doctrines, institutions, and personnel, or 
whether, more expansively, they include within the term, as Tau does, the 
1 I will focus on the colonies that became the United States. Strictly speaking, the British 
Atlantic would have included English Canada and the English Caribbean.
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values and “spirit” of the law and the interactions with politics and the wider 
society that animated the juridical order. The ongoing learned debates over 
the nature and meaning of the derecho indiano have made the term highly 
contested, which has only underscored its importance as an object of study. 
Indeed, historians who go so far as to recast the derecho indiano less as a set of 
doctrines than as an intellectual culture, and who contend that its successes 
and failures owed less to its institutional framework than to the social net-
works and political interests surrounding those institutions, nonetheless 
insist on its centrality as the starting point for discussing Spanish American 
law. Some of the papers in this conference – for instance, by Ezequiel 
Abásolo, Luigi Nuzzo, and Heikki Pihlajamäki – represent the third gener-
ation of reflection on these themes, if we consider Tau and his contempo-
raries the second generation, and their predecessors such as Ricardo Levene 
and Rafael Altamira the first generation.2
Historians of British American law, looking upon all of this, are im-
pressed by the sophistication and intensity of these debates. But even more, 
they are struck by the absence of a workable analogue in their world to the 
derecho indiano. When they discuss the legal orders of the British Atlantic, 
they think in terms of “constitutions,” distinguishing among three types. 
First, a mix of charters, bills of rights, statutes, longstanding institutions, 
and customs organized, or “constituted,” power within Great Britain itself. 
Second, each colony in America developed its own constitution, commonly 
resting on its charter, supplemented by colonial statutes, customs, and habits 
of wielding power. Third, an unstable, disputed “imperial constitution,” built 
out of conventions accumulating from the latter seventeenth century 
onward, structured government between Britain and its colonies across 
the Atlantic. Each colony handled local affairs, while the Crown and parlia-
ment oversaw matters of general concern such as war and peace, diplomatic 
affairs, coinage, and intercolonial and foreign commerce. The Empire pro-
vided a structure for review of colonial legislation by the Crown’s Privy 
Council and for appeal of judgments by colonial supreme courts. With 
characteristic unclarity, the imperial constitution offered choice of law rules 
suggesting when colonies might develop their own particular law, when 
they might deploy the diverse array of sources contained within the rubric 
2 Abásolo (2015); Nuzzo (2015); Pihlajamäki (2015).
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of the “laws of England,” and when English law would override “repugnant” 
colonial ordinances.3
Conspicuously absent among these three constitutions was a fourth: a 
collective legal order of the colonies of the English Atlantic, a derecho britá-
nico indiano. Is this concept seldom found in the writings of scholars of 
British America because they had no political or ideological reason to invent 
it? The formation of the notion of a Spanish American derecho indiano is 
instructive here. The concept, developed by Ricardo Levene, came into use 
among historians only in the middle third of the twentieth century. It 
allowed scholars to treat the law of the Spanish Indies from a cosmopolitan, 
pan-Hispanic perspective that escaped from the limitations of national his-
toriography. To speak of a derecho indiano was to emphasize how the various 
Latin American nations shared a legal-cultural inheritance, an inheritance 
that their forebears had not merely received from Castile but had helped 
construct.4 There was no corresponding need to deploy a legal historical 
concept to underscore the common heritage of the constituent parts of 
the United States since it was already a single nation rather than, as in Latin 
America, a grouping of independent countries created out of a once unified 
empire.
Ideology and politics aside, the more significant reason why historians do 
not think in terms of a derecho británico indiano is that the historical record is 
not conducive. Suppose, as a thought experiment, we imagine what a hypo-
thetical derecho británico indiano would have looked like. Its features can be 
modeled, by analogy, on the Spanish American derecho indiano. The purpose 
of this thought experiment is not to argue that a derecho británico indiano
actually existed in any meaningful sense and has been overlooked. Not until 
the closing stages of the colonial period do hints of one emerge. Rather, the 
point is, ultimately, to invite reflection on the implications of Spanish Amer-
ican – but not British American – legal history being organized around the 
study of a collective continental legal order.
3 Greene (1987) 67–68, 74–76; Greene (2011) 49–54, 63–66. See also Bilder (2004) 1–4; 
Brown (1964) 1–22; Hulsebosch (2005) 72–74; Hulsebosch (1998) 319–379; Smith
(1950); Smith (1969); Smith (1970).
4 Pihlajamäki (2010); Pihlajamäki (2015); Nuzzo (2015). Cf. Tau (1997) 28–33, which 
contends that the work of García-Gallo more than Levene’s made “derecho indiano” the 
central concept for the field.
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A derecho británico indiano would have included, first, an array of institu-
tions that recurred from colony to colony (akin to the audiencias, cabildos, 
corregidores, and so forth that could be found in New Spain, Peru, and other 
areas). Second, this collective legal order of the English American colonies 
would have expressed through law a dominant set of ideological and polit-
ical commitments spanning the continent. In the case of the Spanish 
Empire, these included, for instance, the representation of the king as a 
guarantor of justice to his vassals, a commitment to evangelization, and a 
disdain for representative assemblies. Third, the collective legal order would 
have had a branch of law for overseeing a unified religious establishment. 
Fourth, it would have included principles determining which situations 
would be governed by indigenous customs and which by fusions of indig-
enous and settler law. Fifth and finally, a sizable corpus of law issued from 
the metropolis and governing day to day life in the colonies – something 
akin to what the Spanish Empire collected in the Recopilación – would have 
brought some unity to an English collective legal order. But in reality, as 
opposed to in our thought experiment, the different English settlements 
disagreed in their religious and secular institutions, ideological commit-
ments, policies towards native law, and social and economic legislation.
As a result, historians sometimes treat the law of each English colony as a 
singular entity (the law of Massachusetts, of Virginia, and so forth). Or, more 
commonly, they think in terms of regions, with some dispute about how to 
organize them. A typical division includes New England, the Middle Colo-
nies or the Delaware Valley, the Chesapeake, the Deep South, and the Car-
ibbean islands. To be sure, students of the Spanish American derecho indiano
also assume regionalism – but of a different sort. Peripheral settlements, they 
note, employed varieties of the derecho indiano less learned than the versions 
that obtained in the cores of New Spain and Peru. The choice of law rules 
contained within the derecho indiano allowed corporations, indigenous com-
munities, and viceroys, audiencias, cabildos, and other governing institutions 
to create norms that differed from place to place. The geographical variation 
that was expected, even praised, within the derecho indiano did not call into 
question its primacy as the overall framework for Spanish American law.5
5 Altamira (1945) 144–183; Cutter (1995) 32–43; González (1995) 11–67; Tau (1992a) 
181–183, 313–319; Tau (2001) 53–79, 96–100, 151; Tau (1997) 85–92.
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By contrast, the regionalism of British American law was of a more 
profound character. Seventeenth century settlers came over with widely 
varying goals, forming colonies at different points in time with distinct 
institutional structures and legal cultures. First, where the sixteenth century 
Spanish Empire imposed Castilian-governing institutions upon New Spain 
and Peru, the English Empire insisted on no comparable similarities among 
its various colonies.6 The mode of appointment of senior executive and 
judicial officials differed among colonies. The governor and his council 
commonly nominated judges and subordinate executive officials and served 
as an appellate tribunal. The governor and council owed their appointment 
variously to the king (in “royal” colonies such as Virginia), or to private 
individuals who “owned” settlements (in “proprietary” colonies such as 
Pennsylvania), or to popular election (in “corporate” colonies such as Con-
necticut).
Second, institutional and legal cultural variation occurred because the 
initial settlers who established colonies selected among institutions and legal 
norms familiar from home, adopting some, reshaping or rejecting others, in 
regionally specific processes. Consider the contrast between Massachusetts 
(the dominant colony in New England) and Virginia (the leading colony in 
the Chesapeake). Committed Puritans led the settlement of early Massachu-
setts. Determined to create a more righteous and Christianized society, they 
insisted that the state and churches work together in guiding or driving 
people toward moral regeneration. Church members alone voted in col-
ony-wide elections in order to preserve control by the godly. Yet within 
the confines of this religious mission, the colony strove for a communal 
and consensual model of authority. Settlers annually elected their officials 
and participated widely in local offices. Massachusetts codified its laws and 
provided decentralized tribunals at the county and town level, dispensing 
prompt and relatively nontechnical justice. Virginia planters, by contrast, 
primarily sought material gain rather than social regeneration. Tobacco bar-
ons who controlled land and servant labor exercised legal authority as a 
result of their economic and social prominence. Virginia notables dispensed 
a style of justice more authoritarian than the colonial norm in order to 
govern an agitated population that was disproportionately young and male. 
6 Lang (1975) 221–222.
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The primary unit of government was the county rather than the town (as in 
Massachusetts). The colony’s slight institutional presence beneath the county 
level and its dispersed settlement, heavy-handed elite, and propensity to-
wards violence combined to undercut the effectiveness of legal decisions. 
The most distinctive feature of Virginia and the other southern and Carib-
bean colonies was the law of slavery. England did not have a law of slavery 
itself, nor did it create a slave code for its American colonies in the fashion of 
the French and Spanish empires. Virginia and the Southern and Caribbean 
colonies, but not Massachusetts, developed the distinctive policing apparatus 
that accompanied slave law. Masters, for example, enjoyed legal protection if 
they accidentally beat slaves to death; colonies offered public support for the 
private recapture or killing of runaways; and restrictions were placed on the 
ability of whites and slaves to socialize and trade with each other.7
Space restrictions preclude comparing other regions in seventeenth cen-
tury English America. But the contrast of Massachusetts and Virginia suggest 
a conclusion: The profound regionalism of British America appears far less 
as a set of variations within a shared legal order than does Spanish American 
regionalism, which grew up under the framework of the derecho indiano. The 
absence of a derecho británico indiano has shaped how scholars have pursued 
the legal history of the two empires. This is apparent in the study of the 
intellectual history of law.
II. Intellectual History
On occasion similar questions have driven the intellectual history of British 
and Spanish American law. Historians have explored both empires’ justifi-
cations for colonization and dispossession of indigenous peoples. And they 
have stressed the prominence of law as a political vocabulary for negotiating 
with imperial administrators. Yet for all this, significant differences stand out 
in how scholars have pursued the intellectual history of law in the two 
empires. First, in the mix of approaches to legal history, intellectual history 
occupies a more prominent place in Spanish American than in British Amer-
ican historiography. This is, in part, the result of the much greater amount of 
intellectual “raw material” in Spanish America. Since so many key admin-
istrators of the Empire were letrados, they left behind much more high-level 
7 Konig (2008); Nelson (2008) 3–79; Tomlins (2010) 221–226, 267.
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intellectual reflection on law than did their British counterparts, who were 
typically laymen. There was no counterpart in the British Empire to the great 
importance of neo-Thomist legal theory among churchmen and jurists, 
which inspired reflection on the intersection of eternal law, natural law, 
and positive law in both state and church. British Protestants, lacking orac-
ular confession, did not produce manuals for confessors. Confessor manuals 
undertook a sustained engagement with law by asking which ordinances 
bound conscience (as per Romans 13:5), and determining whether violation 
of laws binding conscience subjected the offender to mortal sin or only to 
venial sin. Scholars seeking to write intellectual histories of Spanish Amer-
ican law have much more to work with than British American historians.
The absence of a derecho británico indiano helps account for a second 
difference. Intellectual histories of British American law, particularly in 
the seventeenth century, organize themselves regionally to such an extent 
as to downplay commonalities among the various settlements. By contrast, 
the more plentiful intellectual histories of Spanish American law typically 
treat the New World as a unit harboring variations rather than as a series of 
lightly connected regions. In support of this proposition, consider some of 
the distinguished intellectual histories of Spanish American law produced by 
Tau and by participants in this volume. First, Tau has famously written on 
the transition in the Spanish American Empire from a predominantly casu-
istical style of legal reasoning towards one that is more reliant on system-
ization.8 Brian Owensby’s essay extends Tau’s framework by exploring the 
treatment in Spanish American legal culture of conscience, simultaneously 
the means and end of casuistry.9 Second, Tau and others have stressed the 
importance of natural law and the “common good” within Spanish Amer-
ican legal reasoning. This work has several variants. “Common good” and 
natural law might be treated as a touchstone for assessing whether positive 
laws and customs are valid or not and whether officials might suspend 
ordinances by invoking the formula “obedezco pero no cumplo” [“I obey, but 
do not comply”].10 Or one might argue that for all the legalistic rhetoric of 
the Spanish Empire, officials based their actions far more on natural law, 
religious injunctions, and amorphous, self-interested notions of the com-
8 Tau (1992b).
9 Owensby (2015).
10 Tau (2002); Tau (1992a) 59–126; Tau (2001) 143.
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mon good than on the requirements of positive law.11 Or the common good 
and natural law might be taken as the measure of the respective obligations 
of the Crown, officials, and vassals in a just social order. From this perspec-
tive, the identification of the common good and natural law would be the 
key to resolving disputes in areas as diverse as amparo petitions, land compo-
siciones, citizenship [vecindad], and Indian labor and tribute requirements.12
Historians pursuing each of these topics have mixed evidence from New 
Spain, Peru, the Yucatan, and other regions. In so doing, they adopted a 
continental perspective.
In contrast to Spanish American historiography, the legal-intellectual his-
tory of British American casuistry and conscience, common good, and nat-
ural law commonly follows regional lines from settlement through, roughly, 
the middle third of the eighteenth century. To be sure, the broadest outlines 
of these intellectual frameworks were similar in the various regions of the 
English Atlantic. But in the mid-level propositions, in the ways that settlers 
drew upon and applied these overall frameworks, the regions differed. Let 
us begin with the notion of the “common good.” Jacobean promoters of 
Virginia promised “honor and glory” to settlers who pursued the common 
good of the new colony rather than their own self-interest.13 Massachusetts’ 
leaders emphasized the honor of God rather than personal glory, producing 
a differently inflected notion of the common good, one linked to the reli-
gious mission of the colony. Both Massachusetts and Virginia settlers 
thought about the common good in the Ciceronian idiom characteristic 
of early modern Europe, which implored citizens to identify their private 
good with the collective, shared good of their community. This framework 
recognized that since communities varied, so would the particular form of 
the common good that each pursued.14 The common good defined by the 
leaders of Puritan Massachusetts would naturally differ from that of slave-
holding Virginia, from Quaker Pennsylvania, and from heterogeneous New 
York with its substantial Dutch population.
Understandings of conscience and casuistry likewise varied regionally. 
New England Puritans, Rhode Islander dissidents inspired by Roger Wil-
11 See, e. g., Herzog (2004); Herzog (1995).
12 Herzog (2015); Herzog (2003); Owensby (2008); De Solórzano Pereira (1996) 206–275 
(Indian labor requirements).
13 Fitzmaurice (2003) 77.
14 Miller (1994) 2–3, 21–87.
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liams, and Pennsylvania Quakers, far more than settlers in the slaveholding 
south, made conscience a central category of their political life and legal 
culture and studied casuistical (or “cases of conscience”) literature. Histor-
ians consequently either organize studies of early American conscience and 
casuistry by colony or make sure to elucidate the differences among the 
settlements.15 Along with Connecticut and New Haven colonies, but dis-
tinct from settlements outside of New England, Massachusetts drew on the 
judicial law of Moses to establish the obligations of conscience.16 Massachu-
setts’ ministers and magistrates used casuistical reasoning to reconcile the 
godly mission of their colony with the practical exigencies of reason of state, 
including the need to maintain religious unity. They held that the state 
might coerce dissenters from Puritan fundamentals on the grounds that 
these wayward settlers had sinned against their own conscience. Roger Wil-
liams, exiled out of Massachusetts to help found Rhode Island, famously 
drew the opposite conclusion and denied the right of the civil magistrates to 
pressure Christian believers whose conscience led them to minority views. 
William Penn, the organizer of Pennsylvania, synthesized the leading argu-
ments for religious liberty of conscience circulating in mid-seventeenth cen-
tury England and adjusted them for a colonial context – believing, for 
example, that tolerance would encourage responsible people to immigrate 
to his colony and would reduce the factionalism epidemic in new settle-
ments.17 The regional rather than continental nature of the legal-intellectual 
history of the British Empire before the middle third of the eighteenth 
century is a subset of – and further proof of – the absence of a common 
legal order, of a derecho británico indiano.
But by the mid-eighteenth century, pronounced regional variations be-
gan to abate. Consider natural law. The law of nature supplied arguments 
deployed across the different colonies to justify English sovereignty over 
North America and the rules for dispossessing native Americans.18 Regional 
variation occurred when leaders of the various colonies drew on natural law 
15 For examples of the former, see Mosse (1957) [Massachusetts]; Morgan (1967) 130–142 
[Rhode Island]; Gaustad (1991) [Rhode Island]; Dunn (1967) [Pennsylvania]. For an 
example of the latter, see, e. g., Murphy (2001).
16 On which, see Ross (2012).
17 Mosse (1957) 88–106, 132–145; Murphy (2001) 48–55, 58–60, 173–181.
18 Fitzmaurice (2003) 137–149, 158; Pagden (1995); Tomlins (2010) 93–132; Yirush (2011) 
12–13.
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to discern the obligations of conscience or to define the common good in 
their differing communities.19 By the middle third of the eighteenth century, 
these uses subsided while settlers resisting an intrusive British Empire 
increasingly drew on natural law as a resource against the Crown and impe-
rial administrators. Colonists claimed that their natural right to migrate to 
America, enter upon its unimproved open lands, and form political societies 
implied a further right to dispossess natives beyond what the Crown would 
allow and to claim the full protection of English common law against royal 
and proprietary efforts to limit its applicability. In the decade of agitation 
leading to the American Revolution, controversialists included natural law 
among their arsenal of arguments.20 From the mid-eighteenth century 
onward, then, variations in the use and interpretation of natural law tracked 
more onto political factions (prerogative vs. popular parties and Whig vs. 
Tory) than onto regions, as was the case in the seventeenth century. There 
was, in short, at least a partial convergence among regions in their treatment 
of natural law. This convergence encouraged scholars to write legal-intellec-
tual histories of the Revolutionary era less in regional frameworks than on a 
continental-wide scale (in the style of Spanish American legal-intellectual 
historiography). With this in mind, we might ask whether the term “con-
vergence” meaningfully describes the overall direction of change in other 
aspects of British American legal culture, and in Spanish American law.
III. Trajectories of Change in Spanish and British American Law
The initially regional organization of the British American legal systems 
powerfully shapes the story that scholars tell about the transition of colonial 
law from the seventeenth to eighteenth century. The perceived trajectory of 
change differs significantly from that in Spanish America. Let us start with 
the latter. Historians of Spanish American law speak of how a framework 
established by roughly the 1570s underwent a long, gradual period of stabi-
lization, maturation, or consolidation until, arguably, the 1750s. The derecho 
indiano in the center of this picture underwent, it is said, continual but 
incremental change. Tau’s history of the relative shift from casuistical to 
19 Adding to the complexity, minority ethnic groups such as the Germans cultivated differ-
ently inflected understandings of natural law. See Roeber (2001).
20 Botein (1980); Wright (1931) 13–99; Yirush (2011) 17, 138, 156, 223–258.
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systematic reasoning might be read in this vein. So, too, accounts of the 
greater professionalization of Spanish American law, with the multiplication 
of letrados as judges or as “judicial advisors.”21
The dominant narratives of change deployed by British American legal 
historians are more dynamic in that they feature a rupture, or a significant 
reorientation, of the colonial legal systems between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The most important of these stories is “anglicization.” 
This development has two parts. The first concerns an alteration in dispute 
resolution and the character of litigation. Few trained lawyers immigrated to 
seventeenth century America. The colonial court systems were overwhelm-
ingly staffed not by legal professionals but by laymen who administered 
nontechnical, arbitral, and discretionary justice and brushed aside inconven-
ient ordinances. Magistrates selected more for their social prominence than 
their legal competence praised fairness and looked down on legal “niceties.” 
Settlers concentrated on the substance of disputes and dispensed with the 
intricacies of English legal procedure, with its complicated rules of pleading 
and obscure terms of art. Community leaders commonly valued arbitration 
over litigation. By the late seventeenth century, important elements of this 
inherited system were under stress. The rate of litigation increased faster than 
population in the eighteenth century. Where neighbors might arbitrate dis-
agreements in order to restore peace in a face-to-face community, population 
growth and dispersion and the expansion of long-distance trade and credit 
networks meant that more disputes arose among strangers “at arm’s length” 
determined to prevail at trial even at the cost of fracturing relationships. 
Commercialization, especially trans-Atlantic trade, created pressures for a 
more predictable, more lawyerly and formal legal system, one more attentive 
to English precedents and procedures. As tribunals increasingly respected 
rather than recoiled from legal technicality, litigants found it in their interest 
to hire lawyers who dissected pleadings and sought delays and reviews. This 
further undermined the simplicity and accessibility of colonial justice. The 
colonial legal system became more like England’s, became more “anglicized,” 
as it moved from a “communal, informal mode of resolving disputes to a 
rationalized, lawyerly,” technical mode.22
21 Bravo Lira (1989) 11–37; Haring (1963) 69–70; Muro Orejón (1970); Tau (1992b); 
Zorraquín Becú (1994) 416.
22 Botein (1981); Dayton (1995); Dayton (1993) 10 [quote in Dayton (1995)]; Hoffer
(1998) 76–85, 93–97; Mann (1987); Murrin (1983); Rosen (1992). Although these inter-
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The British colonies “anglicized” in a second way in that their intensely 
regional legal cultures lost some of their distinctiveness and converged 
towards the legal order of England. The Puritan commitments of New 
England, the Quaker experiment in Pennsylvania, the Dutch heritage and 
the Stuart monarchs’ absolutist initiatives in New York, and the Catholic 
presence in Maryland faded in the eighteenth century, losing their seven-
teenth century salience. Although marked economic, social and demo-
graphic differences continued to divide the regions of eighteenth century 
British North America, increasing imperial oversight of colonial lawmaking 
and judicature reduced the distinctiveness of regional legal orders. The king’s 
Privy Council began taking appeals from colonial courts and vetting legis-
lation. Britain appointed English barristers as judges on supreme tribunals 
and introduced customs inspectors, admiralty judges, and other imperial 
administrators into the colonies. Through these mechanisms the Empire 
reconfigured colonial judiciaries along more uniform and hierarchical lines, 
eliminated the appellate jurisdiction of Assemblies, and suppressed practices 
that were too puritan, Quaker or Dutch or that interfered with imperial 
control of trade and the royal prerogative. This partial convergence of region-
al legal orders was part of a larger North American anglicization noticeable 
in the formation of a deeper, more self-conscious British identity and the 
growing resemblance of elite culture and values, military structures, and 
consumption patterns across the colonies and the metropolis.23
Comparing the dynamic transformations captured by the rubric of “angli-
cization” to the incremental changes of the derecho indiano in the mature 
Spanish American Empire suggests two (somewhat speculative) hypotheses – 
one brief, and one more extensive. To begin with, might we suppose that the 
eighteenth-century British colonies not only converged towards each other 
and towards England but also towards the Spanish Empire by developing 
certain features of a collective legal order, this hitherto missing analogue to 
related processes have been taken as evidence of the “anglicization” of colonial law, im-
portant elements of them have also been organized under other rubrics, such as legal 
“modernization.” On the latter, see the debate between Priest (2001), and Mann (2002), 
and Priest’s reply, ibid., 1881–1887.
23 Botein (1983) 50–67; Breen (1984) 221–223; Breen (1986); Greene (1988) 170–177; 
Murrin (1966). To be sure, regional legal orders only partially converged. On the impor-
tance of communications patterns in preserving some measure of diversity among the 
colonies’ legal orders, see Ross (2008).
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the derecho indiano? In eighteenth century British America, institutional 
forms grew more similar among the regions; the Empire articulated more 
elaborate choice of law rules for meshing metropolitan legal norms with 
settler norms, backed up by a more intrusive imperial review of legislation 
and adjudication and provision for appeals to a crown council; and finally, 
Britain engaged in more direct regulation of colonial society through parlia-
mentary legislation, gubernatorial instructions, and crown-controlled tribu-
nals such as vice-admiralty courts. These developments are reminiscent of 
analogous features in the derecho indiano. Perhaps some measure of conver-
gence between the Spanish and British empires occurred in the eighteenth 
century as elements of a collective legal order emerged that were absent or 
muted in the regionally distinctive seventeenth century English colonies 
living under a lax empire. Although no derecho británico indiano existed on 
the eve of the American Revolution, were there intimations of one?24
I will develop my second (speculative) hypothesis at greater length. British 
American anglicization is about the reorientation of a legal order on account 
of powerful social forces: population growth and dispersal, greater partici-
pation in transatlantic trade, and a newly intrusive English Empire. Was 
there an analogy in the Spanish Empire – a story about the recreation of a 
legal order under the pressure of profound demographic, political, and 
economic change? In search of this story, we should look not at the settler 
side of the derecho indiano (which featured consolidation and incremental 
change), but at the Indian side. The Spanish Empire famously used law and 
bureaucracy to regulate the lives of indigenous peoples – to calibrate their 
tribute and labor requirements, to gather together dispersed Indians through 
congregaciones, and to develop semi-autonomous governance under Spanish 
oversight in the republic of the Indios. Within this general framework, there 
were specific ways in which the changing relationship of the derecho indiano
24 What I am suggesting is related to, but ultimately different than, the convergence of the 
political cultures of the two empires in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth 
century observed by historians. Venality and creolization of officeholding in Spanish 
America granted settlers a larger degree of self-rule. Meanwhile, the pressures of a more 
intrusive British Empire encouraged English settlers to learn how to lobby and manipu-
late an imperial bureaucracy. As a result, the differences in British and Spanish American 
political culture narrowed. Elliott (2006) 378–379. By contrast, I have sketched out – 
really, speculated about – a (partial) convergence in the legal orders of the two empires.
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to indigenous peoples between the mid-sixteenth and mid-eighteenth cen-
tury brings to mind elements of the anglicization story.
First,“anglicization” refers to the transformation of litigation in the North 
American colonies, a move towards a more technical, lawyerly, and formal 
system, one more responsive to English precedents and procedures. Indige-
nous communities in Spanish America underwent a (partial) Hispaniciza-
tion in how they handled disputes. As is well known, natives became adept 
at using Spanish legal tools, from petitions and lawsuits to appeals and 
amparos, in order to protect communal lands, participate in newly formed 
private land markets, reduce tribute and labor exactions, defend against the 
overreaching of officials, and mediate political conflicts.25 As Indians grew 
more knowledgeable about Spanish law, they began to import into their 
legal affairs and governance of their own communities Spanish procedures 
and concepts learned in conflicts with settlers and imperial officials. One sees 
this in land records used within Nahua communities, in conflicts among 
ethnic groups and Andean ayllus, and in disputes about succession to major 
chieftainships. Native commoners appealed to Spanish legal concepts and 
tribunals when fighting to reduce duties owed to Indian notables. Indige-
nous governadores and alcaldes mixed native usages with Spanish legalisms 
when they judged other Indians or conducted residencias for Indian offi-
cials.26 By the end of the seventeenth century, lawyers needed to do less 
translating of the accounts of indigenous complainants and witnesses into 
Spanish legal categories as natives became more familiar with legalistic ter-
minology.27 To look at these developments comparatively is to notice that 
indigenous internalization of Spanish legal procedures and concepts, what 
Tau provocatively calls “mestizaje jurídico,” resembles anglicization in certain 
respects.28 For anglicization likewise involved both an external dimension 
(the deployment of English legal technicalities by settlers disputing with 
imperial officials) and an internal dimension (the refashioning of settlers’ 
legal culture as they became habituated to more lawyerly and formal English 
legal procedures and concepts).
25 Kellogg (1995) 13, 51; Owensby (2008) 20, 41–44, 88–89, 95–100, 127–128, 137–140, 
157, 295–93; Stern (1993) 116–119.
26 Gibson (1964) 180–181; Lockhart (1992) 166–167; Stern (1993) 132–134.
27 Kellogg (1995) 13, 82.
28 Tau (1997) 102.
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Second, anglicization alludes to a more “English” style of governance in 
the colonies. This involved the creation of more hierarchical judiciaries, the 
elimination of Assembly appellate jurisdiction, and the displacement of 
some measure of Creole control by the appointment of customs inspectors, 
vice-admiralty judges, and English barristers in the colonial supreme courts. 
By the latter seventeenth century, the Crown not only began accepting 
appeals from colonial supreme courts, but demanded that statutes be sent 
for vetting, which could lead to editing or abrogation. The Board of Trade 
sent questionnaires to the colonies asking about their laws and customs, a 
proactive way of beginning the process of inspection. As Spanish American 
historians have detailed, over time Castile pressed for a more intrusive gov-
ernance of indigenous communities. This occurred in stages. From the mid-
sixteenth century onward, the Empire drew on models of Spanish municipal 
government to impose cabildos with alcaldes and regidores on native com-
munity units.29 The imperial bureaucracy from the local corregidor through 
the Council of the Indies scrutinized indigenous customs and bylaws, reserv-
ing the right to eliminate native usages that violated natural law, reason, or 
Christian doctrine. The Empire’s screening process did only extend to usages 
brought before its tribunals. Crown officials interviewed Indian elders and 
conducted ethnographic and historical surveys in order to determine – and 
begin the triage of – native customs.30 By the latter eighteenth century, in 
some parts of Spanish America, newly appointed local officials answerable to 
the Crown intervened more extensively into Indian affairs within native 
communities. Subdelegates and jueces españoles inserted among the Yucatan 
Mayans increasingly adjudicated intra-Indian disputes that previously would 
have been handled by native leaders.31 Viewing these developments with an 
eye on the anglicization of British North American colonial governance 
reveals some intriguing similarities. In both cases, one sees the (partial) 
reordering of governing structures along metropolitan lines; a modest shift 
from indirect to direct rule through the appointment of officials more 
responsive to imperial priorities than to local audiences; and the vetting of 
29 Gibson (1964) 166–181; Horn (1997) 44–85; Lockhart (1992) 28–58.
30 Borah (1983) 43; Tau (2001) 134–143.
31 Farriss (1984) 355–366. In other areas, such as New Spain, the Bourbon reforms do not 
appear to have made much difference in the governance of Indian communities. Gibson
(1966) 173.
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locally generated customs and bylaws, both reactively (as a byproduct of 
litigation and appeals) and proactively (through crown-initiated surveys 
and questionnaires).
Third and finally, anglicization refers to the fading distinctiveness of the 
legal cultures in the English colonies and the convergence of those legal 
cultures toward each other and toward England. The strictures of the derecho 
indiano likewise pushed for a (partial) convergence of the distinct indigenous 
legal cultures among the Nahuas, the Yucatan Mayas, and the Andean peo-
ples. Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the wide variety of insti-
tutional forms that had previously obtained among indigenous towns and 
villages in Mexico, the Yucatan, and the Andes were subordinated as the 
Spanish imposed upon native communities throughout the Americas an 
administrative structure modeled on Castilian municipal government: the 
cabildo with its alcaldes, regidores, escrivanos, and other minor officials. Like 
their Spanish counterparts, Indian officers in all of these regions came to 
enjoy legal authority – as a formal matter – because of their connection to 
the king rather than by hereditary succession. Indian hierarchical chains of 
command reaching downward from the provincial level withered away.32 As 
indigenous governance withdrew from provincial networks to concentrate 
in cabildos with structural similarities throughout the Americas, as Indian 
officials traced the source of their power back to the Crown, as native 
judicature and administration increasingly incorporated Spanish legal con-
cepts and looked upwards to imperial tribunals and councils for appeals and 
redress of grievances, then the legal cultures of Nahua, Yucatan, and Andean 
communities began to look more like each other, and somewhat more like 
Castile, than they had at the time of conquest. At least to some extent, they 
converged. Let me be clear about what I am not saying: that indigenous 
communities and the colonies of British North America were socially or 
legally similar. Instead, more modestly, I claim that there were suggestive 
parallels in their direction of movement – in the “convergence” that each 
underwent and in the transformations they experienced in dispute resolu-
tion and governance structures. If this is true, might scholars of British 
American law looking to establish a Spanish American comparative perspec-
32 Farriss (1984) 148–150, 158–159; Gibson (1964) 166–167; Owensby (2008) 37, 212–213, 
227.
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tive on their dominant narrative of legal “anglicization” be better served by 
looking to the experience of indigenous peoples than of Castilian settlers?
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Revisiting the America’s Colonial Status
under the Spanish Monarchy
Most historians focused on the Americas have assumed the colonial status of 
Spanish America. With some exceptions, which will be mentioned through-
out this paper, the period between the conquest and independence of Span-
ish America is described as “colonial” and, thus, included in the long-term 
history of the phenomenon of colonialism in the world.1 Within this com-
mon framework, there are different interpretations of the nature of this 
colonial relationship, its degree of continuity with 19th-Century colonial 
experiences, or the relatively typical character of colonial societies in the 
Americas between the 16th and 18th Centuries. This is not the place to 
reconstruct the genealogy of this interpretation of colonial Spanish America, 
even though there is no doubt about the role that post-colonial discourse has 
had and continues to have in its consolidation.2 In post-colonial discourse, 
the colonial nature is a heuristic tool in the hands of historians, a starting 
point for a historical study ultimately conceived as the deconstruction of 
discourses that mask and reproduce dynamics of power and control between 
European powers and colonized countries.3
The starting point in this paper is different. The colonial nature of the 
relationship between the so-called West Indies and the Crown of Castile is 
the subject of study, rather than an assumption. Our purpose is to try to 
offer, from legal history, a new reading of Spanish colonialism that could 
lead to a more accurate interpretation of Latin American history. To this 
end, it is worth reflecting on the historiographical categories we are using 
to define the “political” status of American territories under the Spanish 
1 A typical example of the assumption of this “colonial paradigm” is the title of the well-
documented work by Woseber (2003). The author does not explain why she uses the 
phrase “Colonial Domination” as the title for her work. Its appropriateness is taken for 
granted.
2 For the formation of post-colonialism and its different projections, see Young (2001).
3 In this sense the question is revisited. Mabel Moraña / Jáuregui (2008).
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Monarchy and particularly on the preunderstandings and explanatory con-
sequences of the “colonial” interpretation of this historical period.
We will begin by critically rebuilding the debate on the political status of 
the Indies which Ricardo Levene started in Argentina in 1951 (I). We will 
deal with the major contributions to the subject, and we will focus on the 
theses supported by another Argentine in the 1970s, Ricardo Zorraquín 
Becú, and on the debate on the subject published in the journal Nuevo 
Mundo, Mundos Nuevos in 2004. Next, we will discuss the place occupied 
by the Indies under the Spanish Monarchy from a diachronic perspective 
that addresses the changes that both Spanish America and the Court under-
went during the Modern Age (II). Finally, we will conclude with some 
thoughts that hopefully will help shed some light on this historiographical 
debate (III).
I. From Las Indias no eran Colonias [The Indies were not Colonies]
to the Livre noir du colonialisme [The Black Book of Colonialism]
1. Levene’s proposal: Las Indias no eran Colonias
Sixty years have elapsed since Ricardo Levene contested the treatment of 
colonies which historiography gave – and continues to give – to the Spanish 
dominions in the Americas during the Modern Age.4 The publication of the 
Argentine historian’s theses, condensed into the title of his work Las Indias 
no eran Colonias, gave end to a series of actions promoted by Levene that 
were favorably received by the Argentine National Academy of History for 
the first time in 1948. Their aim was to replace the term “colonial” with 
other terms that evidence the full integration of Spanish America into the 
Spanish Monarchy as “provinces, kingdoms, dominions, republics (the latter 
term, in the etymological sense).”5 Levene's work addressed the problem 
4 Levene (1951).
5 Levene (1951) 10. On 2 October 1948, the Argentine National Academy of History de-
bated the proposal put forward by its president whereby he “suggested that the authors of 
works of research, abstracts or texts on history of the Americas and of Argentina, substi-
tute the expression ‘colonial period’ for ‘period of Spanish rule and civilization,’” among 
others. Finally, the proposal was accepted, with Ravignani’s dissenting opinion, although 
the expression ‘Hispanic period’ was favored to the one originally put forward. The min-
utes are transcribed at the end of Levene (1951) 153–156.
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from a strong legal positivist perspective. In his argument, the Argentine 
historian attached special significance to the laws promulgated by Castilian 
Monarchs, in particular to the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias [Compilation of 
the Law of the Indies].6
These Argentine pronouncements were echoed in Spain immediately.7
In 1949, the First Hispanic-American Conference on History agreed to name 
the colonial period “period of Spanish rule.” In 1954, the Instituto Gonzalo 
Fernández de Oviedo, affiliated to the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas [Higher Council for Scientific Research], organized two work 
sessions for its members to discuss the issue. The conclusions they reached 
were somewhat more nuanced than those approved by the Argentine Acad-
emy, but both institutions strongly concurred in matters of substance. 
According to the Institute, the terms used by the Law of the Indies and 
by “Spanish Constitutional law” to refer to the Spanish American territories 
had been “kingdoms,” “domains” or “provinces,” equating them to peninsu-
6 Summarizing the arguments that he would develop throughout the book, Levene stated 
in the preliminary chapter that “The Indies were not colonies, according to express legal 
provisions, because they were incorporated into the Crown of Castile and Leon, accord-
ing to Pontifical concession and to the inspirations of the Catholic Monarchs, and they 
could not be disposed of; because their natives were on a legal par with European Span-
iards and the legitimacy of marriage between them was consecrated; because the descend-
ants of European or Creole Spaniards, and in general the worthy of the Indies, had 
preferential allocation of offices; because the Councils of Castile and of the Indies shared 
the same high political powers; because the provincial or regional institutions of the 
Indies exercised legislative authority; because the kingdoms of Castile and Leon and of 
the Indies belonged to one Crown, and their laws and order of Government had to be as 
similar as possible; because in all the cases where it was not decided what the laws of the 
Indies should provide for, those of Castile would be observed according to the order of 
precedence of the Leyes de Toro [Laws of Toro]; because, finally, the term conquest as 
source of law was removed, and it was replaced by the terms population and pacifica-
tion.” Levene (1951) 10–11.
7 It should be remembered, however, that in 1946 legal historian Alfonso García Gallo had 
published a lecture on “The political constitution of the Spanish Indies,” where he stated 
that legally the Indies constituted a “political entity with independent personality.” Yet, 
this did not mean denying their special bond with Castile to the extent that such close 
bond – as García Gallo pointed out – “sometimes becomes a true merger and the title of 
Kingdoms of the Indies has only an honorific value, such as that of the Kingdoms of 
León, Toledo, Granada, etc., merged into the Crown of Castile.” In addition, he rejected 
the term colonies to refer to the Indies, recalling that the laws referred to them as king-
doms, provinces or, in the 18th Century, domains. García Gallo (1946) 16–17.
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lar terms. Therefore, expressions such as “colonialism,” “colonialist,” “colo-
nist” and “coloniage,” deemed harmful to the dignity of those peoples, could 
not be used to refer to the relationships between both worlds. There was no 
such problem, however, with the terms “colony,” “colonization,” “colonizer” 
and “colonial,” as long as they were used in their technical sense.8 In this 
regard, the Institute was adamant to clearly state the differences between the 
Spanish colonization and modern colonialism, which is why it stated that, 
since the latter had “distorted the pristine meaning” of the above-mentioned 
terms “colony” or “colonization,” they should be used where it was not 
possible to employ other expressions conveying more limited meaning, such 
as “period of Spanish rule,” “Spanish period,” “Hispanic,” “Viceregal,” “Pre-
Viceregal,” “Proto-Viceregal” periods, etc. Finally, considering the overall 
picture of colonization, the Institute stressed the need to highlight the Span-
ish one due to “the high spiritual and human values that characterized it.”9
It is inappropriate to provide here a detailed description of the first 
moment of historiographical discussion brought about by Levene’s initiative 
and its continuation until the mid-1970s, since this has already been duly 
reconstructed by Tau Anzoátegui.10 However, it is relevant to highlight the 
8 As stated in the minutes of the sessions, designating the Spanish American territories as 
kingdoms, provinces or domains in the legal sources did not entail any obstacle for the 
Institute “to place the Spanish action in the Indies within the multiple colonization pro-
cesses that have taken place throughout the history of mankind, though, as stated above, 
valuing its uniqueness, and not diminishing the greatness of the ‘Spanish colonization’ 
period for receiving such designation nor considering it harmful for those States that owe 
the base of their current existence as nations to the referred period.” Acerca del término 
“colonia” (1954) 176.
9 Acerca del término “colonia” (1954) 180. The conclusions of the first session included the 
assertion that Spain had conducted “a colonization process” in the Americas but it had 
“not subjected the Spanish American regions under its rule to a regime of exploitation; 
rather, it gave them a legal personality, and in such legal order the absence of the term 
colony is evident.” Ibid., 159.
10 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 80–92. As stated by Tau, there was active participation in the 
debate by the most prominent specialists of the time – with different political views –, 
such as Ots Capdequí, Rafael Altamira, Alfonso García Gallo, Mario Góngora, Richard 
Konetzke or Demetrio Ramos. Even though there was general consensus with the theses 
supported by the Argentine Academy, there were also dissenting voices. Altamira believed 
it was correct to speak of colonies, in the classical sense of the term, as a result of the 
action of populating, even if the territories were denominated provinces, dominions or 
kingdoms. Ots shared Levene’s proposals, although he rejected equality between Peninsu-
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terms in which the debate was held as well as its ideological background 
because, despite the time elapsed since then, some of these features still 
describe the treatment of this issue.
The debate about whether it was appropriate to use the word “colony” 
was not understood then in purely nominal terms. Implicitly, and some-
times also explicitly, for many participants the subject of debate was not so 
much the place occupied by the Spanish American territories under the 
Spanish Monarchy but the role played by “Spain” in the Americas. The result 
of such dispute, which seems related to the one involving other actors in the 
18th Century,11 appeared fraught with political consequences on both sides 
of the Atlantic. What was at stake in Argentina and in other countries in the 
Americas was the prominent role that the Hispanic world should play in 
defining the Nations in the Americas. Levene recognized this clearly in the 
preface to his work of 1951 by stating that the “history of the Americas 
begins with that of Spain, our spiritual ascent and whose roots connect us 
with the remote origins of civilization.”12 In this regard, the Argentine his-
torian not only excluded from such historical past indigenous cultures, alien 
to that historical context through which the Americas connected with “civ-
ilization” (which could only be European), but also linked the debate about 
the nature of colonial Spanish domination directly to their present, because 
ultimately the Americas had their spiritual origin and roots in Spain.
Therefore, it was not a terminological problem. The attempt to remove 
the term “colonies” from historical vocabulary did not respond to mere 
academic reasons. In the words of Levene himself, “It is not a mere question 
of logomachy or discussion where attention is focused solely on the word 
rather than on the issue itself. […]. It is about providing evidence, as it is 
done in this book of historical synthesis, of the legal and political values of 
Spanish rule – surely not viewed through the glow of the red legend rather 
lar and Spanish American inhabitants, without this implying any present political state-
ments. According to Mario Góngora, it was right to use the term colonial when one 
meant transferring a population nucleus to another territory. However, the relevance of 
its economic sense required further research. Ibid.
11 It is no coincidence that the “colonial issue” was raised precisely in the 18th Century, in 
an intellectual context marked by European Enlightenment conceptions of Spanish Amer-
ica and their Creole response. See Gerbi (1973); and Cañizares-Esguerra (2001).
12 Levene (1951) 9.
Revisiting the America’s Colonial Status under the Spanish Monarchy 33
than the black one –, values that provide the foundation for the thesis that 
the Indies were not colonies.”13
In Spain, the debate was also framed in terms of approval or condemna-
tion of the work done in the Americas. Those were the early years of the 
Francoist State. The political context favored a nationalist reading of the 
history of the conquest and incorporation of the Indies into the Spanish 
Monarchy.14 However, this did not lead – as we have seen – to the outright 
condemnation of the term “colony.” From an analysis of the different mean-
ings that the term had received throughout history, it seemed reasonable to 
conclude that it could be used to designate the Spanish American territories 
provided it was not used pejoratively, i. e., identifying it with the mere 
economic exploitation of the New World.15 Hence, it can be stated that 
the debate started by Levene was basically about the historical and cultural 
identity of Spanish American Nations and, at the same time, about the 
historical action of Spain in the Indies. In this sense, the starting point 
was patriotic essentialism: in Francoist Spain, in the most radical nationalist 
terms, even though (or perhaps because of it) what they tried to defend was 
the Old Empire; in Argentina, it was the defense of a Hispanic identity.
On the other hand, though the participants in this first debate were 
historians, in most cases the approach suffered from a certain lack of atten-
tion both to the historicity of the issue raised, as to the proper subject of 
study. In this regard, the image portrayed of the territorial status of the Indies 
under the Spanish Monarchy quite resembled a static photo whose detailed 
observation might resolve the issues raised. Thus, unconsciously, not only 
was the evolution of the relationship between the Crown and its dominions 
in the Americas over time dispensed with, but also the historicity of “both 
subjects.” Spain and the Americas were presented as compact entities with 
little historical evolution from the 16th to the 18th Century. Accordingly, 
also the relations between them and their projection in the status of the 
13 Levene (1951) 10.
14 However, such nationalist reading of the Americas’ history did not start with the new 
Francoist regime; rather, it was common to political and academic elites of every political 
party since the late 19th Century. Feros (2005).
15 Acerca del término “colonia” (1954). The only dissenting opinion appearing on a sum-
mary of the debates was that of the Ukrainian historian Juan Friede, who defended the 
existence of a “colonization phenomenon,” understood also as “material exploitation of 
the indigenous people by the civilizing people.” Ibid., 158.
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Indies, whether colonial or not, had to be unique and constant during these 
three Centuries, which in no way prevented a detailed and precise exposition 
of the development of the Law of the Indies over time or of the institutional 
apparatus set up for their government. The “timelessness” of the adopted 
perspective influenced a deeper level, that of the assumptions underpinning 
the whole discourse.
Thirdly, it is noteworthy that this academic debate had little significance 
in both Anglo-Saxon and Latin historiographical production, despite the 
implications of its proposals. Indeed, it did not lead to the elimination of 
the concept of colony. At best, it hardly raised awareness of the semantic 
density of the concept and of the implications of using the term uncritically.
2. Zorraquín Becú’s contribution
With the emergence of economic history in the analysis of Spanish Ameri-
can reality, brought about by the Annales School, the word “colony” was 
undisputedly placed at the heart of studies on Spanish America. The debate 
initiated by Levene was largely set aside. From an economic standpoint, the 
binomial metropolis-colony offered an interpretive framework that was tak-
en for granted.16 In the few cases where this was noted, it was to confirm, 
without any reservation, the relevance of this framework of “colonial” 
understanding.17
Zorraquín Becú made his contribution to the debate in this new historio-
graphical context. He believed that the problem of the “constitutional sta-
tus” of the New World under the Spanish Monarchy was the most important 
problem of the Law of the Indies. However, not many authors had looked at 
16 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 90–91. Tau provides Ruggiero Romano’s position as a paradig-
matic example, since the latter referred to the term colony and the resulting colonial 
dependence as a “fact of general economy.” Ibid., 91.
17 Tandeter reopened the debate in economic history, not to refute the colonial assumption 
of these studies but to evidence the lack of theoretical characterization of colonial depend-
ency for the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries. The fact that this was a purely colonial 
relationship was unquestionable. Moreover, Tandeter believed that the debate on the col-
onial nature of the Indies was a mere continuation of the work of Hispanophile historians 
trying to offer a positive global view of Spain’s action in the Americas. According to this 
author, “Thus develops the pernicious polemic that denies the nature of colonies to the 
Indies under the Spanish rule.” Tandeter (1976) 156.
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it or, at least, not in depth.18 Spurred by this conviction, Zorraquín pre-
sented a paper on this topic at the Second Venezuelan Conference of His-
tory, held in Caracas in 1974, which was published in the collected papers of 
the Conference19 and in the journal Revista de Historia del Derecho.20 Sub-
sequently, he included it in his Estudios de Historia del Derecho.21
According to Zorraquín, the question of the political status of the Indies 
should be answered by resorting to “facts and laws,” and not to the theories 
of those who took part in the controversies over the Indies in the 16th 
Century or to modern views. Thus, from the very beginning, he established 
the limits within which he would analyze the problem. This did not prevent 
him, however, from carrying out well-documented work with interpretation 
proposals which are largely valid today.
The specific issues he intended to resolve were the political status of the 
Indies in the Monarchy, the nature of their incorporation to Castile and the 
institutional consequences that followed.22 With this aim in view, Zorra-
quín organized his work into four parts, each corresponding to a specific 
historical period: The first part dealt with the Indies as dominions of the 
Catholic Monarchs, and covered the period between their discovery and the 
death of Ferdinand the Catholic (pages 61–79); the second part, entitled “the 
Indies as decentralized provinces of Castile,” covered from the incorporation 
of the Indies to the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty (pages 80–133); 
the third part, “The progressive centralization of the Monarchy,” finished 
with the abdication of Bayonne and the entry of Napoleonic troops into 
the Peninsula (pages 134–143); and the fourth part focused on the crisis of 
the Monarchy (pages 144–161).
As already established by historiography, Zorraquín verified that the 
Indies had been joined to Castile in the form of an accessory union. In 
practice, this meant political, legal and economic dependence on the King-
dom of Castile.23 Thus, there was no equal footing with Castile or integra-
18 Zorraquín Becú (1988) 55.
19 Zorraquín Becú (1975).
20 Zorraquín Becú (1974).
21 Zorraquín Becú (1988) 55–161.
22 Ibid. 59–60.
23 Zorraquín summarized the dependence of the Indies on the Kingdom of Castile in eight 
points: They could not decide on the election, recognition or acceptance of the King; they 
did not have their own Courts as other kingdoms of the Monarchy; they were not in-
36 Rafael D. García Pérez
tion into the Spanish Monarchy comparable to that of other kingdoms. 
Spanish America was subordinated to European politics and not vice versa. 
Nevertheless, Zorraquín believed that the Indies could not be considered 
colonies for two main reasons: Firstly, because Spanish American territories 
were not deprived of their own government and, in addition, a special law 
was created for them; secondly, because the term “colonies”, understood as 
“mere dependencies exploited by another State”, was anachronistic with 
regard to the New World. The meaning given to this term, therefore, was 
the Roman Classical and, as such, it rarely appeared in the laws of the Indies. 
On account of the foregoing, Zorraquín considered that the Indies were in 
an intermediate situation: they were not totally subordinate to Castile, nor 
did they enjoy perfect autonomy, comparable to that of the kingdoms joined 
to the Spanish Monarchy. In the absence of a categorization in the language 
of pre-modern times, Zorraquín spoke of “decentralized entities of the Cas-
tilian administration,” in the understanding that it was a territorial and self-
regulating decentralization due to the high degree of self-government they 
attained, despite imposed centralism on the government by the Council of 
the Indies. To sum up his position, he wrote that “there was self-regulation in 
the region as a whole with regard to Castile, centralism imposed by the 
Council on the New World, and decentralization if the existence of each 
of the major regions into which the Indies were divided was taken into 
account.”24
It follows from the paragraph titles of the Laws of 1681, that the Indies 
had developed from dominions to acquire the legal status of provinces. 
Zorraquín formulated his interpretation on the latter concept – deeply 
rooted in history – emphasizing the contrast between the autonomy 
achieved by the Spanish American provinces during the 16th and 17th 
Centuries and the process of “centralization” imposed on them since the 
volved in the government of the whole of the Monarchy nor were they incorporated into 
the common organs of the Empire; decisions regarding international treaties and wars, 
even if affecting the Americas, were made in Europe; the most significant decisions con-
cerning the Law of the Indies were taken without participation of residents or local 
authorities; both the King and the most important organs of government of the Indies 
were located in Castile and were subject to Castilian influence; senior officers, both in the 
Court and in Spanish America were of peninsular origin; and finally, there was trade 
monopoly with Castile. Zorraquín Becú (1988) 106.
24 Zorraquín Becú (1988) 107–113.
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18th Century. This policy ended with the crisis of the Monarchy and the 
creation of the new Nations after their independence. Hence, Zorraquín’s 
interpretation seemed to emphasize, without saying so expressly, the tensions 
that the contemplation of the government system of the Indies as a whole 
revealed. On the one hand, he noted a clear dependence on Castile together 
with the existence of some territories vested with a certain political and legal 
personality. On the other hand, he spoke of centralization being apparent in 
judicial and governmental institutions in the Court, particularly the Coun-
cil, along with undeniable autonomy of operation in Spanish America.
In my opinion, one of Zorraquín’s greatest achievements was to perceive 
these contrasts. To this we must add, as Tau has pointed out, the adoption of 
a dynamic perspective materialized in the division into four historical peri-
ods and – following Demetrio Ramos on this – 25 the relevance given to the 
term “Province” as the historically most appropriate term to refer to the 
Spanish American territories.26
However, and without detracting from Zorraquín’s work of historical 
clarification, his use of Public Law categories coined in the 19th Century 
for the construction of the modern liberal state, such as centralization or 
decentralization, led to the concealment of key dimensions of the political 
structuring of the Indies under the Spanish Monarchy. Unconsciously, Zor-
raquín’s conception of power was essentially vertical, statist and monolithic, 
fundamentally alien to the legal culture that governed the formation and 
development of the Old Regime Monarchies. In this regard, but with more 
elegance, Tau has said that “using modern notions, conceived by political 
theory for the contemporary State, to refer to the past […] entails accepting 
the idea that the State – in this case the Monarchy – is created and organized 
top down projecting fundamental rules and actions on all levels, even the 
smallest and most remote.”27 Therefore, Tau understands that this vision 
must be completed with one that assumes Spanish American diversity 
derived from geographical, temporal or spatial situation, and the existence 
of “a plurality of small powers and jurisdictions that operate outside the 
25 See Ramos Pérez (1959) 36–39. For this author, the term “Province” in its fundamental 
meaning, connected with Roman tradition and post-independence history, could be ap-
plied to the whole Monarchy, all kingdoms being provinces at the same time.
26 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 97, 101–102 and 120.
27 Ibid. 113.
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central government.”28 In the Americas, it was essentially on these “small 
powers and jurisdictions” that the government system was articulated, so 
this perspective ought to be the starting point of any interpretation seeking 
to explain the place occupied by the Indies under the Spanish Monarchy to 
reconstruct, bottom up, the political order in the Indies as well.
3. Le livre noir du colonialisme [The Black Book of Colonialism] and
the reopening of the debate
The online journal Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos took advantage of the 
publication of The Black Book of Colonialism by Marc Ferro in 2003 to 
reopen the debate on the colonial issue in Latin America.29 Rather than 
“reopening a debate”, it would be more appropriate to say opening a new 
one, since, except for Garavaglia, none of the participants echoed the various 
viewpoints put forward by legal historiography since the 1950s. And, even in 
the case of Garavaglia, the reference was aimed exclusively at Levene, and his 
tone was rather light and contemptuous.
Nonetheless, the debate was not totally alien to the legal historical per-
spective, even though other approaches prevailed, closer to the new political 
history or to economic history. Of particular relevance was the participation 
of Annick Lempérière30 in this debate and the responses that her work 
prompted from Carmen Bernand and Juan Carlos Garavaglia.
The question Lempérière asked, and which guided her reflection, was 
about the ability of the terms “colony” and “colonial” to adequately describe 
any phenomenon regarding the Spanish dominions in the Americas 
between the 16th and 19th Centuries. As this historian pointed out, this 
practice – introduced by exponents of European Enlightenment such as 
Raynal or Robertson – was broadly welcome in the independence speech. 
It was used to reject en masse the period of ownership by the Spanish Crown 
28 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 113.
29 “Para seguir con el debate en torno al colonialismo …,” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos, 
Debates (2004), http://nuevomundo.revues.org/430, posted 08/02/2005. Participants in the 
debate as follows: Sallmann (2004); Subrahmanyam (2004); Lempérière (2004a); Ber-
nand (2004); Gordillo (2004); Garavaglia (2004).
30 A corrected version of this paper was later published under the title El paradigma colonial 
en la historiografía latinoamericanista: Lempérière (2004b). Quotations correspond to 
this version.
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and to lay the ideological foundations of the new Nations. Thus, Creole 
patriots, once vassals, now became colonized, and the term colony acquired 
a negative connotation. This tradition of thought joined the anti-colonial 
critique of the last third of the 19th Century, which brought about a re-
interpretation of the period of Spanish rule in the Americas as “first modern 
imperialism” or caused such period to be set as the starting point of “Euro-
pean colonialism.”
Lempérière believes it is necessary to reconvey the historical sense of 
concepts in order to avoid anachronistic readings of the past, particularly 
of the so-called Old Regime societies. From her perspective, it is inappro-
priate to use the term colonization in a sense other than the traditional one – 
devoid of negative connotation – when referring to any time prior to the 
19th Century. The French historian stresses the need for conceptualizing this 
period of American history by taking into account the space and time coor-
dinates of the creation of these new political communities. Thus, and based 
on the social or sociological aspect of the “Kingdoms” of the Indies, it is 
Lempérière’s belief that it is possible to resolve the dilemma posed by Levene 
between colonies and kingdoms. For such purpose, it is convenient to inter-
pret from a historical perspective – that is, one open to changes and muta-
tions – a number of concepts from the domain of sociology, such as “repro-
duction,” “integration” or “social control”.31 Further on, we will return to 
this author’s proposals since her thoughts may help us reconsider this debate 
from new viewpoints.
The thesis Lempérière defended was answered directly by Carmen Ber-
nand and, indirectly, without reference to it, by Juan Carlos Garavaglia. 
Bernand, who shares Lempérière’s concern to avoid explanations outside 
their historical context, believes that the terms “colonialism” and “imperial-
ism,” nonetheless, refer to models that are useful to understand Spain’s 
policy in the New World. To that end, Bernand uses “minimalist” definitions 
as a starting point so that the terms “empire” and “imperialism” as well as 
“colonial” or “colonialism” become ideal concepts whose variations may be 
applied to different historical periods. According to the Quillet-Flammarion
dictionary, “imperialism” means “politique par laquelle un grand Etat cherche à 
étendre sa domination;” following the model described by Georges Balandier 
31 Lempérière (2004b) 107–120.
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in 1955, “colonization” is “the imposition of an external power over sub-
jected populations.”32 In Bernand’s opinion, both models may be perfectly 
applied to the Iberian expansion into the New World, without prejudice to 
specific characteristics of each particular case.33
From another perspective, Garavaglia also maintains the existence of a 
“colonial relationship” in the Americas during the Centuries of Spanish rule, 
both from the economic and political points of view. On the economic 
front, Garavaglia studied the constant economic flows from the colonies 
to the metropolis and the hard- labor jobs implemented to extract riches 
for the Crown throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries. On the polit-
ical front, the Argentine historian highlights the contrast between the rights 
the King could have in territories such as Naples or Aragon – of a dynastic 
nature and with limited exercise due to the existence of certain institutions 
and pre-existent rights – from those he enjoyed in Spanish America as a 
result of the conquest of non-Christian peoples. This is why, Garaviglia states, 
it was possible to impose certain rights on Spanish America that would have 
been unthinkable to impose on other territories owned by the Monarchy. In 
this unequal context, any negotiation – in the cases where there was one – 
seemed conditioned by power politics. Not even the feeling of white Spanish 
American elites nurtured by the sense of belonging to the great Spanish 
Nation in the 18th Century could evolve from mere feeling, and, as such, 
was unable to deny the existence of a historical relationship of colonial 
subordination between the Americas and Spain. The Cadiz Parliament, with 
their mechanism for calling elections and their debate on the political rights 
of castes, evidenced once again that equality between both sides of the 
Atlantic was a chimera.34
32 A similarly broad concept of the term “colonial”, although not expressly defined, is the 
one employed, for example, by Benton (2002).
33 Bernand (2004). We cannot stop to consider the thorough development of the arguments 
put forward by Bernand, for which reason we refer the reader to the original text, and the 
same stands for Lempérière’s work and for all the other papers we analyze herein. In her 
paper published in the Black Book of Colonialism, Bernand had argued that even though 
both the imposition of tributes on the indigenous peoples as well as the transfer of a 
substantial portion of Brazil and Spanish America’s wealth to the Iberian Peninsula were 
clear signs of colonial domination, Peru and New Spain were not colonies themselves, 
but kingdoms joined to the Crown, just as Naples or Navarra. Bernand (2003) 138.
34 Garavaglia (2004).
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4. Some conclusions from an endless debate
Levene published his thought-provoking book sixty years ago. We have 
focused our attention on some of the most relevant contributions to this 
debate published since then, but there have been other important reflections 
on this issue. In this regard, the proposal to distinguish (though up to what 
extent is still under discussion) Old Regime colonizations35 from those 
carried out by European powers throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries 
should be highlighted.
Among legal historians, there is agreement on the accessory nature of the 
union between the Indies and the Kingdom of Castile and, accordingly, on 
their legal status as territories belonging to the referred Crown. Based on this 
assumption, Garriga states that “the question about the political status of the 
Indies […] can only be answered […] by maintaining that the Indies had no 
political status per se.” Thus, he tries only to make it clear that, as territories 
added to the Crown of Castile under an accessory union, they lacked a polit-
ical constitution of their own, different from the Castilian one, at the heart 
of the plural Catholic Monarchy.36 In this sense, the colonization of the New 
World was but a replication of the Castilian legal regime in the Americas. 
The new lands were regarded as empty spaces (though it was obvious they 
were not) ready to be legally completed after the Castilian model.37
It would be proper, however, to consider the ability of the legal categories 
of the time and, in particular, the description of the union as accessory, to 
adequately assess the relationship between Spanish America and Castile and, 
ultimately, to define the place the former occupied in the Spanish Monarchy. 
This question, as we will maintain hereinbelow, could help rethink the 
controversial issue of the legal status of the Indies.
35 The expression references a paper by Poloni-Simard (2003).
36 Garriga Acosta (2006).
37 Part of Garriga’s article is focused on the description of this replication of Castile in the 
Indies after the territorialization of the new lands, that is, their conversion into spaces 
endowed with jurisdiction.
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II. An attempt to offer a new reflection on an old question
The first step in renewing a discussion with such opposing positions could 
be to assert its eminently historiographical nature and, therefore, continue 
the debate in academia rather than politics, or any other area characterized 
by ideological struggle. Ever since Levene’s explicit formulation, the debate 
on the political status of the Indies has been followed, in most cases, by an 
implicit value judgment on the legitimacy and fairness of Spanish action in 
the Americas.
Denying the colonial nature of Spanish American territories seemed to 
involve certain approval of, or at least justification for – given the historical 
context –, the abuse of indigenous peoples by the Spaniards. Definitely, it is 
utopian (and likely undesirable) to write history deprived of value judg-
ments. However, that does not mean that we can replace historical analysis 
with ethical judgment or assert the impossibility to distinguish between 
both areas. In other words, and regarding this issue, it should be possible 
to deny the colonial nature of Spanish American territories for the sake of a 
more accurate interpretation in historiographical terms, and in turn recog-
nize, through such historical interpretation, the manifold abuses of native 
American peoples by Castilians, or Spaniards in general, whether European 
or Spanish American, as already distinguished in the 18th Century. And vice 
versa. Thus, the discussion would be relieved of its strong axiological burden 
and would facilitate readings with greater appeal to experts in the field.
Having explained the epistemological scope of our study, we should now 
rephrase it in positive terms. Some of the questions could be: Is it historio-
graphically correct to speak of “colonies” and “colonial relationship” in 
reference to the lands of the New World and their relation with the Castilian 
Crown between the late 15th Century and the first third of the 19th Cen-
tury? To what extent was describing the union as accessory useful to classify 
the relationship between Spanish America and Castile properly? How did 
this accessory union evolve between the 16th and 18th Centuries?
This issue – as raised – reminds us of another great historical debate in the 
past decades: the one on the rise of the modern State. Now, as then, we 
could attempt to solve it in several ways. One of them is to begin by defining 
the concept under discussion (“colonies,” “State”) as broadly as possible so 
that it may be applied to the period concerned. This is the option chosen by 
Benard. It was also the view of most of the historiography focused on the 
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study of the modern State. According to Jellinek, its definition was based on 
three core elements: a supreme power, a territory and a population.38 In 
such broad terms, the “State” formula was applicable to political formations 
as heterogeneous as Monarchies in the late Middle Ages, the “absolute” 
Monarchies of the Modern Age, and the liberal States of the 19th Century. 
This even led to a heated discussion in Spain on the potential existence of a 
Visigoth State.39
The main problem of such an approach is the lack or loss of semantic 
density of key concepts of political and legal history. Formulating in very 
broad terms concepts which are key to our understanding of history, such as 
“State” or – in our case – “colony”, will severely impair their interpretative 
potentiality in the long run. Therefore, it is not surprising that they are 
eventually replaced with other concepts which allow for a more accurate 
explanation from a historiographical viewpoint.
Another problem of such a discursive strategy is the distortion of the 
process of historical understanding, which may be caused by the heavy 
semantic burden acquired by those key concepts in contemporary cul-
ture.40 Indeed, it is just a possibility since, as certain historiography has 
proven, one may discuss the State under the Old Regime without it getting 
tainted with contemporary implications, that is, without slipping in anach-
ronisms by projecting into the past categories and ways of thinking that did 
not exist at that time.41
From that point of view, the question Lempérière asked at the beginning 
of her article on the colonial paradigm makes sense: “Do the terms ‘colony’ 
and ‘colonial’ account for Hispanic-American history from the 16th Century 
to their independence and up to the present?”42 We should add two further 
issues: What implicit contents fall within the “colony” and “colonial” cate-
gories? Are those contents consistent with the place occupied by the Indies 
under the Spanish Monarchy, with the political system established there after 
38 Jellinek (1943).
39 Torres López (1926).
40 A good critical explanation of the discussion about the so-called “modern State,” in: 
Garriga Acosta (2004) 1–5.
41 I am referring to the work by Paolo Grossi and the Florentine school of legal historians. 
In this area, the works that stand out, among others, are those by Pietro Costa, Maurizio 
Fioravanti, Lucca Mannori and Bernardo Sordi.
42 Lempérière (2004b) 107.
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the conquest, and with the type of relationships maintained between the 
Indies, Castile and the other territories of the Monarchy?
I believe these are the questions that should be asked. It is outside the 
scope of this paper to answer each of them in detail, as that would mean 
analyzing from different perspectives the categories at issue – “colony” and 
“colonial” – and the vast historiography published on the subject during the 
past decades. However, we should bring forward some resolution proposals 
that shed new light on this old discussion. Therefore, it is convenient to 
review the process of integration of the Indies into the Spanish Monarchy 
during the 16th and 17th Centuries, and the consequences of the establish-
ment of a new dynasty at the beginning of the 18th Century for both the 
Americas and the other territories of the formerly universal Monarchy. In 
short, this is about defining the scope of the accessory nature of the union 
with Castile during these Centuries; the historical evolution of its “contents.”
1. The Indies and the House of Austria
It is commonplace in historiography to identify the rise of the Bourbon 
dynasty to the Spanish throne at the turn of the 18th Century as a substantial 
change in the conception of the Monarchy. During the 16th and 17th Cen-
turies, the Spanish universal Monarchy had been a model of composite and 
plural Monarchy – the throne being occupied by kings of the House of 
Austria – where every kingdom maintained its original rights and liberties. 
The Indies, a territory conquered and incorporated into the Crown of Castile 
in the form of an accessory union, was an “essential”43 part of this conglom-
erate of kingdoms and crowns united in the public person of the Monarch. 
Papal Bulls granted dominion over the Indies to the Catholic Monarchs and 
their “heirs and successors, the Kings of Castile and Leon.”44
43 As can be read in the Recopilación de leyes de Indias, Charles V had sworn in 1519 that the 
Indies “would always remain united, and for their greater perpetuity and strength, we 
prohibit the disposal thereof. And we order that at no time shall they be separated from 
the Royal Crown of Castile, disunited or divided, in whole or in part, nor shall their 
cities, villages, or populations for any reason whatsoever, in favor of any person.” He 
declared null and void any such disposal made by him or by his successors. Recopilación 
de leyes de Indias, Book III, Title I, Law I.
44 On the incorporation of the Indies to Castile see Manzano Manzano (1948). More re-
cently, and with special treatment by legal literature on the topic, Barrientos Grandón
(1999).
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As is well-known, ius commune jurists basically distinguished two methods 
of union between kingdoms: aeque principaliter and accessory. In the words 
of Crespí in the 17th Century, the kingdoms or provinces joined under an 
aeque principaliter union “retain their own nature and keep it separate, as 
though they were still ruled by the same princes prior to the union, each 
keeping the same law as if they were to remain separate.”45 In contrast, 
where a province was added or joined to a kingdom under an accessory 
union, they became a single kingdom governed by the law and privileges 
of the kingdom to which they were united.46
As regards Spanish American territories, the accessory nature of their 
union to the Kingdom of Castile rapidly caught on. The lack of consolidated 
Christian kingdoms in the New World, such as that of Navarre in the Old, 
made it easier to consider those foreign lands a mere extension of the Old 
World, and especially of Castile. That is why, from the outset, Castilian Law 
was applied generally in the Americas, together with the old ius commune, 
which was also that of the New World, as well as the new local laws, 
expressed in a host of written or customary sources. From this standpoint, 
the order of the sources applicable in Spanish America did not give rise to 
any particular dispute, as had been the case in other conquered territories, 
such as Navarre.47 According to the Ordenanzas de Audiencias [Ordinances of 
Audiencias] of 1530, Emperor Charles V had ruled that, were the provisions 
issued for Spanish America not to apply, the laws of the Kingdom of Castile 
would apply in accordance with the Leyes de Toro [Law of Toro]. This prin-
ciple was reproduced in the Recopilación [Compilation] of 1681, along with 
another law whereby “such cases as may not be determined by the laws of 
this Recopilación shall be subject to the laws of the Recopilación y Partidas
[Compilation and Seven-Part Code] of this Kingdom of Castile.”48
On the other hand, in the Ordenanzas del Consejo de Indias [Ordinances of 
the Council of the Indies] of 1571, Philip II had mandated that the “States 
45 Regarding the Catholic Monarchy, this Catalan jurist stated “Regna Castellae, Aragoniae, 
Lusitanae, Flandriae, Neapolis et Siciliae, unita esse in Monarchia Hispanica aeque prin-
cipaliter: Regna vero indiarum occidentalium unita esse accessoriae Regno Castellae, et 
Indias Orientales regno Lusitaniae.” Crespí de Valdaura (1677) 187.
46 Crespí de Valdaura (1677) 187.
47 See Galán Lorda (2012).
48 Book II, Title I, Laws II and I.
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(of the Indies) be governed according to the style and regime prevailing in 
the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon,” as they were part of a single Crown.49
Thus, the Indies reproduced the institutional and legal regime of Castile, 
even where the special circumstances of those lands altered the original 
model from the beginning, which means that there was a process of terri-
torialization of the new dominions, by virtue of which they became political 
spaces vested with jurisdiction. This process included the division of the 
Spanish American territory into major provinces, ruled by their respective 
Audiencias, and minor provinces, as well as the foundation of cities.
However, the distinction made by legal scholars between aeque principa-
liter and accessory unions was unable to adequately explain the articulation 
of a universal Monarchy, such as that of Spain, and, in particular, the union 
of an entire continent to a Crown, such as that of Castile.50 The fact that 
Crespí or Solórzano have written that the Indies had joined Castile under an 
accessory union did not mean that this legal construction properly reflected 
the institutional and legal reality of the New World under the Catholic 
Monarchy. In my opinion, putting, for such purpose, the so-called King-
doms of the Indies and Kingdoms of Grenade or Murcia on the same footing 
as territories which had joined Castile under an accessory union showed the 
rigidity of the legal “categories” used, which evidenced the limitations of 
legal theories conceived at a time when there was only one world: the Old 
World.
Accordingly, as time went by, the territorial status of the Indies, as prov-
inces which had joined Castile under an accessory union, was gradually 
overtaken by reality. They shared Castile’s political status, since they were 
part of it, as if they were a mere extension of its territory. Nevertheless, their 
49 Book II, Title II, Law XIII: “and because the kingdoms of Castile and the Indies belong to 
one Crown, their laws and government system ought therefore to be as alike as possible. 
The members of the Council shall try, in the laws and institutions which they may estab-
lish for those States, to reduce the form and manner of their government to the style and 
order by which the kingdoms of Castile and Leon are ruled to the extent allowed by the 
diversity and difference of lands and peoples.” Philip II, Ordinance 14 of the Council of 
1571.
50 The limitation of this distinction to explain the complexity of the unions between king-
doms in the Modern Age has been highlighted by Elliott. The English historian cited as an 
example the union between England and Scotland in 1707, a type of union that does not 
fit fully into any of these categories. Elliot (2009) 15.
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exceptional nature under the Spanish Monarchy, characterized, inter alia, by 
their vast territory located thousands of kilometers away from the Peninsula, 
their abundant natural resources, and, more particularly, the diverse ethnic 
groups among their inhabitants, was also reflected in the institutional and 
legal framework.
It was not easy to establish a legal regime to govern that territory by 
resorting to Castilian Law only, based on the categories of ius commune. Both 
laws were transplanted to Spanish America but they underwent profound 
transformations. Moreover, that legal regime had to be supplemented with a 
myriad of provisions issued by both the Court and the different instances of 
Spanish American governments. But, as Tau has determined, the source of 
law that better adapted to the new needs was custom.51 The specific nature 
of this new law did not reflect only in the well-known Recopilación de 
Leyes de Indias [Compilation of Indias’ Law], a compilation promulgated 
by Charles II in 1681 which had no parallel in the territories that had joined 
Castile under an accessory union; it found its greatest expression in the 
customary dimension, both in the so-called Republic of Spaniards and 
Republic of Indians. In this light, although it is important to realize that 
there was no legal regime of the Indies as such, different from that of Castile, 
this conclusion is considerably played down, if not in the context of jurists’ 
discourse – with its mere conceptual distinctions – than in the context of law 
in action.
The particularity of those lands was not only reflected in the legal sources, 
but at the institutional level as well. Suffice it to mention, the institutions 
created ex novo or the legal entities under ius commune for the government of 
indigenous peoples, such as encomiendas or indigenous villages. In other 
cases, legal solutions originally conceived for other situations were applied, 
with a broad use of analogy as a tool to construe and organize these new 
realities. The most evident case, which most directly affects our topic, is 
probably giving indigenous peoples the status of “miserable” persons, one 
given by ius commune to “rustics,” “widows”, or “underage orphans”.52 Thus, 
indigenous peoples or Indians, who had had their natural freedom and their 
condition as vassals of the Crown recognized from as early as 1500, became 
legally incorporated in the corporative regime of the Monarchy, although in 
51 Tau Anzoátegui (2001).
52 See Duve (2004). See also Duve (2008).
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a situation comparable to the underage, that is, under the Sovereign’s tute-
lage through its officers in the Americas.
This shared legal condition cannot be understood in terms of social 
homogenization. The “Indians” were in reality a creation of the conquest. 
Before the Spaniards’ arrival, the American continent was populated by 
highly diverse ethnic communities: the Mayas, Aymaras, Mexicas, Arauca-
nians, etc., but not by “Indians.” After the conquest, and under the umbrella 
term of “personae miserabiles,” “Indians” kept on forming heterogeneous 
groups, engaged in different activities, with very diverse rights and obliga-
tions which evolved over the years. Hence, these communities, forming the 
so-called “Republic of Indians” which, in turn, consisted of a plurality of 
“personal” statutes, did not remain the same over the Centuries either.
The consequences of the military, cultural and legal conquest of the 
territory among natives in those lands are explained by different factors. 
A few of them include: the transformation of their old traditions; their 
acceptance or rejection of the conquerors; their capacity to survive diseases 
then unknown, or the violence and mistreatment by the Spaniards; and their 
adaptation to new religious and cultural patterns or to the political mecha-
nisms imposed by the Crown. In some cases, the final result was the mere 
extinction or the drastic reduction of the American Indian population; in 
other cases, it was the compulsory or negotiated integration into a new social 
and political structure, the Spanish Monarchy, in which they would interact 
with other groups and communities in an ongoing process of identity rede-
finition. There were also examples of escape to the margins of the system 
over the Centuries, a prolonged resistance which could still not avoid cul-
tural and economic exchanges with the Spaniards.
Eventually, given this plurality of underlying situations, an Old Regime 
society was reproduced in the Americas, based on socio-political, rather than 
economic, criteria. As historiography has often shown, a corporative society 
was established out of dependency relations articulated in more limited 
geographical areas, mainly in cities, towns, villages or farms, based on a 
common religion and united under the Sovereign, of whom everyone was 
a vassal. As late as 1806, in an inquiry on marriage and access to offices by 
mulattos, the Council of the Indies stated that
“It is undeniable that the existence of different hierarchies and classes is of the 
utmost importance for the survival and proper governance of a Monarchy, where 
gradual and linked dependence and subordination achieve and maintain the lowest 
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vassal’s obedience of and respect for the Sovereign’s authority, a system all the more 
necessary in the Americas, given the greater distance from the throne (…).”53
This does not mean that economic criteria were irrelevant; they were simply 
not recognized for the social and cultural role they would play during the 
19th and 20th Centuries. Accordingly, despite the existence of conquerors 
and conquered, or exploiters and exploited, it is inappropriate to analyze 
Spanish American social reality solely in these terms, especially after the first 
conquest period.54 It would be further inappropriate to represent such social 
reality by placing a subordinate class, the “Indians,” against another, the 
white, that would appear – by contrast – as “independent” or “dominant.” 
As can be clearly inferred from the words of the Council transcribed above, 
the entire American society, as well as European societies, consisted of 
groups or estates that depended on each other, to a greater or lesser extent, 
despite their different manifestations. However, a phenomenon emerged in 
the Indies which was unprecedented in the Peninsula: the existence of ethnic 
subordination criteria that affected particularly the native inhabitants of 
those lands. These dependence-based relationships were part of a pre-modern 
political system, ideally based on patterns of inequality, under which they 
made sense. Nevertheless, this observation entails no justification whatso-
ever, nor does it in any other pattern of inequality existing in those times.
The level of social integration and stability achieved in the Americas can 
only be understood from a different social model, that of estate-based struc-
tures under the Old Regime. In this regard, as emphasized by Poloni-Simard, 
integration was possible, among other reasons, because in Spanish coloniza-
tion, the King’s justice – channeled through its officers – was established at 
the core of social relationships.55 This should not be construed as supporting 
any idyllic representation of Old Regime societies, let alone the one created 
53 In this same inquiry, the Council judged that equating mulattos with whites in issues 
which were the subject matter of the inquiry “would bring about disputes, alterations 
and other consequences which must be avoided in a Monarchy, where the classification 
of classes contributes to enhanced order, security and good governance, and where opin-
ion prevails over the ideas of equality and confusion.” Consulta del Consejo sobre la 
habilitación de pardos para empleos y matrimonios, Madrid, julio de 1806, in Konetzke
(1962) 825 and 822.
54 In this regard, see Pérez Herrero (2002) 117.
55 For this author, “la justice doit être envisagée comme l’institution centrale de la colonisa-
tion espagnole en Amérique entre XVIe et XVIIIe siècle”. Poloni-Simard (2003) 197–198.
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in the Spanish Indies, but merely highlights the shared social, institutional 
and imaginary mechanisms that allowed for the operation and maintenance 
of such an unequal political system. Justice, whether secular or ecclesiastical, 
enjoyed a privileged position in dispute mediation and the preservation of 
a system deemed pre-established. We should further mention other contri-
buting factors, whose analysis exceeds the scope of this paper.56
Likewise, the “Spanish American specificity” translated into the adapta-
tion to the new environment of institutions typically Castilian, such as the 
audiencias and municipios, which, without radically altering their original 
features, adopted their own profiles in the Indies.57
The creation in 1524 of a supreme Council, the Council of the Indies, is 
even more relevant to our subject of analysis.58 The creation of this supreme 
court symbolically placed the Indies on an equal footing with the other 
kingdoms which had been united under an aeque principaliter union in 
the figure of the Monarch. The Councils were the utmost institutional 
expression of the plurality which characterized the Catholic Monarchy. As 
Crespí de Valldaura expounded after describing this plural structure, the 
inability of Sovereigns to administer justice in person in each and every 
territory called for the constitution of some kind of “common homeland” 
of the entire Monarchy where every province and its subjects could have 
justice dispensed. In this “curia regia” – as Crespí went on to say – jurisdic-
tions should not overlap, but be fairly divided, as though justice were admin-
istered in every province, so that the supreme Council of Castile did not hear 
cases pertaining to the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, which were to be 
substantiated in the Council of Aragon, just like Italian cases had to be heard 
by the Council of Italy and Portuguese cases, by the Council of Portugal.59
Thus, the “polisinodial” regime reflected the “plural” constitution of the 
Monarchy, serving as a link between the Sovereign and his subjects. As 
Bermúdez de Pedraza put it,
“The superior government of this Monarchy is admirably divided into twelve Coun-
cils, business being divided by kingdom and subject-matter. Each of these Councils 
56 For an introduction to the topic for New Spain, see Castro Gutiérrez (1996) 19–37.
57 This “Americanization” of audiencias is discussed by Diego-Fernández (2000). For munic-
ipalities in the Americas, see Pazos Pazos (1999).
58 Schäfer (1935) 44; Ramos Pérez (1969).
59 Crespí de Valdaura (1667) 187–188.
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is composed of a mystical body, the head of which is the President, the members of 
which are the Counselors, and the field of competence of which is the business 
assigned thereto.The presidents do not usually vote on matters of justice, but are the 
immediate means of communication between His / Her Majesty and His / Her King-
doms.”60
The Council system was a more or less functional solution to the problems 
arising from governing a complex framework of territories through the 
Court. Furthermore, the Councils were also the meeting point between 
the King, on whose behalf they acted, and the territories subject to his 
jurisdiction, which they also represented, that is to say, which they caused 
to appear in spirit before the King. In such regard, Solórzano stated that “the 
quality and prominence of Councils and Magistrates is observed and regu-
lated by that of the kingdoms and states they rule and represent.”61 Similarly, 
in a footnote, this jurist noted that the Councils worked with Ambassadors 
who were “more or less honoured, and preferred according to the place and 
status of the Princes or Provinces they sometimes represented.”62 Hence, 
inter alia, the relevance of conflicts over precedence among Councils was 
such that, from our viewpoint, alien to the culture prevailing at the time, it 
is impossible to understand. In this case, and on the basis of these assump-
tions, Solórzano did not hesitate to assert the prominence of the Council of 
the Indies over the Council of Flanders in public acts, since the former was 
in charge of “not only the government of a county or kingdom, but that of 
an empire which embraces so many kingdoms and such rich and powerful 
provinces, or, in better words, the broadest and most extended Monarchy the 
world has ever known, as it actually comprises another world.”63
60 Bermúdez de Pedraza (1635) 1–3, cited in: Rivero Rodríguez (2004) 507.
61 Solórzano y Pereira (1776) 177.
62 Ibid. (1776) 177.
63 Ibid. 178. In another passage of this same memorial, Solórzano states that by virtue of the 
accessory union it might be understood that the Empire of the Indies, just as its governing 
Council, is part of that of Castile (p. 188). He also explains that the Council of the Indies 
came into being as a result of the development of business on those lands, so it is possible 
to assert that once the administration of these matters was removed from the Council of 
Castile, “authority [remained] united as a whole.” (p. 189). These statements, which appa-
rently deny the personality of the Council of the Indies as a separate institution from the 
Council of Castile, ought to be interpreted within the framework in which Solórzano 
formulated them, i. e., to prove the seniority of the Council of the Indies over that of 
Flanders. In a different paragraph of this memorial, he argued that the Council of the 
52 Rafael D. García Pérez
As Rivero has pointed out with reference to the Council of Italy, this 
representative dimension of Councils endowed the different territories sub-
ject to their jurisdiction with unity and provided them with organicity, 
within their corporate jurisdictional structure, just like the other kingdoms 
and crowns.64 That is how the Council of the Indies acted in relation to 
Spanish American land. In spite of its great diversity and the complexity of 
its jurisdictional structures, linked to the very evolution of the process of 
conquest and colonization, the existence of a Council of the Indies, gradu-
ally distinguished from that of Castile, also led to the endowment of those 
territories with a certain political status of their own within the Castilian 
Crown. However, this process was not automatic. As we have already stated, 
in 1511 there was a Board within the Council of Castile, responsible for 
hearing issues pertaining to the Indies, while in 1524 it became a separate 
Council. Under the Ordenanzas de 1571 [Ordinances of 1571], Philip II 
prohibited the other Councils and courts from intruding by hearing issues 
pertaining to the Indies, thus consolidating its position within the system of 
Councils, as well as that of the Indies within the Castilian Crown.65 In 1600, 
just like the Council of Castile, the Council of the Indies was provided with 
its own Chamber for the allocation of benefits and offices in the Indies.66 In 
1614, Philip III ordered that no mandate served by another council be 
observed unless it had already been submitted to the Council of the Indies. 
In 1626, Philip IV mandated that no pragmatic sanction promulgated in the 
Kingdoms of Castile be enforced in Spanish America, unless a mandate 
issued by the Council of the Indies ordered that it had to be observed.67
Ten years later, this same King conferred ecclesiastical powers upon the 
Council of the Indies, thus inhibiting the Council of Castile.68
Indies is truly Supreme, without possible recourse to any other tribunal, as Philip II 
expressly established in the second ordinance of 1571 (p. 198).
64 Rivero Rodríguez (2004) 507.
65 Recopilación de leyes de Indias, Book II, Title II, Law II: “the Council of the Indies shall 
have supreme jurisdiction over the West Indies, whether already discovered or to be dis-
covered, and the business arising therefrom and depending thereon, and for their good 
governance and judicial administration it may issue Orders and consult with our Laws, 
Pragmatic Ordinances, etc.”
66 Schäfer (1935) 179.
67 Recopilación de leyes de Indias, Book II, Title I, Law XXXIX.
68 Recopilación de leyes de Indias, Book II, Title II, Law III.
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If, within the Court, the foundation of the Council provided an institu-
tional dramatization of the unity of the New World without altering its legal 
status – that of a territory which had joined the Crown of Castile under an 
accessory union – in the Indies, the consolidation of a civic culture and the 
formation of a creole elite enabled the gradual formulation of a self-defining 
discourse, which, on the basis of its urban location, also referred to the 
Indies as an entity distinct from Castile within the realm of the Spanish 
Monarchy. This discourse revolved mainly around the natural obligation of 
reserving offices for the natives of those lands.69 Logically, this was aimed at 
defending local offices from Castilians. The purpose was to turn Spanish 
America into a perfect community, a separate territory within the common 
Spanish Monarchy, as was Navarre. Since the late 16th Century, this dis-
course was accompanied by a remarkable increase in the level of self-govern-
ment of local powers in the Indies, which was mostly achieved by means of 
the purchase of most of the offices in Spanish America, in particular, in 
audiencias and cabildos.70
2. The Bourbons and the Hispanization of the plural Monarchy
When Charles II died, the Spanish Monarchy had a plural composition where 
the Indies had gradually acquired some political entity, both on the institu-
tional level and that concerning political discourse. On the basis of these 
assumptions, the establishment of the Bourbon Dynasty has been tradition-
ally construed as the beginning of a clear change of direction. Thus, the 
enthronement of Philip V would not have entailed just the extinction of 
the judicial and executive institutions proper to the territories of the Crown 
of Aragon and, accordingly, their disappearance as a political entity different 
from the Crown of Castile, but, in particular, it would have entailed the 
beginning of a new way of thinking “Spain,” focused on the increasing cen-
tralism and authoritarianism of the successive Monarchs. This process would 
have concluded in the reign of Charles IV with the influence of the almighty 
Godoy, whose despotism would have led directly to the crisis of the Mon-
archy and, consequently, to the extinction of the Hispanic Empire, except for 
some colonies such as Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
69 See Herzog (2004); Garriga Acosta (2003).
70 See the already classic Burkholder / Chandler (1977).
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Now is not the time to criticize this reading of 18th-Century Spain, rather 
consolidated in historiography, or to trace the origins of this constructive 
paradigm.71 Clearly, there are many reasons supporting this interpretation. 
In addition to the Nueva Planta Decrees and the patrimonial understanding 
of power behind the acts by Philip V,72 there are many other measures 
evidencing the Crown’s increasing interest in having more expedite and 
effective mechanisms for decision-making and the enforcement of policies, 
as well as in recovering positions of power. In this regard, we should men-
tion, by way of example: the creation and development of the Secretariats of 
State [Secretarías de Estado y del Despacho]; the creation of intendencias; the 
professionalization of the army; the (temporary) suppression of internal 
customs; the rationalization of the tax system; the reform of the system of 
fleets and galley slaves; and the introduction of the company system in 
peripheral regions, or the struggle to control the sale of offices.
However, we should not lose sight of the “structural” limitations imposed 
by the very “constitution” of the Monarchy upon any process of nationaliza-
tion and standardization of the political territory. Despite these and other 
measures of great significance adopted by successive Bourbon kings, the 
Spanish Monarchy maintained its institutional plurality and its jurisdictional 
structures. The Secretariats of State did not suppress all secular councils. In 
fact, some of them, such as those in Castile or, to a lesser extent, in Navarre 
and the Indies, continued playing a key role in the governance of their 
respective territories.73 On the other hand, intendentes coexisted with corre-
gidores and alcaldes mayores in the Peninsula and in the Americas, and the 
audiencias maintained their leading role over this period. We should further 
mention the importance of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the different spe-
cial jurisdictions largely dividing public space and limiting any monopolistic 
claim of political power. This institutional “duplicity,” which has led histor-
iography to talk about the conflictive coexistence over this Century of two 
71 An explanation for the first half of the Century, based on propaganda by the supporters of 
the Bourbon dynasty in the succession conflict can be found in Stiffoni (1989).
72 On the patrimonial logic behind the measures adopted by Phillip V, see Fernández 
Albaladejo (1992) 380; Garriga Acosta (2006) 94–96.
73 Sesé Alegre (1994); García Pérez (1998). On a more favorable view of the relegation of 
the Council of the Indies as a consequence of the creation of the Secretariats of State, see 
Bernard (1972); Cabrera Bosch (1993).
Revisiting the America’s Colonial Status under the Spanish Monarchy 55
parallel or overlapping Monarchies – one “administrative,” the other “juris-
dictional” –,74 explains some of the difficulties in understanding the 18th 
Century from the perspective of the operation of different power dynamics.
Such diversity of institutional structures and logic of power can be clearly 
seen at the higher governmental levels of the Monarchy. In this case, the 
Council of the Indies saw its authority disputed by the creation of a Secre-
tariat of State of the Navy and the Indies. It was established in 1714, together 
with the Secretariats of War, State and Justice, which reflected not only the 
implementation of a new form of government in matters related to the New 
World, but also the consideration of the Indies as a mere branch of “admin-
istration,” along with others such as the Navy or War. In a sense, the measure 
could be construed as a denial of the political status implicitly recognized 
with the creation and consolidation of a Council of the Indies over the 
previous two Centuries, coexisting with other councils for other territories 
of the Monarchy.
In the 18th Century, the Secretariat of State had a checkered evolution.75
It was removed in 1715, restored in 1720 as Secretariat of War, the Navy and 
the Indies, only to become the Secretariat of the Navy and the Indies in 1721. 
In 1754, its structure changed when matters pertaining to the Indies were 
separated from those pertaining to the Navy, to form two separate Secretar-
iats of State which, nonetheless, were still headed by the same Secretary. In 
1787, upon the death of Gálvez and the creation of the Junta Suprema de 
Estado [Supreme Board of State], the Secretariat of the Indies was split into 
two with a view to expediting the handling of matters in the Americas. In 
1790, in line with Floridablanca’s projections to join interests on both sides 
of the Atlantic, matters concerning the Indies were distributed among the 
other five Secretariats of State, a solution that had already been contem-
plated in the instruction reserved for the Junta de Estado (No. CXLV). This 
was aimed not only at streamlining and securing “Treasury and War 
expenses, resources and assistance” on both hemispheres, but also at “largely 
deterring hatefulness for such separation of interests, charges and objects, 
74 On this regard, see the classic work by Hinrichs (1986). On the difficulty to subsitute 
the jurisdictional power model with one purely “administrative” in the Old Regime, see 
Mannori (1990).
75 See Gómez Gómez (1993); Escudero (2001).
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which destroys the Spanish Monarchy and divides it into two Empires.”76
However, as explained below, Floridablanca’s non-colonial idea of governing 
the Americas was not the only one, and not even the most prevalent in the 
Court, during the second half of the 18th Century.
The fact that most matters concerning the Americas were handled 
through the specific channels, that is, through the relevant Secretariat of 
State, did not downplay the leading role of the secular Council of the Indies. 
While still being the highest court for Spanish American matters, the Coun-
cil also experienced a change in composition in the reign of Charles III and 
became a benchmark for most of the reforms introduced in the Americas 
during those years.77 Its continuity over time was, on an institutional level, a 
clear manifestation of the specific nature of the Spanish American territories 
within the Crown of Castile. It was also a clear manifestation of the ongoing 
idea of government linked to the right of justice.
Within the framework of this institutional complexity, merely outlined 
here for the peak of the Monarchy, the Ministers of Charles III adopted the 
policies to be implemented after the defeat in the Seven Years’ War along 
lines that had already been anticipated during the previous two reigns. On 
the international level, the imperial expansion of foreign powers, mainly 
England, France and Holland, demanded political action to ensure Spanish 
dominion over the New World. After the independence of the thirteen 
colonies in America, it became even more necessary to change a traditional 
system of government that had allowed a high degree of self-government in 
those lands.
In this context, we can also gain a better insight into the consolidation of 
a discourse and politics with colonial features in the Court, as well as the 
reactions this caused among the elites of the Indies. It was at that moment, 
in the 18th Century and not before, that the Indies were referred to as 
colonies for the first time. It should be noted, however, that just as it is 
not possible to reduce the 18th-Century institutional structure of the Mon-
archy to a consistent and systematic unit – since it was more the outcome of 
a historic development marked by a collection of different institutional 
logics rather than the design of a Cabinet projected over an empty space 
76 Escudero (2001), II, 68.
77 I have dealt with this matter in Garcia Pérez (1998). This “rebirth of the Council” was 
brought to attention by Burkholder (1976).
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available to the Sovereign –, neither is it possible to unitize the different 
policies issued by the Court for the Americas in the 18th Century, or any 
supporting discourse to legitimize them. Therefore, while focusing on the 
emergence of a true “colonial” discourse in the 18th Century, we should not 
overlook its coexistence with other discourse of a different nature, aimed at 
achieving a better unity of interests between Creole elites and the Crown. 
We have just seen this when discussing the extinction of the Secretariats of 
State for the Indies in 1790, with Floridablanca leading the King’s Ministers. 
Some years earlier, in 1768, the extraordinary Council formed in the Council 
of Castile had articulated the need to send Spaniards to the Indies to hold 
“the major offices, Bishoprics and Sinecures, and to have the Creoles hold 
equivalent offices in Spain.” This would establish stronger ties and lead to a 
“united Nation.” The goal was to ease tension in the Americas after the 
expulsion of the Jesuits and to deter any independence movement.78
In addition to this unifying discourse, we should mention the persistence 
of old political conceptions over the whole 18th Century, in line with the 
prevailing ideas of previous Centuries. In light of this plural background, we 
may assess the scope of colonial discourse supported by some Ministers and 
materialized in the adaptation of specific political measures for the Americas 
during the last decades of the Old Regime.
3. Colonial discourse and its institutional incidence
It is not our intent to discuss here in detail the reforms initiated by the Crown 
since 1763: the policy of appointment of senior officers that privileged the 
Peninsulars vis-à-vis the Creoles; the extension of the system of intendencias to 
most of the Americas; the creation of new viceroyalties and provincial boun-
daries; the introduction of significant tax reforms; the formation of a perma-
nent Royal Army, and the implementation of the militia system, etc.79 While 
we cannot state – as noted above – that the Court had developed a consistent 
political program for the Americas, since actors, interests and principles 
78 The report is reproduced by Navarro García (1996). Quotes on page 205.
79 Historiography has given considerable attention to the reforms in Spanish American pol-
itics in the 18th Century. For a general vision, with the corresponding bibliographic 
references, see Pérez Herrero / Naranjo Orovio / Casanovas Codina (2008); Lynch
(1991); and Navarro García (1991).
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involved in the adoption and execution of such decisions varied to a great 
extent, we can state that there were some goals behind many of the reforms 
carried out during the second half of the 18th Century.
On the one hand, as often underlined, “Bourbon reforms” were aimed at 
securing the defense of Spanish American territories. Financing such an 
endeavor required a considerable increase in the revenues from the Amer-
icas. Though the target of these policies was the Americas, they focused 
basically on Spain, on the preservation of its Empire in an international 
setting different from that of previous Centuries. At the same time, within 
the context of the Audiencias – a centerpiece of the American government –, 
action was taken to restore a justice system that had been shaken over 
decades by practices such as the sale of Court offices or, more generally, 
the deep-seated roots of judges in the Indies society.80
These reforms were accompanied with the simultaneous publication of 
projects concerning the government of Spanish America. The presence of 
enlightened ideals of government among many of the Court’s Ministers, 
with emphasis on the virtues of trade and economic development towards 
peoples’ progress, and the exemplary policy promoted by foreign powers for 
their overseas domains, also led Spain to work on new governmental pro-
posals for the Americas, whereby such lands could emerge from “their state 
of decadence,” a popular cliché then. In most cases, the proposals were clearly 
in line with those adopted during the first half of the Century by authors 
such as Macanaz, Jerónimo de Ustáriz or the author of “Nuevo sistema de 
gobierno para la América” [“New Governmental System for the Americas”], 
dated 1743 and mistakenly attributed to José del Campillo.81 Even if it is 
possible to establish a connection between the theoretical proposals and the 
institutional reforms, it is always advisable to maintain both areas well differ-
entiated. Both are important from a historical point of view. Both reveal the 
ideas then prevailing in the Court’s circles about the right position of the 
Americas within the Spanish Monarchy. However, their practical significance 
has not been the same.
The terms used by the Ministers and senior Officers of Charles III, in 
addition to the terms “Kingdoms” and “Provinces,” predominantly used in 
the political jargon, particularly in the legal area, now included the term 
80 See Garriga Acosta (2002).
81 See Navarro García (1995a).
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“colonies.” Yet, the term was often reserved to refer to colonies of foreign 
powers, i. e., French, English, Dutch, or Portuguese colonies. While an em-
pirical study should be conducted to assert this unmistakably, any historian 
acquainted with 18th-Century archive sources would be able to note it.
In other cases, the use of the binomial metropolis-colonies reveals the 
modernization of a discourse that was still based on traditional guidelines or, 
at least, that had not yet adopted the patterns of modern colonialism. There 
are many examples in that regard, but let us focus on the policy pursued by 
the Crown in the Americas during the reign of Charles III. We refer to the 
well-known plan of intendencias designed by Gálvez after visiting New Spain, 
and the reports prepared by the Bishops of Puebla and “this metropolis,” i. e., 
Mexico, as mandated by the Viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis de Croix.82
After a careful reading of the project, one can note the coexistence of 
colonial languages and policies with others consistent with reformist prem-
ises of the Old Regime, where the preservation of the political order appears 
related to the effectiveness of mechanisms ensuring officers’ good behavior 
and fairness. The reform proposed by Gálvez is intended to “standardize both 
the government of these great Colonies and the government of the metrop-
olis,” since intendencias had already been introduced into the Peninsula fifty 
years earlier. While Gálvez uses the terms “colonies” and “metropolis,” the 
standardization of the former and the latter is inconsistent with politics of a 
colonial nature. Spanish Americans could consider it despotic – rather than 
colonial – action to the extent it violated acquired rights. The problem lay in 
the fact that “the huge kingdoms of Spanish America” were in decline 
because they maintained a government “that imitated the metropolis’ for-
mer government.” Therefore, it was logical to apply in those lands “the 
healthy remedies that had cured the ills of its head.”83
According to Gálvez, the problem was that the existing system of govern-
ment in “this important and extensive Monarchy of New Spain” prevented 
the Viceroy from “establishing good order and justice.” The fact was that the 
one hundred and fifty alcaldes mayores and corregidores, having no salary, did 
business in such lands to the detriment of the King’s vassals and to the 
Crown itself, which lost substantial income. The creation of the office of 
82 “Informe y plan de intendencias que conviene establecer en este reino de Nueva España”, 
reproduced in Navarro García (1995b).
83 Navarro García (1995b) 112–114.
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intendente was, in the opinion of Gálvez, the remedy for this “ruinous con-
stitution.”84
At the same time, the plan included indications that revealed the sub-
ordination of American to Peninsular interests, such as the references to 
setting up factories “prohibited in the Colonies.” It was not Gálvez’s original 
idea. From this standpoint, the subordination of manufacturing companies 
in the Indies to Peninsular interests had been supported some years earlier by 
the author of Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno.85 However, this was neither the 
only nor the primary goal of Bourbon reformist policies, aimed rather at 
regaining control over power structures on both sides of the Atlantic and at 
securing the integrity of its possessions in the Americas.86 Likewise, attrib-
uting “natural neglect and laziness” to indigenous people was not new 
either. Nonetheless, the proposal insisted on the need to eradicate a business 
that caused considerable harm: the distribution of merchandise.87
The report prepared by the Bishop of Puebla, strongly in favor of Gálvez’s 
proposals, focused on the need to standardize government on both sides of 
the Atlantic; however, neither the language used nor the proposals made 
allow us to talk about the emergence of a new colonial mindset. Firstly, the 
Bishop denied the novelty of the project, as it already existed in Spain. 
Expanding it into the Americas – he explained – would avoid losing many 
souls and would put an end to the ill-treatment of indigenous people by 
alcaldes mayores and to the damage caused to the Royal Treasury. The plan 
was justified by its effects and by itself: Since Spain (identified with Castile) 
and the Americas formed “a single Kingdom,” they should move towards 
standardized government inasmuch as possible, as vindicated by the history 
of colonization. The Bishop was not thinking about other foreign powers’ 
external policy, but that of ancient peoples. Conquering nations transformed 
conquered nations, basically by reciprocal marriage. Therefore, it was desir-
able that Spanish and native families be joined in marriage, at least princi-
pals’ and caciques’ families. A very different consideration was given to ple-
beian Indians, incapable of governing themselves.88
84 Ibid. 112–114.
85 Campillo y Cosío (1789); Ward (1779).
86 Perez Herrero / Naranjo Orovio / Casanovas Codina (2008) 40.
87 Informe y plan de intendencias (n. 82) 123, 125. Gálvez’s plan is dated 15 January 1768.
88 Report of 20 January 1768. Navarro García (1995b) 128–130.
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On the other hand, dependence on Spain was also justified in accordance 
with traditional reasons. The Indies were members of the Spanish Monarchy, 
branches of a tree, and, as such, should bear fruit. Intendencias would not 
only put an end to vassal suffering, but also report substantial profits to the 
Royal Treasury.89
The Bishop of Mexico approved the plan proposed by Gálvez too; he 
considered the abusive behavior of alcaldes mayores to be the root of all evil 
of Spanish American government. Intendentes would fill the gap between 
alcaldes mayores and viceroys. They were even more necessary than in Spain, 
where inhabitants of villages were more rational. Although he did not dwell 
on more theoretical considerations, he did make reference to the conquest in 
order to stress the need to accommodate natives’ lives to the conquerors’ 
laws and customs.90
The goal set by the Crown to regain control over power structures in the 
Americas, in order to guarantee that justice be served and that all necessary 
resources to enforce its Atlantic policy be extracted, ended up – as is well 
known – with Gálvez as Minister of the Indies, in an attempt to exclude 
Creoles from holding major political and judicial offices.91 However, it is 
one thing to have measures adopted in Court, and quite another to imple-
ment them in America. In either case, it is clear that both the underlying 
discourse of most projects as well as the measures implemented in the 
second half of the 18th Century impaired the rights and interests of many 
American elites. In both cases, a utilitarian vision of the Americas was gain-
ing momentum, which translated into a divergence between Monarchy and 
Nation. The Indies were part of the Monarchy’s – but not of the Nation’s – 
discourse.92
It was a process already under way. The loss of Spanish dominions in 
Europe after the War of Succession favored the “nationalization” of the 
Monarchy. Castile increasingly consolidated as its center and, consequently, 
a periphery started to develop. With the encouragement of the Court and 
the support of different cultural groups, an interpretation of history inclined 
to identify Castile with Spain was evolving.93 However, this process encoun-
89 Ibid., 131.
90 Report of 21 January 1768. Ibid., 131–134.
91 Burkholder / Chandler (1977) 103–106.
92 Portillo (2000); Portillo (2006) 32–34.
93 For the development of Castilian legal history as Spanish legal history, see Vallejo (2002).
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tered resistance in certain territories, such as the Basque Provinces and the 
Kingdom of Navarre – especially –, which, since ancient times, had had their 
own laws, governmental and judicial institutions. Here also an alternative 
discourse of a constitutional nature emerged which, as would be the case in 
the Americas, tended to emphasize its “separation” from Castile, that is, its 
essence as a perfect political community, whether as a province, dominion or 
kingdom.
Yet, the consequences of the establishment of a Spanish Nation partially 
different from the Monarchy were not the same for Peninsular and oceanic 
territories. Navarre and the Basque Provinces were still part of both, even 
though their rights and liberties, particularly in the fiscal and military areas, 
were increasingly challenged. Conversely, the Indies appeared more and 
more as areas politically available to serve the interests of the Monarchy’s 
principal Domain, namely the Nation. In this regard, it is no coincidence 
that one of the Ministers who, as prosecutor of the Council of Castile, had 
played a more prominent role in the conflicts between the Kingdom of 
Navarre and the Court since 1770,94 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, 
was also the author of one of the treatises that best featured the subordinate 
nature of the Indies to the Nation, to which – seemingly – they did not 
belong. This can be noted by merely reading the acknowledgment at the 
beginning of his treatise “Reflexiones sobre el comercio español a Indias [Reflec-
tions on the Spanish Trade to Indias]”.95
94 I refer to the conflicts over levies and transfer of customs houses. In this context, Navarre 
was forced to develop an elaborate constitutional discourse in defense of their fiscal and 
military rights and liberties. Allow me to refer you to García Pérez (2008) 205–262.
95 To Campomanes, the decadence “of our farmers and craftsmen is that there is no dispatch 
of the fruit of their work or craft,” which damaged the strength of the Monarchy, based on 
“its population and its trade.” However, Campomanes wondered “Who will believe, Sir, 
knowing that Your Majesty dominates the largest and best part of the Americas, where 
there are many millions of Your Majesty’s vassals, that these goods have no dispatch?” The 
work he presented was aimed at revealing the cause of this evil which – in the words of 
the prosecutor of the Council of Castile – could only reside “in the body of the Nation or 
in the rules hitherto observed on the traffic to and from the Indies.” The problem was, 
indeed, in the rules. The trade ban imposed “on the Americas ports is far from admirable 
– he noted – as the Colonies should not have concurrent navigation with the matrix. But 
it is unprecedented for Spain to suffer this exclusion.” In this context, the Indies were not 
the Nation, but colonies at its service. Campomanes (1988) 3–4.
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The unequal condition of the Indies is similarly noticed in the well-
known projects developed by Intendente José Ábalos (1780), by the Count 
of Aranda (1783), and by the almighty Godoy (1804) – which was even 
known and approved by Charles IV –. All of them agreed on the conven-
ience of dividing the Indies into several Monarchies led by members of the 
Spanish Royal Family.96 Regardless of the feasibility of such proposals, the 
Indies were described as territories politically available to the Monarch. In 
practice, this was clear during Godoy’s government with the transfer of 
Santo Domingo to France in 1795, and Louisiana and Trinidad to England 
in 1800 and 1802, respectively.97
However, the key trigger for the creation of a discourse of colonial denun-
ciation was the crisis of the Monarchy after the entry of French troops into 
Spain and the abdication of the Spanish Monarchs in favor of Napoleon. The 
ensuing power vacuum and the different solutions then defended provided 
the perfect framework for the development of an anti-colonial discourse in 
the Americas. In this new and unforeseen context, the term colony became 
instrumental in the fight between political projects on both sides of the 
Atlantic: within the Peninsula, in order to gain American support for the 
constitutional case in Cadiz and, in general, for the war of liberation against 
Napoleon; in the Americas, in order to support the different projects for an 
autonomous government at first, and an independent one later on.98 Thus, 
the “colonial paradigm,” to quote Lempérière, evolved, a paradigm which 
has dominated the Latin American historiography so far.
III. Final Considerations
It is commonplace among historians to assert the need to understand ancient 
societies from their own interpretive categories. It is not an easy task. Some 
would consider this an illusive goal as temporal borders would make it 
impossible to overcome cultural ruptures. While there is no need to engage 
96 Ramos Pérez (1968); Muñoz Orán (1960); Rodríguez (1976) 54–66; Navarro García
(1997).
97 A paradigmatic expression of Godoy’s declared colonial policy was the Board of Fortifica-
tions and Defense of the Indies, as has been pointed out by Garriga Acosta (2006) 
110–120.
98 Ortega (2011).
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in these theoretical rather than practical debates, no one questions how 
convenient it is for a historian to avoid projecting into the past categories 
or concepts coined or re-elaborated in the present time to provide solutions 
to current world problems.99
In the case at hand, it is quite clear from what has been described in these 
pages that, after their conquest and incorporation into Castile, the Indies 
became part of the Spanish universal Monarchy. The colonization model on 
which the Spanish based their conquests was not the one that predominated 
as from the second half of the 18th Century – and particularly during the 
19th and 20th Centuries –, used by the main European powers. Rather, at 
least ideally, it resembled the Roman model.100 That is why, until the late 
18th Century the words colony and colonize were understood both in diction-
aries and usage as well as in legal texts as synonyms of population and 
populate.101 In the second half of the past Century, the term colony acquired 
the modern sense of economic exploitation both in the republic of letters as in 
the European Courts.102
The ideal reference to the ancient colonization model does not preclude 
me from stating that the colonization of the Indies had particular or specific 
features: by way of example, and among other factors, religion enjoyed a 
dominant though not exclusive role. It could not have been otherwise. 
Historical times were significantly different. In the 15th Century, the con-
quest and colonization of the Americas also involved joining the Indies to 
Castile under an accessory union and, consequently, transferring the Castil-
ian legal order to the new lands. However, the different treatment required 
by the New World over the years resulted in a progressive increase in its 
99 Gaddis (2002); Wood (2008).
100 See Padgen (2005) chapter 1. Regarding the connection between liberalism and imperial-
ism in the mid nineteenth Century, see Pitts (2006).
101 “Colony: a town or parcel of land that has been populated by foreign people taken from 
the City which owns such territory or from some other place. The word colonies also 
meant the places populated by their ancient inhabitants, who had been granted the priv-
ileges corresponding to such peoples by the Romans (…). In Spain, there were many 
towns that had been Roman colonies.” Covarrubias Orozco (1674) 154. The definition 
of the term “colony” in the Diccionario de Autoridades de 1729, 419, is practically the same. 
This ancient meaning of the word colony also appears in Política Indiana by Solórzano 
Pereira, as has been pointed out by Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 102–103.
102 Lempérière (2004b) 114–116.
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political identity as a territory distinct from Castile, though formally it was 
an accessory part of the latter. This particular or specific feature was reflected 
on the institutional level, with the creation of the Council of the Indies and 
the particular evolution of its Audiencias and its municipios, of Spaniards and 
of Indians, as well as in the legal sources, with the leading role of custom and 
the specificity of the law of the Indies, paradigmatically represented in the 
Recopilación [Compilation] of 1681. In this respect, the accessory nature of 
the union gradually developed turning the Indies into a territory more 
similar to Navarre or Aragon than to other kingdoms joined to Castile under 
an accessory union, such as Granada or Murcia. At the same time, a creole 
discourse emerged – studied from this perspective by Garriga – that viewed 
Spanish America as a perfect community separate from Castile. The purpose 
was to secure that offices to be held in the Indies were reserved for natives of 
those lands and not for Spaniards.103
The Castilian estate-based social order, unevenly constituted, was also 
transplanted to the New World but with some clear differences. In addition 
to the kings’ policy of limiting jurisdictional dominions as much as possible, 
the integration of the indigenous peoples into this imported order posed not 
only theoretical but, mainly, practical problems. Although indigenous peo-
ples were considered “miserable people” legally and, as such, subject to the 
Crown’s protection, the consequences of such status were diverse, depending 
on the different peoples, places and times. In addition, the degree of assim-
ilation of European culture and of the Catholic religion were also different, 
as well as the transformations that the native cultures underwent. In any 
case, and despite the relationship of subordination and dependence that the 
conquest entailed for indigenous peoples, together with the numerous abu-
ses that, notwithstanding the Crown’s protectionist policy, they suffered in 
these Centuries, the colonial relationship model – understood in its modern 
sense – does not seem to be the best suited to explain the place occupied by 
the Indies and their people within the Spanish Monarchy. In this respect, we 
agree with Tau when he posits the “inappropriateness of the word colony to 
describe generically the political condition of the Indies.” No political entity 
in the Spanish Monarchy is referred to by that name in legal or political 
texts, in custom or in practice.104 Moreover, the emergence of a colonial 
103 Garriga Acosta (2006) 72–93.
104 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 121.
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political discourse in the 18th Century and the adoption of measures reveal-
ing a colonial conception of the Indies did not result in a substantial trans-
formation of the political model of the Spanish Monarchy. Therefore, from a 
historiographical perspective, it seems more accurate, and possibly more 
fruitful, to assume the legal categories used at the time to construct the 
Spanish American space. The Indies were provinces or kingdoms joined to 
the Crown of Castile under an accessory union. Henceforth, it is the duty of 
historians to determine the concrete meaning of these categories in each 
historical period, avoiding the use of schemes that are too rationalist and 
anachronistic to comprehend a reality which then, just as now, was beyond 
any simplistic approach to systematization.
On the other hand, adopting perspectives that assume a plurality of con-
current powers and jurisdictions in Spanish America, leaving aside mental 
structures too bound to state standards, can provide a more realistic 
approach to the relationships between the Crown and the New World. From 
this perspective, the leading role that indigenous peoples – with their rights 
and traditions – played in the creation of the Spanish American legal order 
should also be acknowledged. Without underestimating the significance of 
the policies the head of the Monarchy pursued, through the Council of the 
Indies, Juntas [Boards] or the Secretariats of State, the fact that they were 
focused on the places where the different social actors converged – mainly 
cities and towns – evidences the inappropriateness of explaining political 
societies of the Old Regime too flatly or homogeneously.105 In this area, 
dominated by the existence of patronage or family networks, or by the 
interaction of groups having diverse interests which, on many occasions, 
joined the two sides of the Atlantic, it is not sufficient to apply general 
binary schemes, such as Peninsular-Creole or Spanish-Indian. Also in this 
context, the simple opposition colonizer-colonized can leave a substantial 
part of the human relationships typical of the Old Regime in the Americas 
outside our attentional focus.
Finally, as is the case with the word “State,” whether it is appropriate to 
use the term “colony” will ultimately depend on the meanings and conno-
105 On the need to study the history of the Nation in Spain and also of the Americas from 
this municipal perspective rather than from the history of the kingdoms or of the forma-
tion of the State, an author who has attracted attention, among others, is Tamar Herzog. 
A good example of the possibilities of this approach is Herzog (2003).
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tations the historian gives it. In this respect, it is possible to use the word 
colony or colonial while preserving the political logic characteristic of the 
Spanish Monarchy during the Old Regime. We would be dealing, in any 
case, with not very “colonial” colonies.
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Tamar Herzog
Did European Law Turn American? Territory, 
Property and Rights in an Atlantic World
I. The Questions
In 1648, analyzing the titles that Spain may have to the New World, Solór-
zano Pereira advanced the theory that these depended on its vassals first 
having “searched, found and occupied” the territory. Although the American 
continent was not truly a no man’s land, Spain’s entitlements, he insisted, 
were nevertheless guaranteed “because [its original inhabitants] abandoned 
it, leaving it uncultivated.” Natural law and the law of nations, as well as the 
practice “in all the provinces of this world” instructed this abandoned land 
to be given to the Spaniards in reward for their “industry.”1
Some forty years later, in 1690, in his “Two Treatises of Government,” 
John Locke also sustained that property and industry were tied together. 
Those who cultivated a land that had been abandoned or was insufficiently 
worked, by mixing their labor with the earth created a new object to which 
1 Solórzano Pereira (1972), book I, chapter IX, points 12 y 13. The original version reads: 
“y verdaderamente para las islas y tierras que hallaron por ocupar y poblar de otras gentes, 
o ya porque nunca antes las hubiesen habitado o porque si las habitaron se pasaron a otras 
y las dejaron incultas, no se puede negar que lo sea y de los más conocidos por el derecho 
natural y de todas las gentes, que dieron este premio a industria y quisieron que lo libre 
cediese a los que primero lo hallasen y ocupasen y así se fue practicando en todas las 
provincias del mundo, como a cada paso nos lo enseña Aristóteles, Cicerón, nuestros 
jurisconsultos y sus glosadores” and “los lugares desiertos e incultos quedan en la libertad 
natural y son del que primero los ocupa en premio de su industria.” In the seventeenth 
century, “industria” was identified as “the diligence and easiness in which one does some-
thing with less work than others.” With a comparative perspective in mind, it designated 
those who knew better and performed better: Covarruias Orozco (1995), 666. It is 
possible, however, that by the mid-eighteenth century it came to designate simply “a 
mastery or an ability in any art or profession:” Real Academia Española (1732), Dicciona-
rio de la lengua castellana, 258.
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they had now acquired title.2 This entitlement, Locke argued, harmed no 
one. After all, a land that had been abandoned or was insufficiently culti-
vated was a land that no one truly needed. Applying this theory to the 
Americas, Locke concluded that, because Native-Americans did not improve 
the land (nor did they mix their industry with it), they had no title to it, nor 
could they prohibit its occupation and use by others.
By 1758, both these theories were enshrined as doctrines of the Law of 
Nations (and thus of nascent international law). Emmer de Vattel, who had 
reproduced them in his recompilation, also insisted that cultivating the land 
was an obligation imposed upon man by nature, that all nations were bound 
by natural law to labor the territory that they occupied, and that those who 
did not “failed in their duty to themselves, injured their neighbors and 
deserved to be exterminated like wild beasts of prey.” No one, he concluded, 
could “take to themselves more land than they have need of or can inhabit 
and cultivate,” and no one “may complain if other more industrious nations, 
too confined at home, should come and occupy part of their land.”3
Most scholars have assumed that these developments marked an Ameri-
can addition to European (now also international) law. They pointed out 
that both Solórzano and Locke were deeply engaged in the “European 
Expansion,” and both sought to legitimate what their countries were doing 
overseas. While Solórzano was a colonial judge working in Lima, Locke was 
a lawyer that, although living in the Old Continent, represented colonial 
interests.4 Vattel, who had made these theories part of a coherent body of 
law, may have had no commitment to colonialism per se, but his dedication 
to both philosophy and diplomacy geared him to search for a clear statement 
of what he thought was (or ought to be) the legal norms of his time. Scholars 
have also insisted that these developments demonstrated the contribution of 
the Americas to the consolidation of private property. It was first in the 
Americas, they sustained, that property was not only sanctified, but was also 
made a-historical.5
Part of a transatlantic conversation taking place in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, these conclusions serve here as an excuse to examine 
2 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, second treatise, chapter 5, points 27–51, espe-
cially points 31–32.
3 Vattel (1916), book I, chapters VIII and XVIII, 37–38 and 85–86.
4 Arneil (1996) and Armitage (2004).
5 Larkin (1969), 1–52.
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the relations between Early Modern European and American law. We 
already know that European law crossed the Atlantic and, in the process, 
also gained ground as an international law of sorts. We also know that it was 
constructed in a multilog between various actors working from different 
national traditions. But to what degree was this European law American-
ized? Was there, indeed, a derecho indiano, as Spanish scholars have named 
the process of European law having gone native?
I suggest looking at these questions by observing both sides of the Ocean, 
centering not on how these theories had evolved, but instead on how some 
of their tenants were de facto implemented in both the Old and the New 
world.
II. The Spanish-American Observatory
Ideas linking use (mainly cultivation) to rights were clear in Spanish Amer-
ica as early as the sixteenth century, and they mainly operated to justify 
native dispossession. Although not necessarily codified in law books and 
regulations, they nevertheless found ample expression in court decisions that 
declared certain lands as occupied and thus belonging to the native inhab-
itants and others as vacant and thus open for colonization. The jurisdiction 
of the audiencia of Quito (present day Ecuador and southern Colombia) may 
serve as an example. Studying land litigation in Quito clarifies that, follow-
ing royal instructions, Spanish judges were willing to recognize the right of 
native communities to the “land of their ancestors.”6 However, they also 
authorized a gradual process that led to native dispossession, which histor-
ians have since lamented.7
As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail, recognition of ancestral 
rights did not guarantee continuity.8 Instead, it introduced major changes 
in the way native rights were both defined and defended. The reason for this 
mutation was simple: Indigenous communities who wanted their right to 
land recognized by the Spaniards had to address the colonial courts. In 
Quito, at least, these courts responded to these claims by examining whether 
6 Mariluz Urquijo (1978) 24–27. Also see Pagden (1986) and Adorno (2007).
7 Ots Capdequi (1959) 82 and 85 and González Rodríguez (1990) 171–198.
8 Herzog (2013) and (2014) 115–126.
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the land was indigenous according to Spanish criteria.9 Rather than being 
interested in reconstructing what had happened in the past, or what an 
Indigenous, pre-Colonial law- may have recognized and mandated, these 
judges affirmed, time and again, that the only test for the existence of rights 
was occupation. Rather than examining old entitlements, they proceeded to 
verify factors such as residence and continuous use. In most cases, they 
equated “use” with agricultural pursuits, both planting and pasturing. Gath-
ering was sometimes also described as a legitimate activity giving rights to 
the territory. Hunting, on the contrary, never was. Spanish judges thus asked 
who was present on the land, what they were doing and not what title they 
held. They favored sedentary communities over others who used the terri-
tories in other ways and, subjecting rights to “actual use,” they required that 
all natives continuously use the land, arguing that unless they did, territory 
could never be recognized as their own.
The accumulation of all these factors guaranteed that in the process of 
“recognizing indigenous right to land” the Spaniards profoundly trans-
formed these rights; eliminating many that may have existed during the 
pre-colonial period, they created and gave others that were completely 
new. The judges, however, were only complementing what the king was 
doing too. During the colonial period, the Crown routinely distributed land 
to new or resettled indigenous communities.10 Yet, in all these cases, land 
granted to natives was not considered their own. According to the law, this 
land was royal property (realengo) and it was to remain in native hands only 
9 Documentation regarding land claims in the audiencia of Quito was mostly found in the 
National Archives of Ecuador/Quito (hereafter ANQ), sections titled cacicazgo, tierra, 
fondo especial, casas and gobierno. Additional documentation proceeds from the Spanish 
colonial archives in Seville (Archivo General de Indias, hereafter AGI) and the Biblioteca 
de la Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid (hereafter BRAH/M). See, for example, the 
questionaire submitted by don Juan Zumba cacique de Uyumbicho, Quito 28/8/1565, 
ANQ, Tierras 1, exp. 1 de 14/8/1565, fols. 12r–13r on 12v and the royal provision to the 
corregidor of Ríobamba, Quito, 16/8/1649, ANQ, Indígenas 16, exp. 2 de 2/9/1686, fols. 
1r–4r, on fol. 2r.
10 Herzog (2007). For an older bibliography on these issues see Málaga Medina (1974) and 
Solano (1976). On its functioning in Quito see petition of Andrés Zumbaña in ANQ, 
Tierras 1, exp.1 de 14/8/1565, fols. 18r. The grant of land to Indians on the occasion of 
their resettlement (reducción) was also mentioned in the petition of the protector de natu-
rales of Cuenca, ANQ Tierras 17 exp. 19/6/1692.
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as long as natives needed it for their survival and tax payment.11 If they 
no longer did (and the best proof that they did not would be insufficient 
use), the territory would revert to the Crown and could be redistributed to 
those who would allegedly use it better. Subjected to a “right of return” 
(derecho de reversión) in case of non-use (or insufficient use), all land granted 
to indigenous communities was thus conditional. Under continuous scru-
tiny, the Spaniards – both litigants and judges – periodically questioned 
whether the original grant was justified and whether, at the present, the 
community still needed the land. Extremely powerful during the periodical 
examination of land titles called composiciones, the tying of rights to (suffi-
cient) use, became the most powerful mechanism of native dispossession.12
Echoing what Solórzano, Locke and Vattel had described, it mandated a 
new moral economy according to which land should be the property not 
of those who had it first but instead of those who could work and use it 
better.
The legal reasoning that Solórzano, Locke,Vattel, and the judges of Quito 
followed to justify the dispossession of Indigenous peoples by arguing their 
neglect to work the land sufficiently could also operate vis-à-vis European 
powers. This was clearly the case in the Spanish-Portuguese borderland in the 
American interior. Although the Spaniards and Portuguese invoked papal 
bulls and bilateral treaties in their relationship with one another, the histor-
ical documentation generated on the border itself demonstrates that both 
parties were mostly obsessed with the question who was where and what 
they were doing.13 Discovery and exploration – that is, the initial and early 
arrival to the territory – were important in such discussions regarding land 
11 Petition of the protector de indios, Quito 9/11/1791, ANQ, Cacicazgo 3, exp. 3 de 9/11/
1791, fol. 3r, ANQ, Indígenas 1, exp. 3 de 13/12/1597 and “provisión real a petición del 
protector general en nombre de Antonio Amaguano cacique de Nayon,” ANQ, cacicazgo 
44, vol. 99, 23/2/1732, fol. 3r–v. The particular status of such lands was described in 
Solórzano Pereira (1972) 379–380.
12 Latin American composiciones were studied by many. See, for example, Torales Pacheco
(1990) and Amado González (1998). Also see Recopilación de Indias, book 4, title 12, 
laws 15–21. Their operation vis-à-vis native communities was exemplified in petition of 
Salvador Ango Pilainlade Salazar cacique, Otavalo, 3/12/1692, ANQ, Tierras 18 exp. 15/12/
1692, fol. 1v. and petition of Juan Guaytara, cacique, Quito, 15/3/1712, ANQ, Tierras 34, 
exp. 15/3/1712, fols. 2r–v.
13 These issues are analyzed in greater length in Herzog (2014).
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rights, but much more crucial than the question of who had arrived first was 
who had remained: who had established a permanent settlement, or had 
used the territory continuously for transit, commerce, the gathering of fruits, 
and so forth.14 As a result, rather than discussing where the border between 
Spain and Portugal passed, the inhabitants of both powers were engaged in 
proving what they already possessed and occupied. They sent their respective 
monarchs reports about their progress, and they “authenticated” (autenticar) 
their claims by conducting judicial investigations and collecting oral decla-
rations.15
Because rights depended on acutal use of the land, the territorial posses-
sion that resulted was often discontinuous. Made of fields, farms, woods or 
settlements, entitlements took the form of an archipelago, with “islands” of 
occupation and use surrounded by a “sea” of “unoccupied land,” as well as 
corridors and routes connecting them.16 And, while the territory in between 
occupied parcels was open for appropriation, how to define the islands 
already used became a major concern. The nucleated nature of the territory 
that the Spaniards and the Portuguese both possessed came into focus, for 
example, during discussions involving Colonia de Sacramento (in present 
day Uruguay). Colonia was built, destroyed, rebuilt, taken again, and 
returned once more, on several occasions during the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. While discussants in Europe referred to it as a solid, 
clear unit, this clarity dissipated in the Americas. What did Colonia consist 
of ? Was it equal to the territory of its fort? Did it include all of the hinter-
land that its soldiers and residents occupied? And, if so, should not this 
14 A letter of the Count of Bobadilla to Pedro Cevallos, Rio de Janeiro 29/2/1762, Archivo 
General de la Nación/Buenos Aires (hereafter AGN/BA), IX.4.3.5 and a letter of Domingo 
Ortiz de Rosas to Antonio Pedro de Vasconcelos, undated, although describing events 
taking place in 1743, Archivo General de la Nación in Montevideo (hereafter AGN/M), 
Archivos particulares, Caja 333, Colección de documentos de Mario Falcao Espalter, car-
peta 3, titled “Documentos relativos a las luchas entre España y Portugal por la posesión 
de la banda oriental y proceso de población de dicho territorio,” 1685–1757.
15 “Auto de inquirição de testemunhas para justificação da posse e domínio do rio Branco 
pela coroa de Portugal,” 1775, attached to ofício do gobernador e capitão geral do estado 
do Pará e Rio Negro João Pereira Caldas para o secretario de estado da marinha e ultra-
mar Martinho de Melo y Castro, Pará, 4/1/1776, Archivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisboa 
(hereafter AHU), acl_cu_013, cx.74, d.6261.
16 Herzog (2002) and Garavaglia (2003).
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territory be defined by a judicial investigation that would prove what they 
had truly occupied and what not?17
Because occupation and use mattered even on the international scene, 
individuals and authorities on the ground had to be both extremely active 
and extremely vigilant. They had to ensure that the territory they pretended 
was theirs would be constantly used and re-used; but they also had to certify 
that their rivals shied away from it, as well as from any new area. If the rivals 
did not, expressing protest was crucial because the lack of a response could 
be legally constructed and comprehended (by way of legal presumption) as 
consent.
Conflict regarding use, however, was not limited to land. Both the Span-
iards and the Portuguese understood that controlling the local population 
was a means to control the territory. Distinguishing natives according to 
their degree of hostility to them and their potential for “domestication,” 
Europeans also classified them according to whether they were “inclined” 
to one country or the other.18 In the process, natives, too, became objects to 
be possessed (or “used”). Not only did Europeans try to convert those who 
were their enemies into their allies or ensure (when they failed) their anni-
hilation, they were also constantly suspicious of what their native “friends” 
may do.19 They believed that those who had reached an “understanding” 
with them could turn into foes and ally with their rivals. From a Spanish 
17 “Apuntamiento de secretaría ejecutado en cumplimiento del acuerdo del consejo de 20.6. 
pasado …”, Madrid, 4.7.1716, AGI, Charcas, 263. The question of how defining the juris-
diction of Colonia affected the borders of Brazil was asked, for example, in 1713: “Parecer 
do Marquês de Frontera sorbe a paz com Castela,” Lisbon 31.7.1713, cited in Rau / Gomes 
da Silva (1955), V. 2, no. 177, p. 120.
18 “Instrução da Rainha para D. Antonio Rolim de Moura,” Lisbon, 19.1.1749, Arquivo 
Público de Mato Grosso (hereby APMG), Livro C – 03, Doc. 01, fols. 3–8, fol. 5, point 
16 and “Carta do governador e capitão-general da capitania de São Paulo Rodrigo César 
de Meneses para o governador e capitão-general da capitania do Rio de Janeiro Aires de 
Saldanha …,” São Paulo, 15.3.1724, AHU, ACL_CU_023–01, Cx. 3, D. 374. I would like to 
thank João Antonio Botelho Lucidio for sending me the information from Mato Grosso.
19 “Tratados que deberán observar con este superior gobierno el cacique Callfilqui a conse-
cuencia de lo que ha estipulado … con el,” AGN/BA, Biblioteca Nacional 189 exp. 1877. 
The bibliography on treaties with Indigenous groups have become especially abundant in 
recent years: Levaggi (2000); Levaggi (2002); Néspolo (2004) and Lázaro Ávila (1999). 
We are thus now a long way away from the affirmation made by Charles Gibson in 1978 
according to which such peace treaties were absent in Spanish America: Gibson (1978).
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perspective, this apprehension was tied to the belief that the Portuguese were 
willing to appease the natives in ways the Spaniards were incapable of doing, 
offering them expansive and frequent gifts or promising them a better treat-
ment.20 The Spaniards thus reminded “their” Indians of their obligation to 
them. The Portuguese did the same.21 Complaining that “vassals of Spain” 
convinced Indians inclined to their friendship to attack them, they circulated 
rumors that indicated that several such natives might have even joined the 
Spaniards in the effort to expel the Portuguese.22
In the process, the inhabitants of both powers portrayed Indian allies as 
their property.23 Perhaps not quite “theirs” as the land was considered to be, 
but not so drastically different; these Indians, they argued, were already in 
their “possession”(sic) and could therefore not become the property of 
another. These beliefs led the Spaniards to complain in the 1770s, 1780s 
and 1790s, that the Portuguese “stole” (robar) “their” Indians.24 Calling these 
activities “piracy,” they insisted that the Portuguese invaded native villages 
belonging to Spain, capturing their inhabitants and removing them, some-
times in bulk, but always violently, to Portuguese territories. The natives 
20 “Memorial del padre Cristóbal de Acuña sobre el descubrimiento del rio de las Amazonas, 
1639,” AGI, Quito 158, fol. 3v and a letter of Lázaro de Ribera to the viceroy of Buenos 
Aires, Asunción, 18/9/1797, AGI, Estado 81, No. 15 (1e).
21 “Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino referente a uma carta do governador e capitão-ge-
neral da capitania de São Paulo Conde de Sarzedas ao rei informando êste monarca do 
perigo da perda de Cuiabá …,” Lisbon, 5/5/1733, AHU, ACL_CU_023–01, Cx. 8, D. 899.
22 “Representção dos oficiais da Câmara de Curitiba ao rei pedindo-lhe que aquela vila fosse 
assistida pela provedoria da praça de Santos …,” Vila Real de (Curitiba), 2/9/1744, AHU, 
ACL_CU_023–01, Cx. 15, D. 1491 and “Noticias dadas por huma copia en 1/4/1775,” 
attached to “Ofício do governador de Iguatemi José Custódio de Sá e Faria ao governa-
dor de São Paulo Martinho Lopes de Saldanha,” Iguatemy, 20/7/1775, AHU, ACL_
CU_023–01, Cx. 30, D. 2707.
23 A letter of Joaquim Tinoco Valente to the governador of Pará, Barcelos, 20/7/1765, Arqui-
vo Provincial Esatdo do Pará, Belém do Pará (hereafter APEP), Cod. 155, Doc. 41 and a 
letter of Pedro Domínguez to Jose de Espinola, Fuerte Borbón, 20/7/1797, Archivo Histó-
rico Nacional, Madrid (hereafter AHN), Estado 3410, No. 13. I would like to thank 
Heather Flynn Roller for sending me documents from Para.
24 The interrogatory elaborated by Juan Francisco Gómez de Villasufre y de Arce, governor 
of San Joaquin de Omagua on 26/5/1775 and the declarations that followed it, ANQ, 
Fondo Especial 30, vol. 83, no. 3226, copy of letters by Francisco Requena to Antonio 
Caballero y Góngora dated 20/8/1783 and 8/10/1783, AHN, Estado 4677–1, No. 5 and a 
letter of Felipe de Arachua y Sarmiento to Francisco Requena, 15/7/1783, AHN, Estado 
4611.
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captured in this way by the Portuguese, the Spaniards argued, belonged to 
“nations friendly with Spaniards” (afectas a España), were already conquered 
by Spain (conquistados por España), were vassals of the Crown, or were out-
right Spaniards. If they allowed the Portuguese to take them without issuing 
a protest, as would happen with territory, the Portuguese would become 
proprietors of all the land.25 Responding to these allegations, the Portuguese 
normally attested that the Indians were not extracted by force but instead 
willfully came to live among them.26 Nonetheless, Portuguese documenta-
tion clarifies that the Portuguese actively engaged in campaigns to transform 
Indians favorable to Spain (or, according to Spanish versions, already in 
Spanish possession) into allies of Portugal. They also apprehended, or gave 
refuge, to natives who abandoned Spanish missions and arrived at Portu-
guese territories.27 Records also indicate that in order to influence these 
natives, the Portuguese may have offered them gifts and a better treatment. 
Indians may have been told that the Spaniards wished to kill them and that 
they habitually maltreated the indigenous population.28 It is also possible 
that, on occasion, natives were threatened that either they willfully submit-
ted or they would be forced to.29
Although bitterly resenting the Portuguese, the Spaniards may have used 
similar strategies. Already in 1697, the Portuguese governor of Maranhão 
25 Joaquín Alos, governor of Paraguay to viceroy Nicholás Arrendondo, Asunción, 19/9/
1791, AHN, Estado 4387, No. 5.
26 The original version reads: “como sean los referidos indios personas libres, pues los con-
templa así la santa sede apostólica y los mismos soberanos a cuyos dominios pertenecen, 
pueden usar de su libertad que les da facultad como señores de ella mayormente para que 
usen de ella con sosiego a donde les pareciere sin ninguna sujeción de esclavos como en 
cierto modo los quiere vuestra merced …” Feliz José Souza to Francisco José Texeira, 
Fuerte el Príncipe de la Vera 23/11/1784, AHN, Estado 4436, no. 10.
27 “Ofício do governador e capitão geral da capitania de Mato Grosso Luís de Alburquerque 
de Melo Pereira e Cáceres ao secretário de estado dos negócios do reino Marquês de 
Pombal,” Vila bela, 8/1/1777, AHU, ACL_CU_010, cx. 18, d. 1146.
28 A letter of Pedro de Cevallos to Ricardo Wall, ministry of State, San Borja 7/12/1757, 
reproduced in Campaña del Brasil. Antecedentes coloniales, Buenos Aires 1939, vol. II, 
245–6 on page 245.
29 Copy of a letter of Joseph García de León y Pizarro a Antonio Caballero y Góngora 18/4/
1784, AHN, Estado 4677–1, No. 5 and a letter of Juan Joseph de Villalengua, president of 
the audiencia of Quito to José de Gálvez, Quito, 18/6/1784, AHN, Estado 4677–1, No. 7. 
Also see letters of Lázaro de Ribera to viceroy Antonio Olaguer Feliú, Asunción, dated 18/
9/1797 and 24/3/1798, AHN, Estado 3410, No. 13.
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complained that Jesuits may have convinced Indians living in Portu-
guese aldeias to move to their (Spanish) missions. Affirming that these 
Indians were Portuguese vassals living on Portuguese territory and in Portu-
guese (Carmelite) missions, the Portuguese Overseas Council ordered this 
stopped.30 The Jesuit explanation that these Indians chose to come to the 
mission of their own free will was (of course) rejected.31 Portuguese com-
plaints of Spanish attempts to remove Indians from their territories contin-
ued into the eighteenth century, intensifying as the century progressed. By 
the 1750s, the Portuguese accused the Spaniards of convincing Indians who 
“were inclined favorably to Portugal” to ally with Castile by suggesting to 
them that the Portuguese would make them slaves.32 According to other 
sources, in the 1760s, the Spaniards encouraged “Portuguese” Indians to 
rebel.33
Indians could thus maintain their lands only if they continuously used it, 
and Europeans could make claims to territory and people only if they con-
stantly occupied and controlled them. This was a world in turmoil, in which 
no right seemed permanent, and no success ever guaranteed. But were these 
developments a particularly American phenomenon, or were they also 
present in Europe?
III. The European Observatory
The relationship between use and rights had, of course, European roots. 
Greek and Roman writers were already unanimous in holding that property 
was a man-made institution that had emerged as a consequence of the 
adoption of agriculture. According to them, while hunters had no property, 
pastoralists had owned their animals and farmers developed property in 
30 “Consulta do conselho ultramarino para o rei sobre o missionário jesuita castelhano padre 
Samuel,” Lisbon, 12/11/1697, AHU, acl_cu_013, cx. 4, d. 340.
31 Rodríguez Castello (ed.) (1997) 131 and 133.
32 A letter of Councilor Tomé Joaquim da Costa Corte Real to Antonio Rolim de Moura, 
governor of Mato Grosso, Lisbon, 7/7/1757, APMG, CMG-SG, Livro C-18, Estante-01, 
letter 1, fols. 9–17v.
33 A letter of Valerio Correa Botelho de Andrade, interim governor of Rio Negro to Manoel 
Bernardo de Mello e Castro governor of Grão Pará, Barcelos, 22/12/1762, APEP, Cod. 99, 
Doc. 94, 1R.
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land.34 Most medieval and early modern authors seemed to agree.35 Many 
pointed out that God gave man the land so that he could fulfill his needs and 
that, as a result, all property in land was conditioned by proper use. Making 
the cultivation of the land also a religious duty, they insisted that property 
was supposed to advance, not diminish, public utility. In Spain, these visions 
were dominant during the Reconquista, allowing individuals and commun-
ities to obtain title to land, which others had allegedly abandoned or insuf-
ficiently worked.36 They were also continuously invoked in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century by arbitristas who insisted on the obligation of kings to 
reward those who cultivated the land by giving them title to it, and to 
punish those who did not by forcing them to either use the land or surren-
der it.37
The clearest example of how in early modern Spain, too, use and rights 
were closely related is that of the repopulation campaigns carried out in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.38 These campaigns, which identified 
the depopulation of the country as one of the major reasons for its economic 
decline, advocated the need to use vacant territories (despoblados) and, above 
all, to resettle those places that were once cultivated. In the eyes of many, 
these depopulated areas incarnated Spain’s problems. Having once been 
“useful,” they became “waste”. To reverse these tendencies, royal action was 
necessary. The king had to force those who possessed despoblados to cultivate 
them or allow others to do so.
Repopulation campaigns, particularly prominent in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, caused major social upheaval.39 While those who 
wanted access to land pressured royal delegates to translate royal orders into 
34 Roman law may have authorized the seizure of uncultivated land (agri deserti) in order 
to guarantee that it would be worked and taxes would be paid on them: Concha y
Martínez (1946) 139–144. The theory linking property to agriculture survives to date: 
Dodgshon (1987), 24–71.
35 Tully (1980) 65–69, 80 and 100, Rodríguez Puerto (1996–1997) 495–503 and 510–525, 
on 499–500 and 518 and Pagden (1998) 172.
36 Concha y Martínez (1946).
37 Niehaus (1976); Rodríguez (1984); Maravall (1972), vol. 2, 325–339 and Vassberg
(1974) 384–385 and 393–394.
38 Palacio Atard (1989); Oliveras Smitier (1998) and Helguera Quijada (1995).
39 Archival documentation regarding these resettlement campaigns is mainly located at the 
AHN, Consejos, although some of it is also reproduced in municipal and provincial 
archives, as well as the archives of royal courts, and the Royal Academy of History.
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action, those who possessed land often refused to collaborate. As a result, 
repopulation campaigns often degenerated into long discussions involving 
municipalities, proprietors and hopeful colonists. At stake were classificatory 
questions, mainly, which territories were depopulated or insufficiently used. 
Also debated was what was the land’s true potential and who was best suited 
to pursue its improvement. Given these conditions, seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century repopulation campaigns are a good starting point for under-
standing the relationship, in Peninsular Spain between land and use, use and 
rights.
Repopulation campaigns made two issues clear. First, most individuals 
and groups who requested permission to cultivate a territory, which they 
considered empty or insufficiently used, usually argued that pasture, when 
arable agriculture was possible, was a waste.40 According to them, grazing 
did not improve the land, nor did it ensure that its potential would be met. 
Land dedicated to pasture was not only wasteful, it was also dangerous. 
Uncultivated and left in a state of nature, it served as refuge for dangerous 
people and wild animals, even disease.41 Leaving land in this barren state, 
they argued, was never an informed decision. On the contrary, it was mainly 
due to neglect, willful and at times even criminal.42
If the first point of almost general agreement was criticism of grazing, the 
second was the allegation that improving the land by making it achieve its 
(true) potential was not a choice but an obligation. Tying the reform of land 
to the reform of its people, improvement would ensure that, through access 
to land, poor vagabonds would be transformed into responsible, law-abiding 
individuals.43 Improvement would also guarantee the domestication of 
nature itself: uncultivated land became arid to the point of no return.44
40 AHN, Consejos 4057, fol. 1r–4r and 6r.
41 The report written by Pablo de Olavide, Seville, 20/11/1773, AHN, Consejos 4048, 
fols. 6r–9r and AHN, Consejos 4061, no. 15, fols. 30r–36r.
42 Contemporary documentation does clarify, however, that some fields may have been 
abandoned as a result of the “difficulties of the time,” epidemic outbreaks, or foreign 
occupation: AHN, Consejos 4047 and petition of the “lugares de las valles de Broto y 
Tena …” undated, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid (hereafter BNE) VE/200/11.
43 Petition of Manuel Rodríguez, Madrid, 23/11/1798, AHN, Consejos 4061 n. 2 and AHN, 
Consejos 4061 n. 13, fols. 6r–9r.
44 Arriquibar (1779) 238–239 and la Real Sociedad Matritense de Amigos del País en 1780 
according to: Archives of the Real Sociedad Matritense de Amigos del País (hereafter 
RSMAP) 37/1.
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Cultivating the land was deemed a patriotic activity as the re-conquest of 
barren terrain, some argued, was “more glorious, useful and secure than the 
conquest of distant lands.”45
Who was best suited to reform the land was another debated issue. Land-
lords tended to argue that the poor certainly were not. After all, even if they 
did not lack experience as laborers, they certainly lacked the knowledge, the 
means and the tools necessary to improve the land.46 Settlers who were 
“refugees and beggars” (prófugos y mendigos) were equally unsuitable.47 Col-
onizers, therefore, should be of adequate age, economic stature and educa-
tion.48 In short, intention to improve the land was perhaps a necessary but 
certainly not a sufficient condition. Furthermore, those wishing to become 
colonizers were to have a true “vocation.” They would have to have a true 
interest in improving the land (not only in acquiring possession of it), and 
they would also have to prove that they were capable of carrying out what 
they promised.49
Although repopulation campaigns did not always involve property rights 
– in many campaigns colonists would have to pay fees to landlords, who 
would maintain their property –, on most occasions, (proper) use was to 
lead (eventually) to rights. One popular way to attract colonists, for example, 
was precisely the promise to transfer land rights after a certain period. With-
out such an outlook, it was feared, nothing would be achieved.50 And, if 
improvement gave title to land – if not immediately, at least eventually –, the 
45 The original version reads: “un reino podría formarse de sólo estos desiertos espantosos y 
su reconquista sería más gloriosa, útil y segura, que la de países distantes:” Arriquibar
(1779) 235. Also see: Joaquín Navarros, Plan de repoblación para el lugar de Zarapuz en el 
reino de Navarra, 1778, RSMAP 25/11.
46 “Informe del alcalde mayor Antonio Joseph Cortés,” 26/2/1783 and 19/5/1783, AHN, Con-
sejo 4084 1r–4r and 12r–13r.
47 Alegations of the villa de Melgar de Fernamental in Real Chancillería de Valladolid (here-
after RCV), Pleitos Civiles, La puerta 2153/1.
48 Petition of Cristóbal García de Cantos of 1798 and the conclusions of the junta in on 1/
10/1798, AHN, Consejos 4061, cuaderno 8 and “real provisión en que se contiene en 
fuero de población de la Nueva Villa de Encinas del Príncipe …” 1779, AHN, Consejos 
4084.
49 Petition of Cáceres and su jurisdiction, 31/5/1800, AHN, Consejos 4060, expediente de 
Cayo Joseph López.
50 “Los colonos destinados al despoblado de Peñacerracín,” 26/7/1788, AHN, Consejos 4088, 
and “Real resolución,” Madrid, 15/3/1791, ANH, Consejos 4088.
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opposite was also true: landlords who refused to cultivate their land could 
lose not only their possession, but also their property rights. This could 
happen, contemporaries argued, because owners who did not cultivate their 
land had no rights at all. After all, they received the land under the condition 
that they would use it, and their failure to do so was sufficient to justify 
repossession and redistribution of the land. In the words of a contemporary 
observer: “For centuries, these lands have been fruitless. Their owners did not 
have, nor have at the present, nor can have in them any utility other than 
what they could have in possessions situated in imaginary spaces.”51 What 
was also helpful was the conviction that, on these occasions, the king could 
intervene in the existing legal order and both relinquish and create rights. 
This, it was argued, was the meaning of sovereignty: the king’s superior and 
eminent domain over all the land allowed him to distribute it according to 
public need, denying certain (existing) privileges and creating others anew.
Given this background, it is not surprising that, by the eighteenth cen-
tury, like Solórzano, Locke and Vattel, Spanish authors also identified work 
with property.52 They argued that labor, rather than land, produced riches 
and they reasoned that progress required allowing individuals to profit from 
the fruits of their labor. However, Spain was not the only European country 
in which these issues played a major role during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. England, where Locke wrote his essays, is another example.
From as early as the sixteenth century and more clearly in the three 
following centuries, the English countryside underwent a profound trans-
formation.53 Although historians have disagreed about its origin, develop-
ment and results, they have all coincided that during this period many lands 
previously considered public were made private through a process that they 
termed “enclosure.” According to them, economic pressures led to the fenc-
ing of lands, on the one hand, which demanded a more efficient usage, on 
the other.54 Contemporary, was a new ideology that connected property to 
51 The original version reads: “pues ni han tenido ni tienen ni pueden tener por el orden 
regular en ellas más utilidad, que lo que pudieran figurarse en unas posesiones situadas en 
los espacios imaginarios.” Arriquibar (1779) 236.
52 Jovellanos (1795) 8 and 12–13.
53 Slater (1907) and Tawney (1965).
54 This mixing of elements eventually allowed authors such as Grotius and Locke to consider 
the lack of enclosure a sign of absence of improvement and thus the lack of title or 
property: Arneil (1996) 62.
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improvement, arguing that only those sufficiently knowledgeable and capa-
ble of making the land truly profitable should be allowed to hold it. Tied to 
the commercialization of agriculture and to a general attack on both public 
and communal land-holding (making private property a social and political 
ideal), these processes led to the dispossession of many individuals, families 
and communities, converting them from small peasants into landless agri-
cultural (and eventually industrial) wage workers.
Although these developments gradually gained strength, until the eight-
eenth century enclosure, at least, it was a controversial measure that many 
criticized.55 They debated its political, economic, social and legal wisdom 
and asked whether it was beneficial, to whom, and to what extent. Defenders 
of these policies insisted that they guaranteed the “common good” because 
they supplied the country with more food (the assumption was that fields 
better used would produce more) but also because they would reform the 
peasant and the poor, leading the country from “backwardness” to “mod-
ernity.” Identifying enclosure and the privatization of land with its “improve-
ment,” such actors sustained that this was the only means of encouraging 
investment and innovation. Labor was central to this debate as it was 
assumed that the state of agriculture depended on human action, not natural 
conditions.56 Portrayed as an activity confronting man with nature rather 
than with other men, improvement (and the subsequent appropriation it 
entailed) were thus considered a heroic struggle against territories – for 
example, grazing grounds – still in a “state of nature.”57 By the end of this 
process, the call to improve the land was couched as a religious duty to 
transform chaotic nature into a domesticated garden.
The argument supporting enclosure and improvement justified the trans-
fer of property from those “unworthy” to those who would use it “correctly.” 
Yet, if in theory, it could undermine not only the rights of communities to 
their common lands and the poor to their own, but also endanger the 
entitlements of wealthy landowners who did not use their properties suffi-
ciently, such was not the case.58 As happened in the Americas, in practice, 
this powerful discourse was mainly applied to some sectors and to them 
55 Neeson (1993).
56 Arneil (1996) 96–103.
57 Larkin (1969) 1–2 and Brace (1998) 161–162.
58 Weaver (2004) 80–82.
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alone. It was as if the inherent assumption – almost never questioned – was 
that collective and poor was the same as bad use, whereas individualistic and 
wealthy equaled good. These presumptions allowed continuous scrutinizing 
and criticizing of the first, yet no real attempt to measure the performance of 
the second. Put differently, rather than being based on a case-to-case analysis 
(as the theory may have suggested), asking in each case what was the true 
potential of each section of land and how it could be improved and by 
whom, certain stereotypes supplied an automatic response that while under-
mining the rights of certain sectors, defended those of others.
By the eighteenth century, the literature that criticized the English poor 
and English communities for insufficiently attending to their land compared 
the members of these European groups to Native- Americans. Sometimes 
implicitly, others explicitly, it argued that it made equal sense to dispossess 
one and the other.59 After all, both the English poor and the American 
Indians were “backward,” and both hindered “progress.” It is also possible 
that practices in England informed behavior in the colonies. Not only 
because enclosure and improvement were first used in Ireland against the 
local inhabitants, not only because John Locke may have been inspired by 
developments in the Old World in order to elaborate his theories regarding 
the colonies, but mainly because there is evidence that English peasants who 
experienced dispossession at home ended up replicating it vis-à-vis natives, 
whose property they coveted and whom they could accuse of insufficiently 
working the land.60
IV. Conclusions
In the Americas as in Europe, by the late sixteenth century and clearly in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the right to land was tied to its “prop-
er use.” What proper use meant could be endlessly debated, but it was clearly 
the case that in both England and Spain, as well as in the Old and the New 
59 Neeson (1993) 30 and Brace (2001) 16–17. According to Brace (1998) 164, “The virtuous 
disciplined improver was defined not only in contrast to the property-less and wasteful 
hunter-gatherer in America, but also as directly opposed to the ungodly, undisciplined 
and unemployed in England.” On how improvement became an imperial policy see 
Drayton (2000).
60 Buck (2001) 47.
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World, these adjectives were mostly applied generically to certain activities 
of certain people, who were stereotyped as wasteful or, at least, not as suffi-
ciently active or informed as to transform “deserts” into fertile gardens.61
The road leading from criticism to criminalization was short but meaning-
ful. By the end of this process, not only were some Native- American and 
Europeans dispossessed, but this dispossession was presented as their own 
fault. It was a punishment of sorts for their own neglect, a means to force 
them to improve their ways and become “modern.”
Although commonalities existed, so did differences. Improvement was 
seen as an individualistic endeavor in England; in Spain and overseas it 
had stronger communal overtones as many believed that it would only 
happen through the formation of new or the conservation of old commun-
ities. Yet, despite these differences, and the fact that property was not always 
immediately transformed in Spain, eventually in all three places (England, 
Spain, and Spanish America) indigenous communal property ended up in 
the hands of individual outsiders.
One feature that tied all these questions together was the constant debate 
unleashed on both sides of the Ocean on how to reorganize land regimes in 
ways that seemed more “reasonable” to contemporaries. Whether “reason-
ableness” was the motive or the excuse we will never know – it is probable 
that both were equally present – but, regardless, it is clear that rather than 
debating titles and historical rights, what contemporaries did was to discuss 
how to change them, how to undermine them, or how to relinquish them 
altogether. It was as if they were willing to reinvent the social contract and 
the legal basis for ownership by putting a new spin on existing theories. This 
was an important development within a society (still) marked by tradition 
and in which, for centuries, the right to land depended on the passage of 
time. Now, instead of “historical rights” what mattered was a certain “public 
utility.” Historical amnesia, in short, was equally present on both sides of the 
Ocean, although its results may have differed according to place and time. 
Tabula rasa was not an American invention; it was tied to a process we now 
identify as “modernity.”
61 It is thus debatable whether England had indeed developed a particular discourse that, 
contrary to other European nations, focused “on the possession of territory to the exclu-
sion of its inhabitants” and had passed from judging ownership and cohabitation to 
evaluating use: Tomlins (2010) 132–134.
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Insistence on the present rather than the past, however, may have been 
particularly useful in the Americas, as it allowed ignoring the rights of 
previous occupiers; nonetheless, it was also powerful in Europe. Tied to 
the growing notion of sovereignty and royal responsibility, it imagined a 
modernizing upper class leading the rest of humanity (mainly indigenous 
peoples and the poor) to “progress.” Rather than Americanized, law was 
modernized. The Americas, in short, may have accentuated European 
debates on what occupation and proper usage were, but they did not invent 
them, nor did they clearly depart from existing notions as experimentation 
took place on both sides of the Ocean contemporaneously.
The inability to distinguish European from American developments was 
one feature of this modernization process. Although some institutions, laws 
and doctrines found a more fertile ground on one side of the Atlantic versus 
the other, the constant dialog between both and the continuous influx of 
ideas and practices made these worlds to some degree united. Practices 
experimented in Europe were implemented in the Americas, while also 
influencing the Old World. Success or failure in one could be detrimental 
to the experiment on the other side, but exact genealogies are hard, perhaps 
even impossible, to establish. On certain occasions, the Americas appeared 
almost as a platform on which ideas about Europe were debated. On others, 
it was a cause and a reason to reconsider old truths. But whatever the precise 
dynamics may have been, this continuous conversation ensured that the law 
constantly changed. Under the guise of continuity, it mutates according to 
place, time and circumstances.62 And, although innovations could be the 
result of an encounter with new circumstances, more often than not and as 
usually happens with law and legal change, they included new visions and 
new ways of interpreting the existing canon.
62 Mariluz Urquijo (1976) 389–402.
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Heikki Pihlajamäki
The Westernization of Police Regulation:
Spanish and British Colonial Laws Compared
“[…] porque todo o lo más, es nuevo [en las Indias] o digno de 
innovarse cada día, sin que ningún derecho, fuera del natural, 
pueda tener firmeza y consistencia, ni las costumbres y ejemplos 
que hayamos introducidos sean dignos de continuarse, ni las 
leyes de Roma o España, se adapten a lo que pide la variedad 
de sus naturales, además de otras mudanzas y variedades, que 
cada día ocasionan los inopinados sucesos y repentinos accidentes 
que sobrevienen.”1
I. Period Introduction: Legal Globalization in the Early Modern
European law was the primary vehicle and export product of early modern 
globalization. European law spread with the Spaniards to Central and South 
America, and the Philippines; with the Portuguese to Brazil, Angola, 
Mozambique, Goa, and Macao; with the Dutch to Ceylon and Indonesia; 
with the French to Quebec and Louisiana; with the British to North Amer-
ica, Australia, and countless other places around the world; and even with 
the Danes to the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix.
Expansion was nothing new to European law at the outset of the modern 
age. European law had already expanded continuously pari passu with the 
expansion of the Roman Empire, and again after Roman law was revived in 
late eleventh century Bologna. The medieval expansion had meant that the 
learned bodies of law, Roman and canon, traveled from the southern parts 
of Europe to the north, from the western parts to the east, and from the 
cities to the countryside. Roman law traveled with the learned jurist, canon 
law with the Catholic Church and its churchmen.2
1 Solórzano y Pereyra (1648) IV.XVI.3, 260. I have modernized the spelling in the quote.
2 On the expansion of the law within medieval Europe, see Whitman (2009).
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To portray European law as a vehicle of globalization may seem Euro-
centered. It is of course true that European law has not been the only body of 
law expanding in the pre-modern world. Islamic law went through a period 
of rapid expansion from the seventh century onwards. The solutions that the 
Islamic legal experts had developed, building on the heritage of the Semitic 
cultures of the Near East, were quickly absorbed not only in the cradle of the 
religion for commercial needs, but also in large areas of North Africa and 
Central Asia, to where Islam spread.3 Chinese law, especially the Confucian 
concept of li, has traditionally exercised influence in large areas of the Far 
East.4 The same questions that I will ask about European law in this article 
could certainly be asked of Islamic and Chinese laws as well. However, it 
remains fairly clear that of all of these expanding laws of the medieval and 
early modern periods European law had most success in extending its sphere 
of influence around the globe, at least measured by sheer geography.
The term globalization, irritating slogan as it has become for many, can be 
called into question. No globalization has so far been complete in geograph-
ical terms – not even the present-day iteration based mainly on the law of the 
United States of America. Large tracts of the globe have always been left 
untouched, and even the picture of large tracts being completely dominated 
by extending bodies of law may prove misleading on closer inspection – and 
indeed almost always does. The learned ius commune applied in the emerging 
high courts of Europe in the early modern period was not the same as the 
law applied in remote local courts dominated by unlearned laymen.5 The 
difference is naturally even clearer if one compares the audiencias of Spanish 
America to the jungles of Amazonia.
Despite the unquestionable deficiencies in the terminology, globalization 
is still a useful term. It expresses huge waves of legal transfers, as opposed to 
mere isolated legal institutions, not linked to any wholesale cultural transfer, 
floating around the globe. The dimensions of legal transfer are certainly 
completely different if we take the Swedish-Danish institution of the om-
budsman as an example of an isolated legal transfer, comparing it with whole 
3 On the early expansion of Islam and its connection to the preceding cultures of the Near 
East, see Hallaq (2005) 8–28.
4 Chongko Choi even speaks of East Asian ius commune; see Choi (2009).
5 Sweden is the particular case I have in mind.
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bodies of law being taken from one continent to another. We need to have a 
name for the larger phenomenon, and legal globalization is such a name.
Legal globalization, however, is not more than a huge legal transfer, and is 
subject to similar theoretical ponderings as the more limited legal transfers. 
It is a truism that all transfers change when adapted to new circumstances, 
and the new outcome looks different than the old one. The “receiving” 
culture and its new circumstances unavoidably influences the shape that 
the transfer takes. Comparative law scholars and comparative legal historians 
have written extensively on the material aspects of legal transplants: what 
rules are carried over and borrowed by other jurisdictions and how legal 
rules change in this process. However, comparative legal historians have 
written surprisingly little on the conditions which cause transplants to 
change and, accordingly, how they change. The methods of legal change 
themselves can sometimes be understood as legal transfer, however. The 
main contention of this article is that both the Spanish and the British 
colonizers of America made ample use of one such technique, early modern 
police regulations. The spread of police regulation to the New World led to 
globalization or at least thorough Westernization of this legal instrument.
Police regulations were, not however, merely a technique. Although they 
covered a wide array of regulations, they did not cover everything. Police 
regulations were about administration, commerce, security, health, and cen-
sorship, but they were much less about contract law, rules of evidence, or 
punishment.
I will start with some theoretical considerations regarding the concepts of 
European and Spanish colonial law (Section II). Section III, the main part of 
the article, will discuss the main themes in regard to which Spanish colonial 
law developed different solutions in comparison with its peninsular Spanish 
legal order(s). In Section IV, I will then attempt to explain these differences, 
comparing Spanish colonial law with that of the British North American 
colonies. Section V sums up the essential points of the article.
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II. Globalization of Law
William Twining defines globalization as “those processes which tend to 
create and consolidate a world economy, a single ecological system, and a 
complex network of communications that covers the whole globe, even if 
does penetrate every corner of it.”6 The diffusion of Western law with early 
modern colonization not only fits the concept of globalization well, but also 
can in fact be taken as one of its primary examples. The concept of Western 
law still requires some discussion. What later became Western law – a term 
that Harold Berman made universally known – was the same as European 
law or ius commune, the learned law consisting of Roman and canon law at 
the beginning of the early modern period. European law, by the time the 
overseas conquests began, was already falling into regional subcategories 
because of the contact that ius commune made with particular local laws.7
The idea of Castilian regents was to incorporate the desired Roman legal 
texts into written statutes (most notably the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X the 
Wise) and prevent the use of Roman law otherwise. How successful this was 
is disputed.8 In any case, the derecho común of Castile was clearly one of the 
6 Twining (2000) 4. Twining’s concept of globalization is, however, not historically very 
sensitive. Duncan Kennedy has, by contrast, approached the subject of globalization 
historically by distinguishing three periods of globalization in the West: the period of 
classical legal thought (ca. 1850–1914), the period of socially oriented legal thought 
(1900–1968), and the most recent period of “policy analysis, neoformalism, and adjudica-
tion” (1945–). See Kennedy (2006).
7 Many legal historians, most recently Patrick Glenn, in fact deny the existence of one ius 
commune, claiming that the Latin-based ius commune consisting of mainly Roman law 
never existed, but that it always appeared as regional variants only – gemeines Recht and 
Derecho común, for instance. See Glenn (2005) 42–43. Other skeptical views against the 
existence of a truly unified ius commune have been offered by Osler (1997); Halpérin
(2000) 724; and Heirbaut (2003) 304–305. These views are very different from the tradi-
tional ones represented by Francesco Calasso, Helmut Coing and most recently Manlio 
Bellomo. As a Nordic legal historian, the author of the present article cannot help but 
agree with the critical voices. However, the localized variants of ius commune had much to 
do with each other. The overarching learned law was practically the same everywhere, but 
since the local laws were different (written or not), the overall combination of the two (or 
more) layers of law turned out differently.
8 Again, opinions diverge as to whether the Siete Partidas amounted to a “Spanish common 
law,” or whether the law book of Alfonso X was the highest layer of ius proprium, above 
which the pan-European ius commune still existed. See Barrientos Grandón (2000) 203; 
Petit (1982); Jacobson (2002).
100 Heikki Pihlajamäki
European variants of ius commune, sharing the essential features of both civil 
and procedural law with other variants of the European ius commune. This 
Spanish variant of European law served as the basis and bridge for what 
came to constitute the law for Spanish America from 1492 onwards.
We still have one more terminological hurdle to cross, the term “Spanish 
colonial law.” Derecho indiano is the term most frequently used in Spanish to 
denote the legal system in force in the Spanish colonies during the early 
modern period. Like all geographical ways of limiting law, which is essen-
tially a shifting phenomenon, so derecho indiano is also not a natural entity, 
but was created at a particular time and place. In this case, the term was put 
into historiographical use in the early twentieth century as part of the His-
panist ideology of that period.9 Like all geographical definitions of law, 
derecho indiano is helpful in distinguishing and pointing out a particular 
area of study from other such areas. However, by highlighting its particu-
larity, derecho indiano also tends to conceal connections that the law in 
Spanish America had with Spanish and other European law. In this way, it 
does not differ from “European” or “Nordic” law. Like any national legal 
history, the research tradition of derecho indiano has tended to highlight its 
particularity instead of denoting its similarities (or differences) with other 
colonial systems or European law. In other words, comparative studies on 
Spanish colonial law have been completely lacking until recent years.10 This 
is particularly strange considering that general historians have been engaged 
in comparative “Atlantic studies” since the 1970s.11 The lack of comparative 
studies tends to create an illusion of uniqueness of national (or quasi-nation-
al, such as derecho indiano) legal systems. Comparative studies tend to dimin-
ish such illusions.
This article challenges the uniqueness of Spanish colonial law in two 
respects. First, I wish to claim that Spanish colonial law was just one variant 
of European and Spanish law. Second, Spanish colonial law was only one 
version of colonial legal orders. Therefore, it can and should be approached 
9 See Pihlajamäki (2010).
10 In this respect, Spanish colonial law is not different from the mainstream legal history on 
any of the discipline’s subfields. Ross’s article (2008a) is a notable exception, and I have 
myself authored a few articles in which derecho indiano is compared to European law from 
various aspects. See Pihlajamäki (1997); Pihlajamäki (2002) and Pihlajamäki (2004).
11 See Davies (1973); Elliott (1970); and Daunton / Halperin (1999).
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in the global context of the expansion of European law to other continents. 
This does not mean that derecho indiano should not be used as an object of 
study – this article is doing just that, of course. Instead, scholars should be 
aware of the position of Spanish colonial law within a global context. It is 
necessary to understand that the concept of derecho indiano is essentially 
modern, created by legal historians trained in the period of national positive 
law. In this respect, it is no different from concepts like European, Nordic, or 
Far Eastern law. To portray Spanish colonial law as a separate or quasi-sep-
arate system of law would not have occurred to early modern Castilian or 
criollo legal professionals operating under the auspices of the Castilian 
Crown. I will now turn to the modern definitions of Spanish colonial law.
III. What was Spanish colonial law?
The Spanish Crown was quick to organize the administration of its overseas 
territories in America. Formally speaking, the Indies were incorporated into 
the Castilian Crown, although the Castilian kings were also the kings of 
Aragon. Because the American territories were incorporated as a conquered 
territory, it was up to the Castilian Crown to organize their administration 
without the institutional barriers that limited the authoritarian exercise of 
kingship in Castile. For instance, no Cortes, or representative assembly, was 
ever introduced on the American side of the Atlantic.12
The legal order that regulated life in the colonies was basically Castilian 
law. This was based on the Siete Partidas, a thirteenth century compilation 
heavily influenced by Roman and canon law later supplemented by royal 
regulation and court practice. The legal scholarship on ius commune inevi-
tably influenced Castilian law as well.Vigorous development by way of royal 
regulation was precisely what the early modern monarchs engaged in to gain 
increasing control of their lands. This royal legislation was police regulation.
According to a formal definition, Spanish colonial law was a “compound 
of legal rules applicable in the Indies, that is, in the American, Asian and 
Oceanic territories dominated by Spain.” Spanish colonial law can therefore 
be divided into a. norms specifically created for the Indies (derecho indiano 
12 Elliott (2007) 120–122. Elliott observes, however, that the institutional barriers limiting 
the royal authority had not become as important during the Middle Ages in Castile as 
they had in Aragon.
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propiamente tal o municipal); b. Castilian law (derecho castellano), which was 
used if “proper derecho indiano” did contain the normative solution needed; 
and c. Indian law (derecho indígena), or the law of the aboriginals.13 In 
addition to secular norms, we can also speak of the canon law of the Spanish 
colonies (derecho indiano canonico) as the canon law in force in Spanish 
America.14 These definitions reveal that “proper” Spanish colonial law stood 
in relation to Castilian law, used as a subsidiary body of law whenever 
derecho indiano could not provide an answer. The same applies to the canon 
law of Spanish America and canon law in general.
When did derecho indiano propiamente tal, Spanish colonial law in the 
narrow sense of the term, not provide answers for legal problems? And when 
it did, what was Spanish colonial law “properly speaking”? Technical defi-
nitions do not take a stand on what kinds of rules “Spanish colonial law 
properly speaking” consisted of. In principle, it could contain all kinds of 
rules, especially if customary law is taken into consideration, but in practice 
it did not. If we want to set Spanish colonial law into a comparative context, 
we cannot avoid looking beyond technical definitions and attempting to 
understand the norms the Castilian regents thought appropriate to bestow 
on their possessions on other continents.15
Some modern authors have given material descriptions of Spanish colo-
nial law. Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, one of the grand old men of the field 
defines derecho indiano as “a system of law, doctrines, and customs, created or 
accepted by the Castilian kings, in order to organize the spiritual or secular 
government of the Hispanic New World, regulate the condition of its inhab-
itants, direct navigation and commerce, and, above all, ensure the incorpo-
ration of the Indians into the Catholic faith.”16 Anyone acquainting them-
selves with the literature on Spanish colonial law cannot help noticing the 
heavy accent on these and other issues, and the lack of literature on others. 
Collections of papers issued regularly as a result of the conferences organized 
by the Institute of the History of Spanish Colonial Law (Instituto de Historia 
13 “[E]l conjunto de reglas jurídicas aplicables en Indias, o sea, los territorios de América, 
Asia y Oceanía dominados por España.” Dougnac Rodríguez (1994) 11.
14 See Duve (2008).
15 This is not to exclude local norm-giving, which occurred in all parts of Spanish America 
and at various levels of its administration.
16 Zorraquín Becú 22 (1994) 407.
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del Derecho Indiano) are a good way of obtaining an overview of what india-
nistas have produced – and what they have not been so interested in.17
The Conference papers show a heavy emphasis on questions such as 
constitutional and administrative law, ecclesiastical law, mining law and 
water law. Much has also been written on the administrative institutions 
(such as cabildos and audiencias) and institutions of feudal law (such as 
encomienda). Considerably less has been written on the private law, criminal 
law, and procedural Law of the Indies. The scholarship on the history of 
private law in the Indies has tended to stress Spanish colonial law as part of 
the European ius commune. Much the same can be said about the literature 
on criminal and procedural law.18
The reason for the scarcity of scholarship in some fields and the concen-
tration of scholarship in others is obvious: derecho indiano “properly speak-
ing” was mostly the regulation of fields that needed special treatment in the 
Indies. Zorraquín Becú’s definition of derecho indiano above hints at this 
trend, which I have treated in more detail elsewhere; namely, that much 
of derecho indiano propiamente dicho is in fact functionally the same type of 
legislation which has been called “police law” (Polizeirecht) or laws pertain-
ing to “good government” (buen gobierno) in recent international legal his-
toriography. Police law in the early modern sense of the word refers to the 
legislative activity of an early modern state, which organizes its administra-
tion with statutes, decrees, ordinances, and other pieces of legislation.
The ideology legitimating this often massive amount of legislation pour-
ing from the chanceries of early modern kingdoms, towns, and other legis-
lating entities was that of good government, Staatsräson or raison d’État. 
Areas as different as religion, security and public order, agriculture, industry 
and commerce, traffic, construction, culture and sciences, as well as the 
control of the poor and the marginalized, needed detailed legislation.19 In 
these various ways, early modern police ordinances attempted to create and 
maintain public order, discipline and stability, but at the same time promote 
17 The Conferences have been organized at intervals of 2–4 years since 1966 in either His-
panic America or peninsular Spain.
18 See, for instance, the conference proceedings mentioned above, note 10 (Pihlajamäki).
19 In recent decades, the literature on police has grown immensely, and no comprehensive 
list is worth attempting here. See, for instance, Stolleis (1993), Härter / Stolleis (1996) 
and the subsequent parts of the series.
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the well-being of society.20 Church ordinances in the reformed parts of 
Europe came very close to police ordinances. In some parts of Europe, such 
as Sweden, separate church police regulations (kyrkopoliti) were issued, but 
not church ordinances.21
The emergence of police regulation is thus closely linked to the rise of the 
modern state and modern absolutism. Spain was no exception to this general 
European tendency. Johannes-Michael Scholz has noted that the Spanish 
legislator’s interest in police matters grew considerably between the Nueva 
Recopilación of 1640 and the Novísima Recopilación of 1805.22 Police law was 
the most modern regulatory tool that the early modern prince aiming at 
absolute power had at his disposal, although one has to bear in mind that the 
effectiveness of police regulation often left much to be desired. Although 
police law was a tool of the monarch, its legitimating ideology also imposed 
limits on the use of police, because the regulations could only be used to 
further the common good, the bonum commune.
From the very beginning of the conquest, the Spanish Crown issued a 
large number of statutes to regulate life in the Indies. The jurist Antonio 
León Pinelo is said to have extracted the thousands of royal cédulas that made 
up the Recopilación de las leyes de Indias, a compilation of statutes printed in 
1680 but already finished in 1635, from approximately 400,000 laws.23 The 
laws tended to govern every detail of routine administration and were often 
extremely casuistic, as police regulation tended to be. Clarence Haring men-
tions, as examples of the areas governed,“the fixing of prices, the ferry charge 
on the river at Santo Domingo, the right to own fishing boats, permission to 
import from Spain cattle and foodstuffs necessary for the subsistence of the 
new overseas communities, the right to engage in local trade with nearby 
settlements, or to build vessels for such a trade; the exact manner in which a 
town must be laid out, the width of the streets and their direction in relation 
to the sun, the size and subdivision of the city blocks, the location of the 
church and the town hall.”24 Religious matters could with good reason be 
20 Härter (1993) 62–63.
21 On the different concepts of police in relation to ecclesiastical administration, especially 
in Germany, see Stolleis (1992) 250.
22 See Scholz (1996) 230–231.
23 Haring (1947) 113. Haring says that the final Recopilación contains 6400 cédulas, whereas 
more recent scholarship mentions the figure 7308; see Dougnac (1994) 11.
24 Haring (1947) 120–121.
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added to the list, making it look like a rather typical catalog of police 
regulation in any region of the early modern Western world.
The amount of legislation was indeed such that it soon started to call for 
some sort of general presentation. Both compilations and literature started 
to appear to meet this need. Of the scholars in the field, the most famous was 
Juan Solórzano Pereira, who was a judge of the Audiencia of Lima. The 
leading derecho indiano author of the colonial period, Solórzano’s major 
work, Política Indiana (1648), deals with “the law and the government par-
ticular to the Indies” (Derecho y Gobierno particular de las Indias).25
The work is divided into six “books,” which deal with the discovery of 
America (I), the social position of the aborigines (book II), the creoles as 
landowners (book III), ecclesiastical government (book IV), as well as 
administrative (book V) and economic organization (book VI) of the Indies. 
The general plan of the book reveals that Solórzano’s política was essentially 
similar to European police regulations. In the second book, chapters I–XXIV 
are about the “personal services” of the Indians, such as the construction of 
buildings (II.VIII.1.–14.), agriculture (II.IX.1.–40.), the postal service (II: 
XIV.1.–32.), mining (II.XV.1.–56.), as well as tributes (II.XIX.1.–56.) and 
tithes (II.XXIII.1.–43.). These are all areas of regulation central to the Euro-
pean ius politiae.
Because we are dealing with a particular kind of police regulation, Soló-
rzano Pereira’s magnum opus, however, is almost completely devoid of major 
areas of law such as private, criminal, and procedural law. The law in these 
areas by and large followed Castilian law, which, in turn, was just one 
version of the European ius commune.
The huge amount of the laws was also compiled, first as private initiatives, 
then as more official ones as well. The cedulario (register of royal laws and 
decrees) of Vasco de Puga, judge of the New Mexico audiencia, was printed as 
early as the 1560s. The registers proved helpful in compiling the work, and 
later compilers also used them as material. Antonio León Pinelo, as men-
tioned above, bore the main burden of compiling the major general collec-
tion of laws of the laws of the Indies. The work took place under the super-
vision of first Rodrigo de Aguiar y Acuña and then Juan Solórzano Pereira. 
25 Solórzano y Pereyra (1648) I.I.1, 22. The work first appeared in Latin as De indianum 
iure in 1629.
106 Heikki Pihlajamäki
Once completed, copies of the compilation were sent to viceroys, audiencias, 
cabildos, and other major figures of the Spanish colonial administration.26
The Recopilación is divided into nine books, which include – roughly 
speaking – ecclesiastical government (I), matters concerning the Council 
of the Indies and audiencias (II), political and military administration, vice-
roys, and captains-general (III), the legal foundation of colonization (IV), 
provincial government (V), Indians (VI), criminal law (VII), the royal ex-
chequer (VIII), and commerce and navigation (IX).27 The titles of the books 
are quite telling of the contents of the compilation and thus of Spanish 
colonial law itself, since the material included in Pinelo’s compilation con-
centrates heavily on the administration of various kinds and commerce.
Book VII, the provisions of which share elements of penal law, is by far 
the shortest and far from intended as a comprehensive criminal code. Its 
eight headings include regulations on judges (1), games and players (2), 
marriage problems resulting from husbands being away from their wives 
in America (3), vagabonds and gypsies (4), the black people and those of 
mixed race (5), prisons (6), prison inspections (7), and crimes and punish-
ments (8). Most of the titles thus again deal with matters of typical police 
regulation. Criminal law as such is not the point here, not even in heading 8 
on crimes and punishment, the 29 laws of which are really a haphazard 
collection of regulations concerning matters of particular concern for the 
Crown in the colonies. For instance, law 11 of heading 8 requires that those 
sentenced to the gallie should be sent to Cartagena or Tierrafirme to serve 
their sentences. According to law 15, the judges ought not to moderate the 
legal punishment – which was probably also customary in America as else-
where in the Western world. Furthermore, law 17 established that judges 
should refrain from accepting settlements except in “very special cases, at the 
request and wish of the parties, and if the case was such that it [did] not 
require satisfaction to the public cause.”
The examples are numerous, but I think the point is clear: Book VII is no 
penal code in the sense of Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532) or Ordon-
nance de Villers-Cotterêts (1539), but rather a collection of rules not capable of 
functioning without the general background of Spanish penal and proce-
26 Haring (1947) 113.
27 The Recopilación is now conveniently available on the Internet, http://www.congreso.
gob.pe/ntley/LeyIndiaP.htm.
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dural law. This is even more obvious if we think about private law, on which 
the Recopilación is practically silent.
I will take one more example of the Spanish colonial legislation from a 
particular part of the Spanish colonies, for which the catalogues of statutes 
have recently been published, Río de la Plata (1534–1717), Charcas (1563–
1717), and Tucumán and Paraguay (1573–1716). The great majority of the 
statutes catalogued in these registries can, hardly surprisingly considering 
what has been said above, be classified as police law. Some of the statutes 
deal with administration, religion and the protection of aborigines. A vast 
majority, however, has to do with the economy and the military.28 Again, 
criminal, procedural, and private law remain only sporadically regulated.
The precise character of police regulation as “law” is not clear either. 
Police regulations were, for instance, left out of the Swedish Law of the 
Realm of 1734, a compilation of laws otherwise thought perfect and un-
changeable. The natural law ideology underlying the compilations designed 
as eternal in fact demanded the exclusion of police regulations because of 
their mutable character.
Was derecho indiano really considered law, in the natural law understand-
ing of the word? At least the name of the original Latin version of Política 
Indiana, De indianum iure, suggests as much, although the title of the Span-
ish translation seems to convey that we are moving in the borderlands of law 
and more practical regulation. Another essential and specific characteristic of 
Spanish colonial law often mentioned in the literature is its changing char-
acter. The law adapts to circumstances, which change, according to Tau 
Anzoátegui, “quicker than … is experienced in other, more consolidated 
societies.”29 In his Casuismo y sistema (1992), Tau Anzoátegui shows how 
the notion of the mutability of the Indian world became common currency 
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and remained so all through the 
Spanish conquest.30 Gaspar de Villarroel, one of the leading American legal 
scholars of the seventeenth century wrote that “it is impossible that in this 
new world the government were firm and stable, and that the laws were 
28 See Libros registros-cedularios del Río de la Plata I–III (1534–1717) (1984–1991); Libros regis-
tros-cedularios de Charcas (1563–1717) (1992–1994); Libros registros-cedularios del Tucumán y 
Paraguay (1573–1716) (2000); and Pihlajamäki (2002).
29 Tau Anzoátegui (1992) 108.
30 Tau Anzoátegui (1992) 108–114.
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lasting: because there is such a large number of particularities, in the cure of 
which the laws assist, the human animal varies so much that today he is 
disturbed by the same medicine that healed him yesterday.”31
The changing nature of Spanish colonial law also goes hand in hand with 
the changing nature of police law in general. The need for constant and 
rapid change was even greater in the distant American lands, which were not 
only remote but also internally disparate. The modern legislative technique 
of ius politiae was extremely suitable for such circumstances. The institution 
of “obedience without compliance,” the inheritance of medieval Castilian 
law, came to serve much the same goal of constantly accommodating legis-
lation to local needs.32
The whole legislative ideology changed in the modern era. In the middle 
ages, legislation, at least in theory, had not created new law but only fol-
lowed tradition. In the absolutist state, all this necessarily ended: from now 
on, the sovereign’s command was law. Law could be changed anytime and 
basically in any way the sovereign wished, as long as he respected the limits 
of natural law and the law of God, and as long as his commands worked in 
favor of the common good. This type of legislation, as Stolleis has remarked, 
could easily react to the changing circumstances but was lacking ”scientific 
coherence.” In this sense, a police statute was in fact closer to the individual 
command of the sovereign than to a law intended to last. Because of this 
“lack of jurisprudential character” (Marginalitäten des juristischen Elementes) 
in Germany (and elsewhere), police statutes were not taught in law faculties 
of the universities until the nineteenth century, but rather shoved over to 
philosophical faculties.33
In short, corresponding to the latest trend in European statutory law, 
Spanish colonial law was police regulation. This can be said, I think, at least 
31 “Es imposible que en este nuevo mundo sea firme y fijo el gobierno, y que las leyes 
humanas sean duraderas: porque sobre ser tan sin número los casos particulares, a cuyo 
remedio asisten las leyes, es el hombre animal tan vario, que hoy le turba la salud 
la medicina que le sanaba ayer.” Villarroel, Gobierno, II, XVII, IV, 14. Cited at Tau 
Anzoátegui (1992) 111.
32 The principle of “obsérvase pero no cumpla” allowed the authorities of the Spanish colo-
nies, as an individual statute did not seem suitable for the local circumstances, to leave the 
statute unapplied while at the same time not formally violating it. Elliott (1970) 
131–132.
33 Stolleis (1992) 244.
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as long as we do not stick to a formalistic definition of Spanish colonial law, 
which defines it as everything applied in the Spanish law. Derecho indiano
was police law if we concentrate our observations on what was typical of 
derecho indiano propiamente dicho; in other words, the parts of Spanish col-
onial law which differed most from the compound of the laws of peninsular 
Spain and which were most typical of the Indies – typical in the sense that 
the police regulations formed the kernel of Spanish colonial law. In this 
respect, derecho indiano was no different from the law in most regions of 
Europe.
The comparative research question that now almost automatically arises is 
whether the same can be said of the other colonial legal orders of the early 
modern period. Alternatively, are we allowed to continue to speak of derecho 
indiano in terms of exceptionalism that until now has dominated the dis-
cussions, if not expressly then at least as a tacit presumption? I shall now 
move on to these problems.
IV. Comparative Aspects: British Colonial Law in North America
I will now briefly discuss the case of British colonial law in North America. 
The precise question is: To what extent did statutory regulation in the British 
American colonies resemble derecho indiano, and in what respect were the 
two different from each other?
The point that I wish to make in this section is that one of the many 
ingredients that English law around 1600 shared with continental law was 
police regulation, and that this kind of regulation found its way into the 
British North American colonies as well. In developing police regulation, 
England was no different from the German territories, Sweden, or France. In 
all of these polities, legislative powers not only sometimes published codes 
but also issued great quantities of piecemeal legislation on all walks of life. 
In German legal language, this kind of legislation came to be conceptualized 
as “police” (policey); elsewhere, the conceptualization was either lacking, or 
was ill-defined. The phenomenon, according to present scholarly under-
standing, was the same everywhere. A brief look at the colonial legislation 
quite clearly reveals that the British colonies in North America were no 
exception. Why should they have been, eager as they were to utilize many 
other facets of English law as well? I will thus claim that it does not suffice, as 
far as colonial legislation is concerned, to pay attention to the colonial codes 
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that have rightly merited much scholarly attention. It is also worthwhile to 
look into the abundant colonial police regulation.
The emphasis that scholars have recently placed on the complex nature of 
English law at the inception of the colonial period in America is pivotally 
important. As David Thomas Konig observes, the diversity of North Amer-
ican law can hardly be understood without understanding the context of 
early modern English law. Despite the common law’s position at the courts 
of Westminster, English law was far from uniform. Sir Edward Coke, for 
instance, enumerated more than 100 courts in the realm, including ecclesi-
astical courts, manorial courts, and merchants’ courts on his list. “The reach 
of the central common law courts,” according to Konig, was “according to 
local forces and practices.”34 It has been calculated that approximately fifteen 
different bodies of law governed the life of an average Englishman in 1600: 
no wonder William Blackstone lauded the fact that “the law hath appointed 
[such] a prodigious variety of courts in England.”35
England’s legal culture thus offered huge potential upon which to con-
struct the legal orders of the colonies. William Offutt explains that the far-
from-uniform seventeenth century English law provided colonial legal liter-
ates ample material, or “legal capital,” on which multiple legal solutions 
could be drafted. The legal literates made conscious choices between the 
various legal inheritances “to accommodate, prioritize, and integrate” them 
into a coherent system, Offutt argues, and ought not to be regarded as 
primitive versions of metropolitan law.36 It is crucial to understand that 
colonial law did not turn out the way it did by force of accident. However, 
as far as I have been able to determine, none of the contributors to the 
debate have discussed one important choice that the framers of colonial 
law made, which links it not only to English metropolitan law but also to 
Spanish colonial law.37 This is the nature of North American colonial law as 
police regulation.
34 Konig (2008) 151; see also Hulsebosch (2003); Offutt (2005) 161.
35 Blackstone (1765–1769), 3:24, 30.
36 Offutt (2005) 161. Offutt’s main point is that by the 1680s and 1690s “the multiple 
sources that had originally nourished colonial legal imaginations were slowly dying out.” 
Instead, “the common law […] became virtually the only form of legal capital still flowing 
across the Atlantic.” Offutt (2005) 161–162.
37 Richard Ross, however, touches upon the subject in his comparative article on the aspect 
of religious discipline, drawing on Massachusetts, Genevan, and Scottish sources. See Ross
(2008b) 975–1002.
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In recent decades, legal historical scholarship on police regulation has 
spread from Germany to other regions of early modern Europe.38 Scholars 
have confirmed that similar regulation existed practically everywhere.39 Eng-
land is no exception, although little research has been done on English 
police regulation from the comparative point of view. This may be a result 
of the traditional exceptionalism and isolation of English legal history, 
although critical research has recently lowered the barrier between common 
law and civil law.40
As far as I know, Robert von Friedeburg’s article on English police reg-
ulation (which he calls Ordnungsgesetzgebung) is the only study on the sub-
ject. Royal proclamations and parliamentary statutes were, as von Friedeburg 
shows, both instruments of police regulation. In the years 1485–1553, at 
least 437 proclamations were issued. Many of them were, however, intended 
to strengthen the authority of the statutes, and sometimes proclamations 
only gave further instructions in regard to parliamentary statutes.41 Statute 
law, according to the dominant theory of the sixteenth century, was the 
leading source of law because it stemmed from Parliament. Under Thomas 
Cromwell, a period of statutory reform was instigated, and during Henry 
VIII’s reign alone, 677 statutes were issued.42 Both the proclamations and 
the statutes of the late fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries covered very 
much the same matters as police regulation everywhere else in Europe: 
commerce, luxury, clothing, poor relief, vagabondage, health care, and reli-
gion, to mention but some of the most typical.43 Royal proclamations, 
according to the prevailing scholarly understanding, probably had little 
38 One notable exception is Raeff (1983), in which the author compares German and Rus-
sian police regulations in the early modern period. In the history of police regulation, 
Raeff was also an early starter and could therefore not take into consideration all the 
research in the field that has actually emerged only since the 1990s.
39 See the articles in Stolleis / Härter / Schilling (1996).
40 See, for instance, Zimmermann, who has on many occasions emphasized the similarities 
of legal institutions on both sides of the English Channel; see, e. g., Zimmermann (1993); 
and Freda, who has stressed the fact that not only common law but also early modern 
continental legal orders were very much driven by court precedents; see Freda (2009) 
263–278.
41 Friedeburg (1996) 583–584.
42 Friedeburg (1996) 586.
43 See Hughes / Larkin (1964), (1969a) and (1969b).
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practical effect, or at least we know little of their effects.44 This, again, fits the 
general European pattern. The fact that the English police regulation can be 
observed from the point of view of domestic power politics of the estates and 
the Crown, does not, however, prevent one from seeing the English royal 
proclamations and parliamentary statutes as essentially part of the same wave 
of police regulation that was taking over most of Europe in the early modern 
period. There was, no doubt, English policey.45
Written law, the actual “codes” included, was even more important for 
the colonies than for England. The colonists could not wait for the inherited 
common law doctrines to develop so as to meet the specific needs of the 
Americans. As a text-book of American legal history says, “England […] had 
no need to consider, in its law, the problem of hostile native tribes […] Some 
variations were natural – they stemmed from climate or the lay of the land; 
others were structural, depending upon whether the colony was a Crown 
colony, a chartered colony, or a proprietorship […] Initial differences in land 
or structure led to still further differentiation.”46 William Nelson has 
observed that in Virginia, the “rulers sought to accomplish their main chore, 
which was to coerce labor out of the local inhabitants, through intimidation 
and brutality, while New England’s leaders strove to create a religious utopia 
by recourse to the law of God, not the law of England.” These norms took 
the form of statutory law, such as Dale’s Code of Virginia (1611), in addition 
to which English customary law was also used. In the initial period of the 
colonization, however, English common law was not on the agenda.47 Com-
mon law with all its intricacies was simply too sophisticated a tool for 
directing the new colonies effectively and, what is more, it could not func-
tion without lawyers. Common law might have been, as Lawrence Friedman 
puts it, “somehow the norm; colonial differences, then, were examples of 
some sort of rude primitivity.”48
44 Eliot (1965); Friedeburg (1996) 583.
45 Von Friedeburg remarks that the English language did not follow the continental termi-
nology in transforming the Aristotelian “polity” to “policey” during the seventeenth cen-
tury (Friedeburg (1996) 579). This does not, of course, mean that the English were not 
aware of the continental development or that the English “police” were completely differ-
ent from its continental counterpart.
46 Friedman (1985) 37.
47 Nelson (2008) 16.
48 Friedman (1985) 34.
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The common law gained importance over time as soon as lawyers started 
arriving. These “legal literates” often had legal education and continued 
enhancing their need of legal information by reading English treatises.49
The legal orders of the colonies were also controlled by the Privy Council 
in London, although, as Richard Ross has observed, the Council’s decisions 
were too few to control legal life in the colonies effectively. The Privy Coun-
cil only took relatively few cases from the colonies under consideration. In 
this respect, the difference from Spanish America is clear: it was much easier 
for private individuals and authorities to have their cases heard in the Coun-
cil of the Indies than it was for the British colonists to reach the Privy 
Council.50
Even the common law turned out differently in America. In many cases, 
English legal doctrines needed to be simplified to suit the needs of the 
colonies. For instance, the writ system was not adopted as such. The less 
technical bill procedure was used instead, at least in Virginia.51 Many cases 
did not come to court at all because of the widespread use of arbitration and 
mediation, and in most of the colonies juries decided both questions of fact 
and law.52 Nor did the professional division of lawyers into solicitors and 
barristers develop.
The level of legal culture is still another factor, which unavoidably 
affected the closeness of colonial law to English law. At least around 1700, 
colonial legal culture was underdeveloped, as seen through the eyes of an 
English observer. The lawyers had received little or no training at an educa-
tional institution such as the Inns of Court, had not been formally admitted 
to a professional organization, and lacked the social status of their English 
counterparts.53
Although the colonists thus adopted the basic blueprint of English law, 
they did so only with many deviations from the original model. The devia-
tions were typically simplifications, necessary because of the initial lack of 
lawyers and their later scarcity. The functioning of the English common law 
would have been unthinkable in its original form in the absence of lawyers 
able to master its technicalities.
49 See Bilder (1999) 83–102.
50 Ross (2008a) 118–121.
51 Nelson (2008) 37.
52 Nelson (1975) x.
53 See Konig (2008) 157.
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Not all changes were due to the lack of lawyers, however. Some resulted 
from the fact that the circumstances in America were radically different from 
those in England, where the common law doctrines had emerged. England’s 
sixteenth century experience of extending its justice system into the Welsh 
and Northern marchlands, Ireland served as a background for events in 
Virginia and, despite differing circumstances between North America and 
Virginia, there were also many similarities leading to similar outcomes.54
In Wales and the North, instead of a fully developed common law system, 
judicial power was entrusted to the local lords and their conciliar courts with 
a simple royal commission, which granted barons broad discretion in shap-
ing justice. Hardly surprisingly, it came to look quite different from the 
common law. The conciliar justice involved no juries. Legal proceedings 
were speedy, as no common law protection shielded the accused in criminal 
cases and because the complicated forms of the civil procedure were not 
followed. As David Thomas Konig observes, the Crown was forced to toler-
ate these deviances from the common law as the price for maintaining at 
least minimal control over these areas. Later on, the same pattern emerged 
in Ireland, as the Tudors extended conciliar justice there, leaving the central 
courts at Westminster with little influence on the island. In Ireland, just as 
previously in Wales and the North, the interests of a centrally led but com-
plicated common law needed to yield to a more straightforward and discre-
tionary judicial power. Little external constraint or accountability was 
imposed upon any of these courts.55
However, unlike Wales and the northern marshlands, conciliar justice 
failed in Ireland, largely because of the weaker status of the local magnates. 
Conciliar justice ultimately made way for the common law, which, better 
equipped as it was to secure land tenures, served the interests of English 
colonizers and land owners more effectively.56
The first phase of colonization in North America followed similar pat-
terns. The leaders assumed and were granted wide powers in organizing legal 
administration, and they largely ignored and bypassed English common law 
developments. By the 1630s, however, the initial phase of “marshland jus-
tice” was over. Eight common law courts replaced the monthly courts that 
54 Konig (1991).
55 Konig (1991) 72.
56 Konig (1991) 78.
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had delivered justice hitherto, and sheriffs took the place of provosts-mar-
shals. In 1632, the General Assembly ordered that justice be administered “as 
neere as may be, accordinge to the lawes of England.”57
At the beginning of colonization, since it was often unclear which law 
should be applied, so-called introduction statutes were issued in some colo-
nies.58 A principle developed over the years, according to which the laws of 
the colonies should not be repugnant to the English laws although differ-
ences arising from the needs of the place and the people could arise. Mary 
Sarah Bilder calls this the “transatlantic constitution,” According to Bilder, 
the “constitution” was unwritten, although it sometimes found its way into 
legal documents. The Rhode Island Charter of 1663 expresses these princi-
ples of repugnancy and divergence as follows:59
[T]he laws, ordinances, and constitutions [of Rhode Island], so made, be not con-
trary and repugnant onto, but as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of this our 
realm of England, considering the nature and the constitution of the place and 
people there.60
Until the eighteenth century, it remained unclear whether and to what 
extent the laws of England, the common law statutes, would apply in the 
colonies. The so-called introduction statutes solved the problem by deter-
mining the circumstances in which the English law would apply. Rhode 
Island’s introduction statute of 1700 declared that English law would be 
executed if the colony’s own laws would not cover the case.61 English law 
was, in other words, given subsidiary status in a true ius commune sense of the 
term.
Both the discretion left to the local magnates in charge of shaping con-
ciliar justice in Wales, Northern England, and Ireland and the failure of 
conciliar justice in Ireland and North America reveal important things about 
how laws were transferred to colonies in the early modern period. The initial 
phase of legal development in the North American followed much the same 
pattern of simplified justice. The way legal orders took shape was not merely 
influenced by political realities, the practical need to allow concessions to 
those actually in charge of representing the political power of the Crown. 
57 Konig (1991) 92.
58 Bilder (2008) 99.
59 Bilder (2004) 1.
60 Bilder (2004) 2.
61 Bilder (2008) 98–99.
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The local holders of judicial power also had to gain legitimacy among the 
populace. In other words, political alliances decisively determined how jus-
tice would and could be shaped.
The political power alignment was nevertheless only one determinant. 
Another was geography. Time and space both created challenges from the 
point of view of maintaining a genuinely English system of common law, 
even after the common law courts had been established in the 1630s. The 
geographical differences per se sometimes called for different legal arrange-
ments. The time factor also played a role since crossing the ocean took time, 
as such the colonists were not always aware of the latest legal developments 
in England, at least not right away.62 In this respect, British North America 
was similar to Spain’s South America. Another similarity was that the local 
circumstances, in both parts of America, soon came to be controlled by a 
similar legislative technique, police regulation.
If English police regulation has attracted little attention, the American 
equivalent has produced even less scholarship; in fact none. The English 
Crown produced relatively little special legislation for the American colo-
nies, which is a major divergence from Spain’s relations with its overseas 
colonies from a comparative point of view.Taking into consideration the fact 
that police regulation was far from unknown in England, the scarcity of 
British legislation in America cannot be explained by the existence of a 
common law tradition. The lack of royal laws can be understood much 
better when observed against the context of the relative laxness of colonial 
practices on the British side of the Atlantic.
In Spanish America, various authorities were constantly reporting on 
each other to the Crown. The activities of Spanish officials could be checked 
in various ways. The visita or visitation, an institution developed in medieval 
canon law and known in many parts of Europe, could be imposed upon 
an official as a result of an individual complaint to Consejo de Indias or 
if suspicions had otherwise arisen. At the end of his term of office, every 
official’s activities were checked as a matter of course in the residencia
62 But, as Ross remarks, “the great distances that the Atlantic Ocean created between colo-
nies and metropoles provides (by itself) a weak explanation of the forms of imperial 
governance in the Americas. The English and Spanish empires, which both spanned the 
Atlantic, established different systems of legal communication that grew out of the dis-
similar political and social contexts.” Ross (2008a) 118.
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procedures.63 The English Crown imposed no such routine scrutiny on the 
American authorities.64
The British issued important legislation regarding the whole Empire, 
especially on commerce, such as the important navigation acts, laying the 
basis for British mercantilism.65 Although the English otherwise allowed the 
local authorities much more freedom in deciding how to run the colonies, 
some royal proclamations dealing specifically with colonial issues were 
nevertheless issued. Examples include the proclamation on forbidding a 
lottery in Virginia and the one forbidding the importation of tobacco from 
elsewhere than Virginia or the Summer Island.66 Royal proclamations, at 
least under James I were, however, few. Almost all of them dealt with trans-
atlantic questions, typically commerce.
A more voluminous statutory regulation, intended to regulate the colo-
nial affairs per se, was worked out on the spot in the colonies themselves. In 
line with the dual authority system of the British colonial world, by the late 
seventeenth century it had become clear that not only the Crown but also all 
colonial assemblies were entitled to draft, enact, and change their own laws, 
although they were then subject to review by the Crown.67
Virginia’s statutes are a good example of the use of statute law in the 
English colonies in North America, because Virginia’s legislation was one of 
those imitated by the other colonies. William Hening collected Virginia’s 
statutes from 1619 to 1823.68 This is not the place to thoroughly survey 
Hening’s Statutes at large. Henning’s Statutes fill thirteen volumes, and the 
amount of statutory law did not show signs of diminishing towards the end 
of the colonial period.
Even a brief look into the index of the Statutes reveals that the Virginian 
statutes fall squarely into the general pattern of Western early modern police 
regulation. Early Virginians legislated on bastards (1657), church wardens 
(1623), drunkenness (1632), fences (1642), hunting (1642), powder (1642), 
coinage (1645), trespassing animals (1748), weights (1748), and beggars 
(1755) to mention only a few of the typical areas of statutory law. They do 
63 Haring (1947) 148–157.
64 Elliott (1970) 126.
65 See Priest (2008) 406–407.
66 Larkin / Hughes (1973) 500–502, 627–632.
67 Bilder (2004) 55.
68 Hening (1923).
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not essentially differ from the police regulation in continental Europe: piece-
meal legislation disciplining and controlling every aspect of people’s every-
day lives.
Customary law soon started to develop in its own directions in both the 
Spanish and English colonies. Nevertheless, both were also very much gov-
erned with the help of statutory law. There are, however, two major differ-
ences between the ways in which police regulation was employed. The first 
major difference is that whereas the vast majority of statutory laws in the 
Spanish colonies originated in Madrid, an overwhelming majority of the 
statutes in the English North American colonies were produced in the col-
onies themselves. Both Spanish and English colonizers took advantage of the 
most modern legislative technique, the policey. In both cases, some of that 
legislation was produced on the spot, in the colonies themselves. The second 
major difference between the Spanish and English colonial legal orders is 
that that the law in the English North American colonies grew further apart 
from the laws of the mother country. It seems that this was not so much due 
to the greater geographical differences or other local needs (which exists to a 
similar extent in both North and South America) but simply because the 
Spaniards were able to keep their lawyer-civil servants on a tighter leash 
better than the English could theirs, as shown by scholars such as J. H. Elliott 
and Richard Ross.
Another factor contributing to greater uniformity of derecho indiano as 
against North American law was, undoubtedly, the Castilian legislator’s 
greater propensity towards unification. Statutes emanating from the Consejo 
de Indias were recorded in the cedularios, registries kept by the local author-
ities, which enhanced their usability. The greater centralization of Spanish 
law is also reflected in the way its laws were codified. The Recopilación of 
1680 has no counterpart in North America, although North Americans did 
not resist the idea of statutory law or codification as such. The English 
colonies began to publish authoritative collections of their laws early on, 
in addition to which private collections also appeared.69 Although the differ-
ences within the vast area of the Spanish Empire were many, the American 
colonies had been allowed to drift even further apart, legally speaking, at an 
early stage.
69 As examples can be mentioned For the colony in Virginea Britannia (1612), Cotton (1641), 
and The Book of the General Laws and Libertyes (1648) of Massachusetts.
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V. Conclusion: the Westernization of Police Regulation
in the Early Modern Period
I have attempted above to demonstrate how the early modern colonialism 
took advantage of the most modern form of contemporary legal techniques, 
police regulation, not only in practically all corners of Europe, but also 
everywhere in the Western world. Although it may seem self-evident and 
hardly revolutionary to us now, police regulation is, just like any other major 
legal phenomenon, a historical product developed in time and space. The 
amount of literature produced on codification, court decisions, and – as far 
as Europe is concerned – police regulation, shows that it is hardly insignif-
icant which form law takes.
The substance of American police regulation has not been given much 
consideration in this short piece. Such an undertaking would certainly 
require more time and space than I presently have at my disposal. Police 
regulation was a good legal technique to import to the British colonies 
because it typically did not require professional lawyers as draftsmen or 
users. The English common law did, the European ius commune did, and 
codifications have always required expertise. Police regulation was also quick 
and flexible – to what extent it was also effective may be questionable.
Just like the English, so the Spaniards also used the whole array of legal 
techniques available in peninsular Spain to govern their overseas territories. 
The traditional areas of civil, criminal, and procedural law could be trans-
ported over to the Indies relatively easily with the corps of legal professionals 
following in the footsteps of the actual conquistadores. The traditional legal 
techniques – scholarship, court decisions, and codes – were, however, not 
quick and flexible enough to master the multitude of new circumstances and 
peoples to which the law needed to react. Instead, the heart of Spanish 
colonial law, derecho indiano, also came to be based on police regulation, 
of which Spaniards had already gathered plenty of experience on the pen-
insula.
Police regulation as a legislative technique was a legal transfer, and legal 
transfers adapt to new social and political circumstances, often changing 
while they are moved from one place to another. In at least one important 
respect, police regulation in Spanish America was crucially different from 
police law in British America. In the latter colonies, the bulk of the regu-
lation was drafted and issued in the colonies themselves, reflecting the rel-
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ative independence of the British colonies from London. In the Spanish 
colonies, however, the majority of the regulation continued to flow from 
the Council of the Indies right up to the end of colonial period, thus 
reflecting the centralized nature of the Spanish Empire.
Are we thus entitled to speak of a globalization of police regulation? This 
may have to await further studies on Dutch, French, and Portuguese colonial 
laws. At the moment, in any case, it seems fair to assume that in the early 
modern period, police regulation became at least thoroughly westernized.
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Brian P. Owensby
The Theater of Conscience in the “Living Law”
of the Indies
I
In early September 1690, Juan Rodríguez, a royal notary, accompanied Span-
iard Juan Moreno de Acevedo, owner of an obraje in Puebla, to an open field 
between the Indian towns of Santa Ana Acolco and Santa Bárbara Tamasul-
co, in the parish of Santa María Nativitas, Tlaxcala. Rodríguez had been 
charged by the audiencia in Mexico City with conducting a legal ceremony 
that was supposed to officially put Moreno into possession of the land as his 
own. On its face, this was to have been a routine proceeding. But all did not 
go according to plan. The audiencia had issued its order pursuant to a lawsuit 
between Moreno and the residents of Santa Ana and Santa Bárbara. In the 
late 1670s, Moreno had bought an hacienda adjoining the towns. He had 
then claimed certain lands as part of his purchase, lands which the towns 
insisted were theirs from “time immemorial,” as one witness put it. Indian 
litigants relied on two sources to bolster their assertion: a map showing the 
boundaries of town lands and títulos y recaudos, or notarized documents, 
some in Nahuatl, dating to 1597 and establishing uncontested transmission 
from 1624 to 1663. Moreno had first pressed his claim in 1679, shortly after 
buying the hacienda adjacent to the towns. In 1682 he had obtained an order 
from the audiencia awarding him a particular piece of land, alleging that he 
had bought the parcel in question. Much litigation followed over the inter-
vening years.
So when in early September the two Spaniards arrived at the site that 
Rodrigúez, in his notarial capacity, had noticed and were met by a group of 
indignant residents from Santa Ana and Santa Bárbara, there was a long 
history of suspicion between parties. In their September 1690 petition for a 
protective writ of amparo, the Indians stated that Rodríguez had noticed that 
the land on which they stood did not match the parcel described in the 
audiencia’s order favoring Moreno. In the discharge of his notarial obliga-
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tion, Rodríguez had looked at the document describing Moreno’s claim, 
noting boundary markers and other telltale signs, and had concluded that 
he could not match the description to the land on which he was standing. At 
that point, the two Spaniards had argued. After heated words, Rodríguez 
told Moreno that he would not “burden his conscience” by awarding the 
land erroneously. He refused to conclude the ceremony and left. He may 
have known that Moreno and the towns had been disputing this land for 
some time and that the Indians had long claimed to have possessed and 
cultivated it before Moreno bought the hacienda next door.
Temporarily thwarted by Rodríguez’s act of conscience, Moreno sought 
another notary to execute the order and put him in possession. The officers 
from Santa Ana and Santa Bárbara then filed their September 1690 petition 
with the audiencia arguing that Rodríguez’s initial refusal to proceed with 
the ceremony demanded the suspension of the subsequent order until the 
matter of which land was being referred to could be cleared up and the 
towns’ legal claim settled. The audiencia agreed, rescinding its earlier order 
in favor of Moreno. To ensure the Indians were not dispossessed without a 
hearing, the audiencia dispatched a juez receptor, a judge with a special com-
mission answerable directly to the audiencia, who ordered Moreno not to 
plow the land or bother the Indian residents, on pain of a 500-peso fine. This 
order would remain in place pending further litigation.1
Such an explicit reference to an act of “conscience” in a legal proceeding 
was not common during this or any period of viceregal history, at least not in 
the documents I have seen. Indeed, this is the most explicit one I have found 
in an actual court record.2 Yet “conscience” was vital to the workings of law 
and justice in Spanish America. In any viable legal order, individual human 
beings must make judgments about how to act in relation to the laws, 
customs, procedures, rules, doctrines and facts that underwrite legal out-
comes – whether awarding land, parsing contractual agreements regarding 
labor, property or money, interrogating witnesses, enforcing royal decrees 
governing political arrangements, making restitution, imposing fines, or 
determining the guilt and punishment of criminal defendants. This essay 
takes Rodríguez’s moment of conscience seriously on its own terms. I see his 
1 Agnt 127 (1a pte.).2 and (2a pte.).1. Ultimately, the town officials were awarded the land, 
but not until 1706. Agnt 226 (2a pte.).21.37.
2 The word did appear in other legal documents, especially testaments.
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refusal to proceed, and the reason he gave for it, as an occasion to think 
through the role and implications of conscience in the legal relationship 
between Spaniards and Indians, and between the king and his indigenous 
vassals in the New World. My chief aim is to see past the explicit rules, 
conventions or doctrines that governed everyday matters of law and focus 
on the spirit of judgment that animated relations between Spaniards and 
Indians in the context of imperial rule. I will also explore how that spirit was 
expressed in relation to and came to be challenged by the expanding role of 
self interest in social life between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
My point of departure is Víctor Tau Anzoátegui’s reaction against the 
modernist assumption that law can be understood chiefly in terms of its 
“systematic” qualities – explicit rules, procedures and legal norms as the 
baseline for how law works. Rather, Tau reminds us that law’s role in a society 
depends as much on the “spirit” governing legal interactions as on the 
mechanics of a given legal arrangement. By “spirit” Tau means the “deep 
strata of a society’s mentality and culture,” its ideas, convictions and beliefs. 
A historical inquiry into the spirit of law demands that we attend to the 
ways philosophy, religion, morality, ethics, economy and politics are inter-
woven with technical issues of legality in a particular place, at a particular 
time, in a particular historical context.3 With Tau, thus, I see Derecho Indiano
– the Law of the Indies – more as a yielding and adaptive framework than as 
a rigid structure of tightly mortised connections, at least – until the end of 
the Hapsburg period of Spanish imperial rule in the Indies.
Tau’s seminal contribution to our understanding of Derecho Indiano is 
his distinction between casuistry and system. Employing these two “categorial 
concepts” – not quite ideal types – Tau argues that early Spanish imperial law 
was essentially casuistic, rooted not in abstract norms or doctrines, but in 
attention to the individual case and its particularities. He is as concerned 
with casuistry as a “social belief” underlying all legal thought and action as 
he is with casuistry as a specific hermeneutical device. Through the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and culminating in the nineteenth century, Tau 
claims, this understanding of law gave way to a more system-oriented sen-
sibility emphasizing technical matters and positive law over close attention 
to the peculiarities of each the peculiarities of each unique set of facts. 
3 Tau (1992) 9, 11.
The Theater of Conscience in the “Living Law” of the Indies 127
According to Tau, we have misunderstood early law by assuming that the 
move from case-based casuistry to systemic positive-law represented a telesis 
from traditional to modern notions of law, often represented as a normative 
accomplishment of the European Enlightenment. This has made it almost 
impossible to engage Derecho Indiano on its own terms, for the “spirit,” 
“beliefs”’ and “convictions” that Tau argues were at the core of legality in 
Derecho Indiano are largely bracketed out of discussions on contemporary 
systems of law.4
By looking to legal treatises, training manuals, primers, as well as philo-
sophical, religious and political texts, Tau makes a powerful argument for 
seeing case-based casuistry as the means by which Spanish rule attended to 
the realities of the New World and its peoples.5 Legal decision makers were 
charged first with looking to the empirical and experiential side of trans-
actions and disputes. Their duty was not to the law as such, or to any sense of 
abstract legal consistency, but to justicia, and specifically to producing just 
outcomes in light of all the circumstances. Each case was different and could 
not be otherwise; no rule could be universal because each case was a law 
unto itself – a medieval theological idea that can be traced back to Aristotle – 
perhaps especially amidst the wild diversity of circumstances in the New 
World.
Though legal officers had to exercise conscience in all of their dealings – 
whether deposing witnesses, disposing of civil lawsuits, judging guilt and 
punishment in criminal matters, or deciding whether and what to notarize – 
Tau has little to say about conscience as such.Though he refers to “conciencia” 
in passing while discussing “the world of moral cases” and probabilism in 
the introduction to Casuismo y Sistema, and to “rectitude of conscience” as 
one of the requirements for a “good judge” in his final chapter, he does not 
develop conciencia as a theme.6 In this essay, I argue that conscience was a 
crucial animating force of Spanish imperial law and specifically of Derecho 
Indiano. For a time it represented a precept of right and just interpretation in 
the face of ever-present temptations to excess and self-dealing among the 
king’s judges, corregidores, alcaldes mayores, receptores and notaries. In political 
and legal treatises and confession manuals, conciencia connected what was 
4 I have made a similar point in Owensby (2008).
5 Tau (1992) 19 (quoting García-Gallo).
6 Tau (1992) 58, 60, 488.
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known as the fuero interior – the interior court of the soul’s sense of right and 
wrong – to the fuero exterior of the soul’s sense of right and wrong to the 
fuero exterior of positive law enshrined in royal decrees, ordinances and 
accepted legal practices and customs. As such, conciencia was part of the 
matrix of doctrinal and institutional restraints characteristic of Spanish vice-
regal legality, such as overlapping and competing jurisdictions, the right of 
appeal to the viceroy and the king and, crucially for the Indians, the ability 
to seek a protective writ known as the amparo, which effectively preserved 
a factual status quo until a full hearing on a matter could be held.7 While 
it is true that individuals often ignored conciencia, the fact that casuistry 
grounded legal thinking and practice in Derecho Indiano, as Tau argues, 
meant that proper conduct in accord with conscience was universally recog-
nized as an obligation of all ministers of justice – even if many often laid 
their duty aside.
Conciencia, therefore, is better understood as a belief (creencia) – “a deep 
and elemental manifestation of facing reality, more vital than intellectual, of 
which little or nothing is said and which [is] considered to be a basic premise 
of the society” – than an idea announced and proven by means of a precise 
intellectual operation.”8 I think of conciencia as a self-effacing principle, a 
deep reflex expressing the conviction that ultimately men and their judg-
ments, rather than unmediated impersonal norms, sustained the project of 
governing human communities. Following Tau, this reflex began to lose 
meaning as a new spirit of abstraction and distrust for casuistic thinking 
and its emphasis on the particular took root in the soil of European juris-
prudence from the late seventeenth century onward, a process that ran 
parallel to the emergence of economic concerns at the core of all social 
and political thought.
II
As an intellectual, or at least definitional matter, there was little disagree-
ment on the meaning of conscience among early-modern Spanish jurists. In 
1611, Sebastián de Covarrubias defined conciencia as “knowledge of oneself, 
7 On amparos, see Lira González (1971); Owensby (2008) chaps. 3–5.
8 Tau (1992) 39–40. See also Marías (1984) 233–245; Marías (1972) 123. Ultimately, the 
distinction goes back to Ortega y Gasset (1986).
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or certainty or near certainty of that which in our souls is bad or good.” To be 
without conscience was to be “without a soul.” To act without conscience 
was to have “no scruple.”9 The Diccionario de autoridades published between 
1724–1739 by the Real Academia Española retained this definition and 
commented that “[j]ust as nothing gives more life to hope than good con-
science, so one of the things that most tears down [derrumba] and saps 
[desmaya] the vitality of hope is bad conscience.” The Diccionario supplied 
a further gloss, noting that to “charge one’s conscience” was to demand that 
a thing be done “with knowledge, rectitude and without trickery, malice or 
fraud. … And so we charge the consciences of judges.”10
This connection between conscience and legal decision making was 
hardly new in the early eighteenth century. In his 1612 Arte legal para estudiar 
la jurisprudencia, Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza argued that law – ius – was 
essentially homologous to conscience, for it was the “art, that is knowledge” 
of the good and the bad within society. This knowledge called upon legal 
decision makers to deal honestly with their fellows, live by a commitment 
not to harm others, and above all dedicate themselves to the idea that each 
person was entitled to that which was properly theirs (a cada uno lo suyo). 
While justicia rested firmly on these three pillars, a “constant and perpetual 
will” was necessary to ground the last of them, for justice was “a habit 
conceived in the soul of men.” And though laws varied by time, land, and 
nation, said Bermúdez, justice was “one, constant and perpetual.” Jurists and 
judges – and by extension all charged with producing binding legal effects – 
were “true priests, not of the habit but of the soul, employing equity and 
justice” to defend the law – la ley – “fortress of the universe.” Who would 
protect the poor, the orphans, the widows, the prisoners, the pilgrims if 
there were no law?, asked Bermúdez. Law was “the soul of the Republic” 
and jurisprudence the guarantor of “human happiness.”11
In effect, every royal officer of the law and every churchman acting 
through the king’s power under the Patronato bore a responsibility to see 
that justice was done. The will and obligation to justice lay especially heavy 
on those charged by training, vocation and duty with the defense of royal 
law. The Recopilación de 1680, the most authoritative and enduring legal 
9 De Covarrubias Orozco (1674) 157.
10 Diccionario de autoridades (1969) vol A–C 474.
11 Bermúdez De Pedraza (1612) 12–13, 27.
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compilation of the period regarding Derecho Indiano, called all those 
involved with the law to be “men of good conscience,” for the king had 
“unburdened the Royal Conscience” by assigning to his officers the duty to 
carry out the law with justice.12 For Castillo y Bobadilla in his Política para 
corregidores (1640), corregidores – royal officers at the front lines of justice in 
relations between Indians and Spaniards – should above all seek justice, 
because in doing so consisted “the service of God, the discharge of the king’s 
conscience and the good of the republic.” The monarch, after all, appointed 
judges, corregidores, alcaldes mayores, notaries and others because he was in no 
position to administer justice across the kingdom by himself. By these 
appointments he “discharged his conscience” in service to “the administra-
tion of justice.”13 Failure to act in light of the royal conscience amounted to a 
kind of internal subversion of justice and thus of political order. As Jerónimo 
de Ceballos put it in his Arte real para el buen gobierno de los reyes, y príncipes 
de sus vasallos (1613), the “tribunal of justice” was the “firm chain and 
column on which rests the Empire, with which the good consonance and 
harmony of political government is assured, the master of political and social 
life …” Aristotle had noted that the destruction of the Republic followed 
from a failure to maintain “justice,” a “habit of the soul that conserves public 
utility” and enables the king and his officers to “resist … the people of power 
in the Republic.” As such, justice was the “joy of the afflicted, solace of the 
poor and unprotected and medicine for the soul” for it “humiliated the 
arrogant” and “lifted up the humble.”14 Law, in its broadest understanding, 
served as a counterweight to power within the social order. St. Thomas, 
noted Bermúdez, had made the point long ago: “The unbridled greed of 
men would pervert all things if justice did not check their appetites with the 
bit of its laws.”15
According to Friar Luis de León in his widely-read De los nombres de Cristo
(1583), government by men could not match Christ’s perfect government. 
Yet the spirit of the “living law” that characterized divine governance could 
guide human affairs, so long as men in positions of political power heeded 
12 See Recopilación de leyes delos reynos de las Indias, 1680, (lib.tit.ley) 1.1.5; 1.6.28; 1.7.13; 
1.7.30; 1.7.53; 1.19.1; 2.2.31; 2.3.8; 4.1.2; 5.5.2; 5.14.7; 6.2.9; 6.5.1; 6.10.7; 6.12.24; 6.15.7.
13 Castillo de Bobadilla (1750) 207, 222.
14 Zevallos (2003) 59r, 62v, 66v.
15 Bermúdez de Pedraza (1612) 12–13, 27.
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the pastoral call to care for those in their charge “according to the particular 
conditions of each one.”16 Their job was not an easy one. Those who came to 
the law often told “lies and falsehoods to obtain their justice by trickery” and 
in no other arena than judging was “friendship” (amistad) so pressing and 
fickle.17 Hardly surprising, then, that so many – particularly New World 
corregidores and alcaldes mayores – were corrupt and self-serving.18 Indeed, the 
difficulties and temptations faced by all officers of the law in the Spanish 
Empire were widely acknowledged. Not only were the souls of individuals at 
risk; the republic itself faced genuine danger.
A sense of moral hazard hung over all legal affairs in the New World. 
Between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth centuries, Friars Barto-
lomé de las Casas (Dominican), Alonso de Molina (Franciscan) and Jeróni-
mo Moreno (Dominican) insisted that confessors attend to the “juridical 
character of confession” in deciding proper penitence for all ministers of 
justice who wished to ease their consciences, make their souls ready for 
communion and ensure their salvation.19 As legal historian Andrés Lira 
has argued, these men, writing from deep moral shock and political disquiet 
at the treatment of Indians by the Spaniards during the first century after 
conquest, opened the privacy of the confessional to the public realm by 
insisting that confessors withhold absolution from all who sinned against 
God by violating or ignoring positive law.20 Put another way, these three 
writers insisted on a vital connection between conscience and public obliga-
tion: to violate the law, or to fail to uphold it was to sin against God and 
absolution depended on heartfelt contrition and a willingness to right the 
wrong.
This connection expressed a well-established political idea: that the king’s 
great task was to rule according to conciencia, implying the convergence of 
private and public concerns at the very core of political order. This notion 
pointed to a critical role for confessors. As Robert Bellarmine noted in his 
On the Duties of a Christian Prince Toward His Confessor (1513),“[n]ot without 
reason do we place the priest-confessor of the prince among those people 
16 León (1917) 115.
17 Castillo de Bobadilla (1750) 137, 222.
18 See Solórzano y Pereira (1996) III, 1873–1874 (5.2.17/24/25).
19 Lira González (2006) 1139–1178.
20 Lira González (2006).
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whom the prince should consider as his superiors. For the priest, in hearing 
the confessions of the powerful (regardless of whether they are princes or 
private persons), acts as a judge in the place of God and has the power of 
binding or loosening in the sphere of conscience. … [T]he prince’s eternal 
salvation depends, to a remarkable degree, on his confessor.” This was not 
merely a matter of contrition for private acts: a prince’s confession solely to 
“sins that relate to him as a private person” is not a full confession if he “skips 
over the sins he has committed as prince.” This implicated all of the king’s 
officers, and especially those charged with dispensing justice. As Bellarmine 
noted, a king’s confession to narrow sins of commission or omission should 
not satisfy if the confessor knows “how badly his administrators are behaving 
in administering the country.”21
Two notions followed from this proposition. First, the king needed to 
attend closely to what his officers were doing; he had a duty to ensure that 
they were behaving properly in the public, political realm, chiefly by obey-
ing and enforcing the law justly. Second, all who operated with the color of 
the king’s authority should be held to a standard of conscience that recog-
nized their public role vis-à-vis the law. Lira puts it this way: “Conscience, 
beginning with the king’s, was the premise and preoccupation of that public 
order in which Christian government was considered the only legitimate 
one and had to be on display at all times.”22 So when Las Casas in his 
Confesionario of 1545 demanded that confessors refuse absolution unless 
conquistadores and encomenderos made restitution for the harm they had 
caused the Indians, he was extending Bellarmine’s point regarding the dual 
private-public role of the prince to all those in the New World who acted in 
the king’s name or by the king’s license. In effect, the fate of their souls 
depended on satisfying the demands of conscience by confessing and rem-
edying wrongs made possible by the fact that they held office.23 The goal, of 
course, was that they obey and uphold the law, and thereby not succumb to 
sin; if they had sinned by violating the law, then they were obliged to make 
21 From Bellarmino (2006) 223.
22 Lira González (2006) 1158.
23 Lira González (2006) 1151. Though Las Casas’s document is generally known in the 
scholarship as the Confesionario, its published title was Avisos y reglas para confesores 
que oyeren confesiones de españoles que son y han sido a cargo de los indios de las Indias 
del mar océano.
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up for it. In practical effect, Las Casas was insisting that conscience have a 
role in everyday political life in a place where so many people – especially the 
Indians – were vulnerable to the wiles of the powerful.
Alonso de Molina took this notion one step further in his Confesionario 
mayor en lengua mexicana y castellana (1578), instructing confessants to con-
sider their conduct after taking on some “office of lordship and gover-
nance.”24 Confessors were to ask office holders seeking absolution whether 
they had issued unjust sentences or ruled against claimants because of a bribe 
or out of “greed.”25 Such an officer was obliged to make good those who had 
been hurt. But Molina did not stop at the most banal sorts of wrongdoings. 
He held ministers of justice to a higher standard. Thus, a proper confessional 
“inquisition” would press penitent judges on whether they had “disturbed or 
impeded” petitioners from appealing or seeking justice at the audiencia, or 
had not received them “gently” with the intent of helping them, but instead 
“quarreled with them and dismissed them” so that they “would not dare to 
come before you.”26 The soft sin of turning people away from law was just as 
erosive of justice as feckless inattention to the demands of office or the more 
hard-edged corruption of outright avarice. A confessant was always respon-
sible for the state of his conscience, public as well as private, and so was 
obliged to “rectitude, justice and prudence” in all his affairs.27 In broader 
terms, this is what Barcelona printer Sebastián Cormellas meant in his ded-
ication of Manoel Rodrigues’ 1596 Summa de casos de conciencia con adver-
tencias muy provechosas para confessores con un orden iudicial a la postre, where 
he insisted that anything that “benefits conscience aids the republic.”28
With the publication in 1637 of Jerónimo Moreno’s Reglas ciertas y pre-
cisamente necesarias para iuezes y ministros de justicia de las Indias y para sus 
confesores, the process begun in the mid-sixteenth century that gradually 
bound conscience to positive law for those who held office and exercised 
power through the king’s political authority reached its culmination. This is 
Lira’s seminal point. In Moreno as in Las Casas and Molina, the confessional 
bridged the gap between private life and public. Among those concerned for 
24 Molina (1578).
25 Molina (1578) 44r.
26 Molina (1578) 46v.
27 Molina (1578) 10v.
28 Rodrigues (1596).
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the plight of the Indians, this was a welcome development. Martín Acosta y 
Mezquita, audiencia lawyer and advocate for the poor and prisoners in 
Mexico City, wrote a foreword to the Reglas ciertas. Bemoaning the sad state 
of the Indians, he congratulated Moreno for his proposal that those charged 
with ensuring royal justice be held to account in the court of conscience. It 
was, said Acosta, a measured response to the fact that royal decrees had been 
so often ignored by those trusted with enforcing them. As Pope Pius V had 
once noted: “Grant me that confessors will do their jobs as they should and I 
will give you Christian government maintained in peace and tranquility.”29
For Moreno, the temptations even of petty power in the New World were so 
great that “ministers of justice” were under a heavy burden of conscience and 
thus liable to confess even the smallest misstep in their relations with the 
Indians. This was not simply a matter of rendering judgment in cases at law. 
It touched every economic, contractual, adjudicative and administrative 
action ministers of justice might take under color of royal authority, from 
property agreements, to labor allocations, to tribute collection, to election 
mediations, to prices paid and charged pursuant to the repartimiento de 
mercancías. In all things, they were obliged strictly to observe the King’s 
laws. So that even if he otherwise acted justly, a minister sinned by entering 
into any business or contract with his charges for his own benefit, because 
there was a royal decree forbidding it.30 The obligation ran further still. As 
Lira notes, Moreno’s “First Rule” for confessors (of thirty) states that anyone 
who tells a minister of justice that he may legally have personal business 
dealings with the Indians is himself in mortal sin pending confession and 
restitution, because the law clearly forbids such dealings; enabling or even 
condoning sin was itself sinful, for otherwise ministers of justice would duck 
legal prohibitions by claiming that they had been assured in conscience by 
their confessors that they could act as they did.31
For Moreno, mere procedural correctness was never enough to satisfy the 
spirit of the living law, rooted in natural and divine precepts, to which all 
ministers of justice owed their conscientious attention. This is what accounts 
29 Moreno (1637). See also Mayagoitía (1996).
30 Moreno (1637) 19. And because doing so converted the relationship into one of private 
benefit rather than common good, a notion at odds with the fundamental pact under-
lying Spanish legality in the New World. See Owensby (2011) 59–106.
31 Moreno (1637) 2. Lira González (2006) 1163.
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for his references to the “fuero exterior” and the “fuero de la conciencia.” In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, fuero referred broadly to the place where 
matters of law and justice were properly decided. Las Siete Partidas defined 
“fuero” as law properly used, something akin to jurisdiction. Etymologically 
the word derived from the Latin forum and according to Covarrubias it was 
equivalent to the Castillian plaza, “because trials and hearings were con-
ducted in the most public places of the city and where there was the greatest 
congregation of people.”32 In the early eighteenth century, the Diccionario de 
autoridades gave as a first definition of “fuero” the “law or particular statute of 
some kingdom or province” encompassing the “use and custom” character-
istic of that place, pointing to the locative quality of all law.33 Covarrubias 
did not refer to “fuero de la conciencia,” but Solórzano y Pereira did in the 
Política indiana in 1648 and linked it to “mortal sin” and a duty of restitution 
(with regard to the obligation to pay tribute). The Diccionario de autoridades
did offer an entry for “fuero de la conciencia,” giving as a definition “the 
tribunal of reason, which directs and arranges the operations of man, abso-
lutely according to divine and human laws.”34 In essence, by distinguishing 
between the fuero exterior and the fuero de la conciencia, Moreno was making 
the point that public laws in the political world ultimately could not be 
meaningful instruments of justice unless those charged with keeping them 
were bound by an inner compulsion to abide by their spirit, not merely by 
their external formulation.
The crucial point, as with the notion of fuero generally, was that one could 
not be reduced to the other. The two fueros were intimately related, though 
ultimately each held to what was properly its own. The fuero exterior was the 
realm of positive law and royal decrees interpreted and applied by ministers 
of justice, where power and rights often butted heads. In the fuero de la 
conciencia the confessor was in charge and confessants answered to a higher 
standard of judgment. Thus, because “in the fuero exterior a sin can be 
absolved without absolving other sins” and “everyone should confess.” For 
the “judge of the republic is a judge for the community, and so his judgment 
must be for the community, according to proof … [B]ut the confessor is a 
32 Covarrubias (1674) part. II, 19r–v.
33 Diccionario de autoridades (1969) vol 3–4 (D–N) 807.
34 Diccionario de autoridades (1969) vol 3–4 (D–N) 807.
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particular judge, next to God.” As such, the confessor is charged not only 
with hearing the penitent’s words but also attending to “particular knowl-
edge” regarding the state of the penitent’s soul. As Moreno pointed out, a 
minister of justice who has come to confess may not rely on the completion 
of a post-tenure residencia to claim that he is free from further demands, 
because “he is not free in the fuero de la conciencia” until he has made 
restitution to those he has harmed, regardless of the outcome of the resi-
dencia. This was true even if those harmed – usually Indians – had come to 
some sort of settlement with the outgoing officer, because such agreements 
tended to be “violent and against their will” or the result of fraud.35 And 
even if the residencia was entirely above board, confessants could not claim 
absolution merely by asserting lawful behavior; they owed an ineluctable 
duty of conscience to the spirit of the law in the fuero exterior.
III
This appeal to conscience can seem quaint, even quixotic at a time when it 
was commonly said that “self-interest accomplishes all.”36 Life, it struck 
many contemporaries in the seventeenth century, had become lonely, brut-
ish, competitive and petty, an arena of “distrust and suspicion” in which 
there were no true friends because everyone was involved in a “perpetual 
war, without any sort of truce or peace” and each person pursued only “his 
own business and not the common and good of all.” This was thought to be 
especially so in the New World, where Indians were the object of the Span-
iards’ (and others’) manipulative fantasies and abusive energies.37 The point 
was not lost on the theological moralists who sought some way to ensure 
that royal officers were governed by conscience in their official lives. In a 
postscript to his Reglas ciertas, Moreno detailed the extent to which “unfaith-
ful ministers of justice” “offended and aggrieved the majesty of God and of 
the king” by their treatment of the Indians. The majority of judges and 
ministers of justice did not confess because “their consciences did not gnaw 
35 Moreno (1637) 12r, 18v, 47v, 49v, 50r, 51r.
36 Anon., Romance a México.
37 See Owensby (2008) 29 n. 68 (Calderón de la Barca, Darlo todo y no dar nada, act I); 29 
n. 69 (Suárez Figueroa, El pasajero: advertencias utilísimas a la vida humana (1617), Saave-
dra Fajardo, Empresas (emblema 43)); 30 n. 72; 30 n. 73 (Romance a México).
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at them,” a sign for Moreno of how unconcerned they were for the state of 
their souls and for the fate of the Republic.38
So why bother spelling out rules for confession in response to official 
misdoings if the people in question rarely confessed? For Moreno the answer 
was clear: far more than individual souls was at stake in the unconscionable 
behavior of corregidores, alcaldes mayores, tenientes and other ministers of 
justice on the ground in the Indies. By their conduct, such officers not only 
violated the king’s law but sinned against the passion of Christ. They offered 
worse examples “even than the Gentiles,” and by their “ambitions” and 
“greed” they threatened to “undo what the savior accomplished through 
his death.” As a result, some “poor and wretched Indians (those who are 
Christians) abandon the faith, and those who are not Christians do not want 
to receive it,” because those who have the “obligation of justice, to sustain 
and ennoble it with Christian acts” instead “discredit and dishonor it with 
pagan works, scandalizing [the Indians] with trickery, theft and the great 
blindness of greed,” saying that “as they are Indians they are not Christians, 
and it does not matter if they are tricked and robbed.”39 The individual souls 
of Indians and ministers of justice themselves were imperiled by such mal-
feasance, insisted Moreno.
Worse still, abuse by ministers of justice threatened the very fabric of New 
World society. If Indians fell away from the faith or would not receive it 
because of the mistreatment they suffered, the kingdom itself was at risk, for 
as Solórzano y Pereira noted, the king’s indigenous vassals were liable to pay 
just tributes to offset the cost of “their evangelization and Christian gover-
nance.”40 If the Indians were driven away from the church by the misdeeds 
of judicial officers and others, the rationale for tribute became tenuous, at 
least in principle. Conciencia in Spain’s imperial legal order, thus, should not 
be understood solely in terms of whether it was effective in restraining 
undesired behavior by individual officers of the law – often it was not. 
Rather, the concern for conscience expressed deep anxieties, about religious 
faith, good government, justice and right action in human affairs. At a time 
when human relations seemed increasingly instrumental and competitive, in 
a place where distant royal authority faced constant challenge by individual 
38 Moreno (1637) 54r–59r.
39 Moreno (1637) 55v.
40 Solórzano y Pereira (1996) I 435 (2.19.2).
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interests on the ground and still-recent converts to Christianity struggled to 
shield themselves from the arrows of abuse that rained down on their lives, 
Moreno insisted that everyone be reminded of their obligations in the fuero 
interior. Yet this was not a strictly interior matter, as Castilllo y Bobadilla 
noted in his treatise on corregidores: Cicero had long ago pointed out that 
nothing was “more public, more rigorous and more faithful” than the “the-
ater of conscience.”41
Alonso de Peña Montenegro’s Itinerario para párrocos (1662–63), written 
from Peña’s judicial experience in Quito, suggests something of the intricate 
action that took place on this proscenium that thrust into the exterior drama 
of the New World. An instruction manual for priests of Indian parishes 
in New Spain, the Itinerario touches on every issue a pastor might face in 
ministering to his flock. The tome (running to over 500 pages), spared no 
ink in discussing the challenges of conversion, idolatry and witchcraft, of 
tribute and its collection, of justice among the Indians and between Indians 
and Spaniards, of the role natural law played in the lives of Indian subjects, 
and of the sacraments, including confession. It paid attention to the prickly 
relationship between locally powerful Spaniards – land owners, miners, 
alcaldes mayores and their tenientes – and vulnerable Indian parishioners. 
Conciencia ran like a bright thread through this tapestry of topics, reiterating 
the idea raised by Las Casas, Molina and Moreno that confessors were to 
hold all Spaniards to high standards in the fuero interior, especially those 
charged with specific duties by the king’s law. Encomenderos had a duty of 
conscience to treat the Indians well, a principle enshrined in countless royal 
decrees.42 Judges of residencia were bound by conscience to hold ministers of 
justice fully accountable, and to demand full restitution for harm done. 
Those who failed to do so were “unjust judges,” said Peña. Having accepted 
the obligation to “discharge royal conscience,” they were “traitors to their 
Lord and King, carried away by interest and suborned by money” and so 
“approve injustices and dissemble abuses” of corregidores and alcaldes mayo-
res.43
Such charges against ministers of justice were a logical extension of the 
fact that the New World’s Indians were obligated in the fuero interior of law 
41 Castillo de Bobadilla (1750) 418.
42 Peña Montenegro (1662) 242 (lib. II, trat. X, sec. II).
43 Peña Montenegro (1662) 249–250 (lib. II, trat. X, sec. X).
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as well as in the fuero exterior to pay just tribute. Peña was clear. To be “just”, 
tribute had to be measured and proportionate to the ability of the subjects to 
pay, and always in relation to the benefits provided by the king, especially the 
administration of justice.44 As a consequence, the tributary obligation was 
not unqualified. Indians subject to excessive or unauthorized tribute exac-
tions, or to “abuse and vexations” by encomenderos, corregidores, Indian caci-
ques, or parish priests, could with “just and rightful title” flee their jurisdic-
tion. Having fled, they were not bound in the “fuero de conciencia” to pay 
tribute they might otherwise have owed, for an abusive encomendero lost the 
right to demand tribute from his subjects (even if this meant loss to the 
Crown).45 Nor were these Indians, or hacendados or others who might 
receive them in another jurisdiction, liable to restitution of unpaid tribute 
in these circumstances.
Moreover, the Indians’ decision to pay tribute, like any other judgment at 
law, was casuistic. A long-established doctrine held that those who in the 
fuero exterior were too poor bore no obligation, in law or in conscience, to 
pay tribute. The danger in this doctrine was obvious to Peña: if it were too 
easy for the Indians to claim poverty, “everyone would want to enter by this 
door and not pay tribute.” Yet as natural law favored the poor, allowances 
had to be made for tributaries, and judges before whom they might appear 
had to consider “how poor they are.” A man who could not feed and clothe 
his family, was under no compulsion, interior or exterior, to pay tribute.46
There is a crucial point here. As Peña noted, obligation in the fuero exterior
of the law was intertwined with an obligation in conscience, as much for 
tributaries as anyone else bearing a specific legal duty to the king. Tribute 
was a public matter – “chief nerve of the republic,” according to Solórzano y 
Pereira47 – that made claims on the fuero interior of those under a burden to 
pay it. The burden of tribute was never absolute, for circumstances of abuse 
and poverty could justify non-payment. Even so, there is no doubt that 
decisions to suspend payment could be and often were instrumental. Yet 
as I have argued elsewhere, Indians involved in lawsuits made much of their 
tributary duties, embracing them to assert a kind of moral superiority over 
44 Peña Montenegro (1662) 151 (lib. II, trat. II, sec. II), quoting Solórzano y Pereira.
45 Peña Montenegro (1662) 153 (lib. II, trat. II, sec. IV).
46 Peña Montenegro (1662) 150 (lib. II, trat. II, sec. I).
47 Solórzano y Pereira (1996) 3 2354–2355 (6.8.1).
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Spaniards, especially encomenderos, hacendados, corregidores and alcaldes mayo-
res, who so often ignored royal decrees protecting the Indians.48 Indigenous 
litigants advanced such claims understanding that willing acceptance of their 
duties in ordinary circumstances gave them a certain credibility when the 
time came to bring grievances before a judge. Individuals or whole villages 
might go before a judge to complain of excessive tribute exactions, to claim 
poverty in periods of trouble, or to argue that changed conditions – often 
epidemics or flight from a village – made it impossible for them to adhere to 
previous rates and schedules.49 In doing so, they generally pointed to con-
scientious payment during normal times and expressed a desire to return to 
recognized and customary arrangements disrupted by the greed of local 
tribute collectors or to adjust their obligation to match their circumstances.
From Peña’s perspective, Spaniards and Indians in the New World shared 
an obligation to act from conscience in matters of law, each according to his 
station in a hierarchy that bound all into a single political and moral project. 
Although it was established law by the seventeenth century that the Indians 
had the reason and discernment to exercise conscience, some Spaniards 
continued to contest the idea. For the most part, however, Spaniards and 
Indians alike appear to have recognized what conscience demanded. The 
Indians’ status as men required it. And as Castillo de Bobadilla noted in 
his well-known Política para corregidores (1640), addressed to all judges, gov-
ernors, lawyers and “other public officials,” there are “sparks of original 
flame” in all men, which Christians call “the dictates of conscience.” At 
times, conciencia finds its path to virtue without “raciocination or acts of 
understanding,” but for the most part it must be “regulated by reason, and 
not by absolute will, and is not free of the censure of a superior, nor can one 
who has the faculty to do an act, use it when the act is contrary to equity.”50
In other words, conscience inheres in all men and compels them to right 
thinking in judging and discerning right and wrong, but it is neither a 
guarantee of proper conduct, nor a license for arbitrary acts of will. “The 
chief intent and aim which the good Corregidor must have” – and by exten-
sion anyone else under an obligation to the law and justice – “is reverence 
for and observance of justice, as much in what he says and does as in that 
48 Owensby (2008) 67, 87, 299.
49 Peña Montenegro (1662) 250 (lib. II, trat. X, sec. XI).
50 Castillo de Bobadilla (1750) 61, 241 (online).
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which he must judge in others, … because in this object of justice rests the 
service of God, the discharge of the King’s conscience and the good of the 
Republic.”51
For Peña and Moreno in the Indies, and Castillo as a more general 
proposition, conciencia lay at the very core of the political arrangement of 
society. It was a theological requirement, political principle and moral pre-
cept that had to obtain for society to live up to its divine purpose. Those who 
failed to live by its “dictates” – and there were many – violated the very 
essence of Christ’s passion, betrayed the King and threatened the order and 
stability of society.
IV
In the Indies, where order depended on a delicate balance between the 
exploitation and protection of the king’s indigenous subjects, conciencia
was a critical belief that gave a spark of life to legal decision making at all 
levels. Rarely mentioned in everyday judicial proceedings, it was frequently 
invoked in legal treatises, confession manuals and the Recopilación, bridging 
religious notions of sin and obligation to the duties of law in the fuero 
exterior, where power and interest were in play at all times. By the seven-
teenth century, all of the king’s subjects were bound by fearful and prin-
cipled adhesion to the dictates of conscience in confronting the difficult 
choices implied in all affairs of law.
This is precisely what the representatives of Santa Ana and Santa Bárbara 
understood when they filed their petition in 1690. By that time they had 
been in litigation for at least eight years over the land Moreno claimed. Their 
situation looked bleak, as Moreno had in hand an audiencia order awarding 
him the parcel and he was prepared to start plowing. They understood that 
as soon as he did they were almost surely lost. With crops in the ground and 
his farmhands living there, the towns would be unlikely to recover the land, 
given that productive use and occupation constituted prima facie evidence of 
proper possession. This was why the Indians hustled to the audiencia to stop 
Moreno from working the land. They invoked their status as “poor and 
powerless” people, “humble vassals and tributaries, who after our powerful 
51 Castillo de Bobadilla (1750) 270 (lib. II, cap. II).
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God have no other protection.” They included with their petition a state-
ment sworn out in late August 1690 by the local priest, bachiller (university 
graduate) Father Pedro Camacho de Campos Villavicencio who, in verbo 
sacerdotis, insisted that Moreno’s claim was improper. The land abutted the 
Indians’ church, said Camacho, “where we continually celebrate the holy 
sacrifice of the mass throughout the year” as had been done “from time 
immemorial,” and it encroached on their cemetery, “where the faithful are 
buried.” This amounted to a “grave offense against God our Lord and pre-
judice to the native Indians, who for so many years have lived and died as 
Royal Tributaries of your Majesty and residents of said towns.”52 On the basis 
of this petition, the audiencia agreed to override its previous order and freeze 
the status quo. So it remained for the next decade and a half until a terse 
1706 order awarded the towns the land that had been in dispute for over 
twenty-five years.
The turning point of the case had been Rodríguez’s refusal to “burden his 
conscience” by following an order that did not describe the landscape before 
him. He could have executed the document in hand and been on solid legal 
ground. Many other notaries would have done so; Moreno found another 
who did. But Rodríguez said no and walked away. Of course, there were 
other plausible reasons for refusing to execute the order. Rodríguez may 
simply have wanted to avoid further trouble. He surely knew that the Indi-
ans would not stand idly by, given the history of this litigation, and he may 
have been worried about looking bad before the audiencia if he went ahead. 
At the very least he might have been summoned to explain his decision to 
proceed in the face of Indian resistance; not a pleasant prospect under any 
circumstance. A stand on conscience in favor of the Indians was unobjec-
tionable at law and he may have anticipated that Moreno would do as he did 
– seek another notary to carry out the order – rather than complain to the 
audiencia about Rodríguez. This other notary may not have known much of 
the litigation and may have executed the order as a pro forma matter; after 
all, the audiencia had spoken, and more than once. Then again, he may 
simply have enjoyed greater moral flexibility than Rodríguez.
The explicit appeal to conciencia was not legally necessary for Rodríguez to 
walk away. He could have asserted the fact that the description did not 
52 AGNT 127 (2a pte.).1, 223r–v, 224r–v.
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match the land in question and suspended proceedings tout court. Yet Rodrí-
guez’s concern for conciencia was exactly what Lira says ministers of justice 
were under a theological and moral compulsion to do from roughly the 
mid-seventeenth century onward – worry about the fuero interior when act-
ing as legal officers and understand that knowing error in the fuero exterior
exposed them to penance and restitution.53 We have no idea how God-
fearing a man Rodríguez was, or whether he confessed on a regular basis. 
As a royal notary he may well have been concerned, as his profession and 
duty required him to be, with doing right by the royal conscience. Though 
he probably had not reviewed the case record, he would have been familiar 
with the gist of the royal decree attached to a 1688 order favoring the 
residents of Santa Ana and Santa Bárbara. Citing sections of the Recopilación, 
that order stated that all officers of the king were obligated to “see to the 
Indians who suffer such great injustices and vexations … for of all my vassals 
they are the ones who, by their tribute, most benefit and strengthen my 
Royal Crown.”54 Nor was the outcome on that September day just a matter 
of Rodríguez’s act. Indian petitioners chose to highlight Rodríguez’s state-
ment. In doing so, they were appealing not merely to the letter of the law, 
but critically to the spirit of judgment and right conduct underlying it: a 
Royal Notary of good conscience rejected Moreno’s bald-faced, self-serving 
attempt at fraud. The contrast could not have been sharper, which probably 
was the point.
At least in theory, order and justice in the Empire depended on this 
contrast. We know that many did not hear the voice of conscience, or 
ignored it. The confessional was there to remind all who acted on behalf 
of the law that their decisions were not merely private matters and that there 
was no hard boundary between the fuero interior and the fuero exterior. So 
while many ministers of justice did not confess and many who did doubtless 
did so formulaically, the principle that conscience burdened all defined the 
limits of permitted malfeasance and enabled victims of mistreatment to seek 
redress, especially if they could claim to have abided by the demands of 
conscience themselves. In effect, conciencia was part of a yielding web of 
meanings and reliances that stood against unrestrained abuse. Corregidores, 
53 We need far more research on how and the extent to which officers of the law were 
subject to penalties of restitution for wrongly decided cases.
54 AGNT 127.(2a pate.).1, 204v–205r.
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certainly, were the most prone to transgression, facing as they did the entic-
ing vulnerability of indigenous people. Those further from the source of 
temptation, whose interests often ran against the open depredation of the 
Indians – such as ministers of tribute collection in Mexico City or Lima, 
royal notaries and judges of special commission – might be more receptive 
to conscience. For conscience never spoke in a social or political vacuum. 
It was an ethical baseline in a notoriously conflictual world characterized by 
the frequent disregard for legality and by unabashed self-regard, a belief and 
conviction linking each vassal’s immortal soul to the operations of law, the 
idea of justice, the king’s authority and the good of society.
If, as Lira argues, the private consciences of public officials became a 
matter of political concern during the seventeenth century, it was in 
response to a broad sense that the din of private interests – generally referred 
to by such words as codicia (greed) and interés (interest or self-interest) – was 
drowning out the law’s voice on behalf of justice and good government. This 
disquiet was hardly new. In Spain and the Indies, the “universal confronta-
tion of all, of some against others,” as Maravall has argued, was characteristic 
of the long rupture between the Middle Ages and the emergence of a new, 
“modern” way of being in the world.55 For Tau, this was the same period in 
which casuistry, as a basis for legality, began to give way to system in Derecho 
Indiano. If older assumptions and understandings held through much of the 
seventeenth century, in part by insisting on the relevance of conscience, as 
Lira suggests, it was against the run of historical processes rooted in the 
growing commercialization of society as a whole from the fifteenth century 
onward.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, economic concerns had taken 
center stage in reformist debates within Spanish realms. The arbitristas of the 
late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century wrote chiefly about 
trade and the imperial fisc. Reformist minister José del Campillo y Cosio in 
his 1741 Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América focused on 
economic structures and policies, and sought to recast the role of indigenous 
people in the Empire as the only viable basis for rescuing the imperial system 
from collapse. For Campillo, law was to be oriented toward “the good 
economy of the state” rather than toward the “political” and just governance 
55 Maravall (1975) 341.
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of society – i. e., the “good order that is observed and kept in Cities and 
Republics, by enforcing laws and ordinances established for their good gov-
ernment.”56 Without acknowledging it, perhaps because he could not grasp 
the full implications of his language, good government, once linked tightly to 
justice, had become a matter of “good order” above all. And if Campillo’s 
prescriptions were thought extreme in 1741, elements of his economic pro-
gram, and significant elements of his reasoning and his meanings, became 
common sense by the late eighteenth century in the context of the Bourbon 
reforms.57
Two documents written in 1749 in Peru hint at an indigenous perspective 
crosswise to Campillo’s optimism that a “system of economic government” 
could displace justice in resolving the tensions of imperial rule. In the Ver-
dadera relación y exclamación and the Breve y compendiosa satisfacción, Friar 
Calixto de San José Túpac Inca, who claimed descent from the last Inca, 
addressed himself in the form of a Lamentation and Jeremiad to the newly 
enthroned Ferdinand VI regarding the plight of the “American Indians.” He 
catalogued the abuses of Spanish landowners, miners and officials, noting 
that the Indians,“innumerable vassals” and “most faithful subjects,” had been 
abandoned by their King and Lord to the tender mercies of greedy Spaniards 
guided only by self interest.58 The answer proposed by Friar Calixto was not 
Campillo’s turn to “economic government” but instead to shore up “law and 
justice” by cashiering Spanish corregidores and allowing the Indians to elect 
their own judges and conduct their own legal affairs, separate from the 
Spaniards – a jurisdictional solution. Only in this way could the Empire 
“put into practice a Christian, Catholic and proper justice, that is to say, 
law and reason” that would ensure the “souls of all [the king’s] vassals, 
Spaniards as well as Indians.” Thus would Spaniards “be relieved of weighty 
burdens of conscience,” for though “they may gain gold and silver” by their 
self-regarding actions they are left with “heavy faults of conscience and 
56 Campillo y Cosio (1789) 4; Diccionario de autoridades (1969) III 311–312. There has 
been some debate about whether Campillo wrote this tract. See Navarro García
(1983); Navarro García (1995).
57 Artola (1952); Stein / Stein (2010) 231–259; Stein / Stein (2003); Tiryakian (1978) 
233–257.
58 Clamor de los Indios Americanos 81 (15v). There is some debate about authorship of 
these two documents, though Friar Calixto was punished for them. See Dueñas (2010) 
75–78.
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soul.”59 In essence, where Campillo looked at a world of self-interest and 
concluded that the only solution was to give the Indians free rein or even 
force them to act from the same impulse, Friar Calixto took the view that 
justice pursuant to the royal conscience was all that could stand between the 
Indians and those who would trample them and call it good government.
Given the burdens economic processes and legal systems have imposed 
on vulnerable people in the modern age, perhaps Friar Calixto had a point. 
In the affairs of men, the voice of conciencia is never silent. But historical 
processes can produce understandings that drown it out, or make it sound 
thready and irrelevant in the grander schemes of human activity. This is one 
way to think about what happened between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as Europe, both within and in its contacts with worlds outside 
itself, underwent the “great transformation” that brought economic systems 
to the center of social and political thinking.60 Acute observers – such as Las 
Casas, Molina, Moreno, Peña, Castillo and Friar Calixto – sensed what was 
happening without fully compassing it. They worried and offered tenuous 
solutions drawn from their understanding and experience. Actors such as 
Rodríguez and the residents of Santa Ana and Santa Bábara did the best they 
could in the theater of conscience to speak above the din of codicia and 
interés. They might have succeed in an individual case, but in the long run 
the stentorian voice of self-interest and economic imperatives carried the day 
in the political imagination – at least for a time.
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Ezequiel Abásolo
Víctor Tau Anzoátegui and the Legal Historiography
of the Indies
1. Truth be told, it is always difficult to conduct any kind of historio-
graphical analysis. Now, where the task does not only entail the works of a 
contemporary author, but the works of an author who is both a significant 
intellectual reference point and a personal friend of the analyst, the task 
becomes ever more difficult. I confess that such is my situation in regard 
to Víctor Tau Anzoátegui and his works. So, though aware of my limitations, 
I assume the responsibility I took on when I was invited to participate in this 
collective work. More specifically, I will attempt to share a critical and com-
prehensive analysis of what his ideas and contributions imply within the 
legal historiography of the Indies. Thus, I shall not address the remainder 
of his prolific output of scientific writing. I would also like to clarify that, 
besides the fact that I am not in a position to treat all of his contributions 
thoroughly here, I shall not attempt to provide the reader with a catalogue of 
his fruitful intellectual work. I have a different objective: attempt to outline 
the central aspects of the historiographical thinking of this renowned Master, 
whose studies have, for decades, attracted the attention of his colleagues and 
of many others interested in recreating the Spanish American past both in 
the Americas and in Europe. As regards the author and the role that he plays 
within this discipline, I believe that the same words that Tau himself dedi-
cated to García-Gallo when making an account of his intellectual back-
ground can be rightfully applied to him as well; i. e., that the Argentine legal 
historian also has an “outstanding profile”, given that he has drafted various 
works on method and guidance which have contributed “decisively to the 
setting of guidelines within the discipline.” Similarly, it can be truly asserted 
that, as a researcher, he “critically welcomed the legacy of previous scholars 
and developed new criteria, most of which received academic consensus”, and 
that we owe him “sharp analyses that covered different theoretical perspec-
tives, with no opponents of his stature, except for partial disagreements.”1
1 Tau Anzoátegui (1993) 9.
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It is appropriate to describe Víctor Tau as a legal historian who under-
stands Law as the expression of a way of seeing the world, that is, a legal 
tradition. This is his natural observatory. Now, it is worth recalling that as a 
member – possibly, the most prominent – of what can be identified as the 
third generation of great experts in the history of the Law of the Indies – the 
same generation that reviewed and went beyond the guidelines set by the 
two highest exponents of the first generation, Rafael de Altamira and Ricar-
do Levene, and the most renowned of the second generation, such as García-
Gallo, Alamiro de Avila Martel and Ricardo Zorraquín Becú –, Víctor Tau 
Anzoátegui has excelled as an intellectual leader for several decades. Cer-
tainly, that suffices to warrant a piece of writing such as this. Nonetheless, 
my desire to elucidate the guidelines of his legal-historical criteria also 
responds to another reason and has a very specific goal: helping to cover, 
at least in part, the deficit in self-reflection that the legal history of the Law of 
the Indies has. This discipline, despite its relative theoretical weakness, cur-
rently spurs considerable academic interest, and is continuously and con-
stantly nurtured by large amounts of varied monographs.
2. As for the praise received by the works of Víctor Tau, I understand that 
their main impact results from his creativity in the proposal of new topics 
and the treatment of areas that were left behind by ancient masters and 
colleagues.2 Far from intending to make a thorough record of this kind of 
contributions, I can underline, from among his original concerns and recon-
siderations, the detailed analysis of the set of sources of Law; his preoccupa-
tion for the local and concrete practice of normativity; his early and clear 
awareness of the integration of the Law of the Indies into the intellectual 
framework of the European legal tradition. In fact, a key aspect of the legal 
historical thinking of Tau has been his flexible notion of what must be 
considered Law of the Indies. In this regard, he has affirmed that “against 
a classical, unitary, rigid image of the Law of the Indies imposed from the 
Peninsula, there arise new images of a multiple, unbounded Law of the 
Indies, stemming from the different regions of the New World, in accord-
ance with the diverse geographical and human realities of the vast conti-
nent.”3
2 For an example see Tau Anzoátegui (1980) 331 and 332.
3 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 85.
152 Ezequiel Abásolo
However, I must regret that his fine style has not always bore fruit as 
expected. Thus, among what Tau himself described as “uncharted profiles”, I 
understand that the set of his very subtle and valuable conceptual creations – 
like “oscillations”4 or “satellite-texts”,5 to mention just two of them – have 
not yet become an integral part of the consolidated lexical tools that I believe 
he can still provide to academia. Besides, I must also admit that I personally 
do not always agree with his opinions. Far from sharing his assertion that 
“the bans of good government take the most popular place within the legal 
system,”6 I tend to think the opposite.
Apart from the foregoing, it must also be stated that Tau’s work stands 
out, again and again, due to his concern to verify the points of view outlined 
initially, and because of his honesty at the time of warning on the potential 
weaknesses of the evidence offered. Thus, there have been plenty of oppor-
tunities in which he engages in a dialogue with his readership on the diffi-
culties experienced. By way of example, when he presented his works on the 
customs of the Indies, and after warning that “in successive studies during 
the last 25 years” he “gradually [noted that the] Law of the Indies increas-
ingly differed from contemporary Law in its conception and structure,” he 
did not fear to admit that the recreation of American customs demanded of 
him “an arduous task, not always explicitly expressed, not always along safe 
paths.”7
Besides, while one of his concerns has been to replace the ancient legalist
focus of the legal system of the Indies for one based on the notion of legal 
tradition8 (a goal derived from the conviction about anachronistic deviations 
imposed by 20th century dogmatism), his historiographical endeavor is also 
featured by a fascinating intellectual exercise, where the subtle and intelli-
gent use of the most varied sources9 coexists with a formidable rigor and 
accuracy in the delimitation of the objects of study and the exposition of 
results.10
4 Tau Anzoátegui (1977) 88.
5 Tau Anzoátegui (2004) 18.
6 Tau Anzoátegui (2004) 22.
7 Tau Anzoátegui (2001) 14.
8 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 43.
9 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 88.
10 Cfr., for example, Tau Anzoátegui (1977) 86.
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3. Now, as important as the foregoing may be considered, I do not find 
it the most distinguished of Tau’s contributions. In my opinion, there are 
other more relevant aspects. His propositions have fostered and encouraged 
research by others more than once, to a certain extent, because they are 
courteously open to academic debate, and because they are noted for the 
formulation of manifold conclusions defined by a provisional factor11 in-
herent in the conviction that no scientific research can ever be considered a 
“close” piece.12
I would like to point out that several of the distinctive features of Tau’s 
works are along the lines of those of the most salient exponents of the Law of 
the Indies traditional scholars, especially in the formulation identified with 
the members of the so called School of Levene. Among the most important 
features of this line of historiography, it is worth stressing the insistent 
heuristic concern mentioned above, and the firm conviction that a true 
understanding of legal phenomena requires the integration of past Law into 
an ample framework of complex socio-cultural expressions; thus, the con-
stant concern of the Argentine Professor to link legal history and social 
history.13 It is precisely based on this conception of the nature of legal phe-
nomena that Tau affirms, among other considerations, that “Law accepted as 
such by the political authority or by jurists has a scope of influence and 
application that hardly ever reaches all the corners of society.”14 Likewise, 
as a consequence of such outlooks, which integrate Law into the social fabric, 
our author admits: “I would like to draw attention to an approach that 
recognizes laws as social events and which, after establishing laws as one of 
the mechanisms for the creation of the Law, verifies their coherency and 
tension with the other sources, confirms the presence of social and political 
forces in their origin and enforcement, notes their unique manners of appli-
cation, observes their use and lack of use, unveils social acceptance and resist-
ance mechanisms, examines their presence in legal proceedings, notarial 
records, literature and daily conversation.” Thus, “questions arise: what is 
the role played by jurists within this process and to what extent do laws 
support the growing strength of state power; do laws reflect social aspirations; 
11 Tau Anzoátegui (1980) 333.
12 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 123.
13 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 4 and 5.
14 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 24.
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do they propose goals, principles, standards; are all social groups aware of 
their provisions, or is this awareness limited to legal experts? These are some 
of the questions that ought to make laws a matter of joint concern by legal 
historians and by political, social, economic and cultural experts, among 
others”, each addressing such questions from their special viewpoint.15
Another frequent feature of Víctor Tau’s research style is his fine selection 
of the materials and the clear examinations to which they are subjected. Our 
author has recognized his “interest in researching into the notion of justice 
of a certain author does not have a mere academic purpose, of intellectual 
delight, for sheer academic speculation. Without underestimating this 
aspect, my purpose is to examine the use of this notion in legal practice. 
And thus verify to what extent scholarly contributions are accepted, appre-
ciate how such notion operates in the arguments of jurists, and observe the 
value given to it in the then prevailing mindset. To that end, it is necessary to 
consider that casuist thinking, which is twisted in itself, requires notions and 
rules to support the formulation of particular solutions. The absence of strict 
tenets within the legal system led to the appreciation of certain notions such 
as justice, which has played a key role as a guide, end and limit at the same 
time.”16
4. Strictly speaking, and although at present he may be the historian 
studying the Law of the Indies most concerned in defining and specifying 
a sound and original conceptual-theoretical framework, his scientific pro-
gram has not always been presented within a neat organic structure, even 
despite Tau’s manifest tendency on the matter.17 Therefore, it can be argued 
that a considerable portion of his thoughts on program and method are 
more or less scattered through his works. Among the notes that are most 
repeated within such work, his rigorous analytical attitude is worthy of 
mention. Thus, far from indulgent and excessive praise, Tau has undertaken 
to “introduce the scalpel of criticism”18 more than once, urging his counter-
parts to “come out of the narrow environment where Dogmatism has en-
closed the notion of Law, disregarding all spheres of normativity not estab-
15 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 5 and 6.
16 Tau Anzoátegui (1992c) 609.
17 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 13.
18 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 8.
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lished by the written law of the State. Such a restrictive conception cannot 
be applied to our Law of the Indies, nor to other legal systems of the time.”19
Tau Anzoátegui’s recognized sharpness benefits from the fact that many 
of his thoughts have been enhanced after long analysis and the subsequent 
revision of his lucid initial propositions. That is to say, that his style stands 
out because of valuable and sustained intellectual endeavors. Such is the 
case, among many others, of the process that he finalized after two decades 
with the publication of his organic work on the bans of good government.20
Based on his disciplined and continual formulation of ideas, perspectives 
and interests, the works of Tau are defined, more than by “surprises”, by the 
pre-announcement of a series of hypotheses which, having undergone cor-
rections and adjustments, tend to conclude into firm global statements. It 
can be said that his intuition brings about numerous unique studies, which, 
eventually, enable him to formulate suggestive and appealing global recre-
ations of the legal past. Thus, he explains, for instance, and I believe that 
with some degree of exaggeration in terms of their randomness, that the 
works that make up La Ley en América hispana [Law in Spanish America] did 
not respond to “a previous plan, but rather, arose in isolation, fostered by 
various intellectual concerns and realized through academic commitment.”21
Besides, endowed as he is with an acute sense of appreciation of the value of 
the different historical evidence, Tau benefits from the smallest traces offered 
by the wide set of documents that he has gathered in his multiple and 
fruitful incursions into archives.
5. I understand that the key of his thoroughness resides, above all, in the 
exercise of a constant and considered preoccupation, especially the firm 
preoccupation with conceptualizing the legal-historical processes of the 
Indies. Of course, Tau can thus only reject simplifying schemes,22 even those 
endorsed by the best-established tradition in the discipline. Hence, for exam-
ple, his concern to disentangle the normativity of the Indies led him to 
overcome the once-respected, distorted and retrospective legalism to con-
tend that the Law of Spanish America was integrated into an order in which 
19 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 22.
20 Tau Anzoátegui (2004) 15.
21 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 18 and 19.
22 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 12.
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custom had a prominent role,23 and to extol the virtues of legal scholars in 
their role as “directive source” within the Spanish American legal culture.24
In the same sense, he has stressed that while “the rejection of downgrading 
the Law of the Indies to the Recompilación [Compilation] or to peninsular 
legislation has frequently been noted by ancient and modern masters of our 
discipline,” such criterion has not always been applied, “at times, even by 
themselves.”25
All in all, Tau Anzoátegui’s works and activity stand out for a ubiquitous 
and considered preoccupation with the activity of legal historians, and the 
need to “encourage the renewal and expansion of the content of our disci-
pline.”26 Consistent with his condemnation of any kind of “implied” histor-
iographical theory,27 more than once Tau has made the effort to introduce 
“among us, in an organic fashion, and with a view to methodological debate 
and gradual acceptance”, several thoughts on the appropriate approach to 
understanding the Law of the Indies. Against this backdrop, he has noted 
that “review is a claim common to all disciplines and times, but in certain 
opportunities, it is a pressing issue,” and he has endorsed setting out precise 
“general guidelines” which will allow “fixing new [disciplinary] scopes with 
further clarity.”28
To a certain extent, Tau’s rigorous theoretical preoccupation benefits from 
his frequent – and intelligent – readings of the best legal historiography. 
Nonetheless, the latter was impossible on several occasions, such as when he 
decided to address topics lacking an adequate monograph base.
Tau himself has described his style in Casuismo y Sistema [Casuistry and 
System]: “at the outset and during the course of this research – he comments 
– I have borne in mind the ideas put forward and the possibility of their 
multiple usefulness. That has decisively encouraged me to put them into 
action. For a long time, I have gathered the material that I use as support, 
and in the last years I have intensified searches, chiefly in Spanish libraries 
and archives. As presumed, testimonial evidence is scattered throughout 
numerous ancient, printed and handwritten documents. Often, the value 
23 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 9.
24 Tau Anzoátegui (1992c) 609.
25 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 88.
26 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 128.
27 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 3.
28 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 7 and 8.
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of such evidence lies in discovering the spirit underlying the words. There are 
no thematic indexes or files that facilitate the search. Though I have always 
pursued to select writings or examples that are representative and sufficient 
to minimize an error in judgment, this does not prevent other testimonies or 
new interpretations of known texts from taking to standpoints that may 
soften or directly contradict the opinions I state. Far from exhausted, the 
research I present remains open to new searches and reflections.”29
Certainly, the extraordinary academic dissemination enjoyed by Tau’s 
works is connected to the most distinguished historiographical tradition 
of the Law of the Indies. However, there is evidence of an unbiased and 
critical perspective, which has encouraged him, more than once, to over-
come ancient disciplinary paradigms …
In Tau’s view, previous historiographical products make up an important 
disciplinary intellectual capital. Nonetheless, that does not prevent him from 
suggesting the careful employment of accepted paradigms, and of what he 
considers model investigations.30 In this regard, Tau says, generically, that 
“our studies, in continuous formation, have a gradual progress – not linear 
or conformist – through the contributions of successive generations. Thus, 
when we look back to the past of our discipline, we do much more than an 
act of evocation; instead, we engage in a necessary exercise of introspective 
knowledge of our activities, both cumulative and critical, which eventually 
leads us to consolidate the current foundations of our work.”31 Hence, there 
is an imperative need to foster new approaches to the discipline, especially 
after noting the persistence of stagnant legalist views,32 and the inappropri-
ate “application of the set of sources of Law in the formulation of mono-
graphs of the Indies.”33
Based on the preceding arguments, I believe that in the future, to a good 
extent, the works of Tau shall bear the responsibility to fulfill a prediction 
analogous to the one conveyed by Altamira to Levene in their time: “It is 
possible to believe that in some years colonial history will differ radically 
from what has been revealed up to the present time”.34
29 Tau Anzoátegui (1992a) 14.
30 Tau Anzoátegui (2000) 121.
31 Tau Anzoátegui (1990) 475.
32 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 41.
33 Tau Anzoátegui (1997) 47.
34 Tau Anzoátegui (1990) 483.
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Luigi Nuzzo
Between America and Europe
The Strange Case of the derecho indiano
1. The right to memory and lost identities
On December 15, 2010, the United States recognized the Universal Declara-
tion of Indigenous Populations. Their recognition followed the one of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand thereby reinforcing the hopes of those who 
considered the Declaration to be an important instrument for the defense 
of indigenous populations and the reparation of the wounds inflicted on 
them by history.1 It is common knowledge that the Declaration was approved 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007 with the unfavorable 
vote of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the absten-
tion of 11 countries. It was not easy to obtain the approbation of all mem-
bers because of the resistance of many states to recognize the native popu-
lations who lived in their own territories as nations holding collective 
rights.2 As a matter of fact, already in 1982 a special working group com-
posed of representatives of the indigenous populations was formed at the 
Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities. In 1993 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations prepared 
and presented to the Sub-commission an initial project that was approved 
one year later.3 It seemed that everything was going well but after the 
1 The Announcement of the United State’s support for the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was given by President Obama during the Tribal 
Nations Consultation in Washington, D. C.
2 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, 13/12/2007, http://
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html.
3 The Working Group on Indigenous Populations is an organ created by the U. N. Economic 
and Social Council, and it is part of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities. The Project was approved by the Sub-Commission 
with the Resolution 1994/45 (26/8/1994). With the same resolution the Sub-Commission 
had also submitted the draft to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. On 29/6/2006 the 
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approval the project got lost in the U.N. corridors and it appeared again 
many years later. It is a long story, but I neither want to reconstruct it nor 
confront the theoretical and practical problems it entailed.4 I will take 
instead the Declaration as a starting point for a more general consideration 
on derecho indiano and on the research prospects it might suggest to jurists 
and legal historians.
The Universal Declaration of Indigenous Populations is based on memory. 
It assumes the defense of memory as an instrument for the definition of 
indigenous identity and the protection of indigenous rights. The individuali-
zation of a new legal subjectivity, the indigenous people, a collective subject 
whose full right to self-determination is recognized, is possible only by 
recognizing their right to manifest, practice, teach their cultural traditions, 
celebrate their spiritual and religious ceremonies, pass on their history, their 
culture and their language to future generations. In the text there is no 
definition of indigenous people. This should not astonish us since it was 
not contained in the project of 1993. In fact it was not necessary. This new 
subject did not need any definition because it did not ask for state recog-
nition or legitimation. It is not necessary because it is already given, it is a 
historical subject that existed before the states. But it claims, precisely 
through the use of memory, the preservation and reinforcement of its polit-
ical, social and legal system.5
draft was adopted by the Human Rights Council but the U.N. General Assembly adopted 
the Declaration only on September 13, 2007 (Resolution 64/295) with 143 votes in favor, 
4 against it (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United States) and 11 abstentions. The pro-
tection of the indigenous identity is a right already recognized in 1989 by the ILO Con-
vention 169 (Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries). It was the first treaty concerning the protection of indigenous rights adopted 
by the International Labor Organization and ratified by 27 states.
4 See Nuzzo (2002); Nuzzo (2011).
5 In 1983 Martinez Cobo, special rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination 
against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 Add.1–7 (1983) wrote 
that the community, the people and the indigenous nations are those who “having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre–colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in 
those territories or parts of them. They form at present non dominant sectors of society 
and they are determined to preserve and develop and transmit to the future generations 
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis for their continued exis-
tence as people.”
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In order to exist again as a people it is necessary to be able to remember. 
But remembering is not memory. It is part of the distinction with which 
memory works. The other issue is forgetting. As a matter of fact memory is 
based on a series of selective operations of remembering and forgetting. 
As Raffaele De Giorgi wrote, the memory is the unity of the distinction 
between remembering and forgetting.6
Remembering and forgetting are the distinctions through which memory 
works and at the same time we could say, with a certain simplification, they 
are the two poles around which both the issue of indigenous peoples’ claim 
for identity and the discourse of colonialism have been structured and from 
which, in the course of time and in different ways, strategies of assertion or 
denial of indigenous subjectivity have been developed. In other words, out-
side of memory, remembering and forgetting become the conditions that 
make the existence of an indigenous legal subject possible or impossible. 
Only memory of oneself and of one’s own history can produce identity and 
thus subjectivity. On the contrary, those who lack memory or those whose 
memory was stolen or overwritten do not exist. Franz Fanon reminded this 
very effectively many years ago opening a meeting on the relationship 
between national culture and fights for freedom. According to Fanon the 
colonial dominion had produced a “cultural obliteration.” In other words it 
disconnected the subjected peoples from their culture denying the local 
reality, introducing new juridical relationships and producing their system-
atized subjection.7 The consequences were dramatic. The consciousness of 
the impossibility of becoming white or of eliminating the “hated negritude” 
led to wrong-footing of the colonial ego, to the irreparable schizophrenia of 
identity. Many years later in the post-colonial debate the uncertainties about 
identity became a foundation of power.8 The reconstruction of one’s past 
through a long and painful process of re-memorization on the one hand 
confirmed the impossibility of rejoining one’s original identity; on the other 
hand it was a tool for imagining a new hybridized subjectivity in which the 
identity of the colonized and of the colonizer melted. Thus it became impos-
sible to overcome the conflict between the “colonial self and the colonized 
other” and at the same time to establish both the mutual dependence of the 
6 De Giorgi (2004) 142–61.
7 Fanon (1971) 61.
8 Fanon’s central position in post-colonial studies is declared by Chakrabarty (2000) 17.
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two once opposing identities and their continuous fluidity. Paradoxically 
subaltern studies revealed the deepest violence of global capitalism exactly 
at the moment when its strategies confirmed the uniqueness of the world 
and gave a peaceful representation of it, based on the dialectic relationship 
between opposite concepts of center and periphery. They built a theory of 
subalternity that, starting from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, overtook 
the binary logic of first world / third world, colonizer / colonized and passed 
from the dialectic self / other to the dissemination of the images of the self 
and of other. The result was a new subjectivity, precisely a hybridized one, 
residing in the body of a new protagonist upon which colonial modernity 
had built its reasoning and that asked to be the maker of its own history.9
The political battle for the recognition of one’s own diversity and one’s 
own right to memory imposed therefore new approaches to historiography. 
This last one entrusted with the task of revealing the inadequacy of legal and 
political categories of Western thought in order to favour the comprehen-
sion of the world’s complexity, and the relationships of power pre-existing its 
use, thus determining the selection of facts to be told and the way in which 
they had to be narrated.10 At the same time the methodological renewal 
produced by decentralized forces coming from post-colonial and subaltern 
studies overcame the special and theoretic limits of the previous historiog-
raphy and allowed us to make more complex narrative canons of Western 
historiography and the discursive practices of international lawyers.11
However, there is a still a lot to be done, as the strange case of the derecho 
indiano seems to confirm.
2. Claiming an Identity: the Road Map of García Gallo
The editors have suitably called this volume New Horizons of Spanish Colonial 
Law, but what does hide behind the expression “Spanish Colonial Law”? 
What does it hint at, or what is its equivalent in Castilian? The most imme-
diate translation, derecho colonial español is not of great help. No specialist in 
Spain or Central and South America would recognize the subject of their 
9 The existing literature is already endless: Bhabha (1994); Prakash (1994); Prakash (1995) 
4ff.; Guha (2002).
10 Mezzadra (2008) 56–72.
11 Craven (2008); Nuzzo (2012).
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studies in this translation. We might say that Spanish Colonial Law is the 
politically correct version of a legal discipline that is well-founded in the 
Hispanic academic tradition: the derecho indiano.
Anyhow, it is not easy to provide a definition. It seems easier to say what 
the derecho indiano was not: it was not an indigenous law. Carlos Petit 
maliciously defined it as the exotic version of ius commune, and Bartolomé 
Clavero, more polemically, a “derecho generado o reconocido por parte de 
Europa para dicha geografía y dicha humanidad, como si ésta careciera de 
cultura y así de capacidad para regirse por sí misma, así como para determi-
nar la reglas de recepción y acomodamiento de la gente sobrevenida y extra-
ña de entrada para ella.”12 In any case it was a European law that on one 
hand the legal historiography imagined to have arrived in America with the 
first conquistadores, on the other hand it was used to tell the story of the West 
Indies in the same way as the legal history of European countries had been 
told.
Moreover, the expression derecho indiano itself was the result of an inven-
tion. It was absolutely unknown to the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries’ jurists 
who used the expression derecho de las indias or de los Reynos de Indias. On the 
contrary it was invented by the Argentinean Riccardo Levene, leading schol-
ar of the Argentinean school of legal historians, and founding father of the 
discipline together with the Spanish in exile Rafael Altamira.13 According to 
Levene the derecho indiano had to be identified with all the law in force in 
the West Indies. It was an extremely rich prescriptive set of provisions of a 
different origin and nature that met in a single system able to “organizar el 
gobierno espiritual y temporal de las indias, establecer la condición de sus 
habitantes, regular la navegación y el comercio y sobre todo convertir a los 
indigénas a la fé católica.”14
But the loyalty to the idea of system and the sharing of the aims that 
the derecho indiano would bring about did not prevent the historiographic 
representations offered by the doctrine from being univocal. Simply put, one 
might say that until the end of the 1970s (or rather until Alfonso García 
Gallo’s positivistic approach undisputedly prevailed) the system of derecho 
12 Petit (1993a) 665; Clavero (2004–2005) 543.
13 On the relationship between Rafael Altamira and Ricardo Levene, see Tau Anzoátegui
(1997a).
14 Zorraquín Becú, cited in Tau Anzoátegu (1997b) 33 (ft. 19).
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indiano was based on the supremacy of Castilian legislation and on a certain 
image of the Spanish monarchy in which from the outset the signs of a 
modern state were there to be seen. Then, with the end of Francoism, the 
fading of García Gallo’s star and Spain’s entrance into Europe it was also 
possible to rediscover the legal and customary elements of the medieval legal 
experience. At the same time Spanish legal history started to be included in 
the history of ius commune and the common European juridical tradition.15
I will begin with García Gallo. The legal history in Spanish speaking 
countries is characterized by his activity on the Iberian Peninsula as well 
as in Latin America and by his extremely rich scientific contribution.16 He 
was able to make himself responsible for Edoardo de Hinojosa y Naveros’ 
heritage, mythicizing his figure, acting as his pupil and at the same time 
methodologically criticizing his work and his school. He took upon himself 
the burden of projecting a new history of law, thinking of it in the first place 
as a legal-scientific discipline, in which the legal historian is both a jurist and 
a scientist. The first images of this renewed history of Spanish law as a 
juridical science were collected in two works published between 1948 and 
1952 dedicated to Hinojosa. The first one introduced a complete re-edition 
of the latter’s work and the other was the result of a conference held at the 
Instituto nacional de estudios jurídicos, and the following year published in the 
Anuario de historia del derecho español.17
The methodological change that García Gallo called for was not simple: 
he had to introduce Edoardo de Hinojosa y Naveros’ work, commemorate 
the hundredth anniversary of his birth and at the same time trace out the 
guide-lines of his own history of law. He had to impose a turning point in 
Spanish legal historiography through a deep renewal of the conceptual 
instruments it used. At the same time he had to hide the changes in his 
own point of view inside a discourse and a representation that, both on a 
political and legal level, focused on continuities more than fractures.18
15 Nuzzo (2008).
16 On García Gallo’s role at the Instituto internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano founded 
in Buenos Aires in 1966 with Ricardo Zorraquín Becú and Alamiro de Avila Martel, see 
Martiré (1996).
17 García Gallo (1948); García Gallo (1953b); a critical analysis of the relationship be-
tween García Gallo and Hinojosa in Vallejo (1998).
18 These fractures were evident in García Gallo (1941), where he criticized Hinojosa’s 
thesis on the Germanic component of Spanish law expressed in Hinojosa (1910).
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The history of law was a legal science that needed its own methodology in 
order to be told. This on the one hand would free legal scholarship from 
political constraints, and from the economic and more generally the socio-
cultural context. On the other hand it would prevent singling the jurist out 
as the main partner of the legal historian. Moreover, the legal historian was 
also a jurist and as such felt the duty to remove his subject, the law, from the 
influence of other disciplines and in particular freeing it from cultural con-
taminations that would alter its identity and it is precisely identity the issue.
Whilst reconstructing the route through which the legal systems and the 
institutions had developed, García Gallo did not speak of medieval law, but 
rather of a present law that regulated the daily aspects of social life. Thus he 
entrusted the historian with the delicate task of remembering and selecting 
which were the element for constructing the memory and identity of the 
jurist and the country and what, once again, was to be condemned to 
oblivion.
The problems the legal historian had to face with dealing with the issue of 
derecho indiano were not different. Also in this case the re-definition of 
disciplinary identity continued to be his main aim. Moreover, while in Spain 
García Gallo had identified Hinojosa as the founder of the discipline, thus 
contributing to mythicize his profile and presenting himself as his heir, in 
Central and South America the absence (from his point of view, obviously) 
of a school which complied with a strict legal method, took him to propose 
himself as the true founder of the derecho indiano.19
At the beginning of the 1950s García Gallo adjusted his strategy. He 
exalted the role of law as a legal source in the 16th century Indies and 
subjected the methodologies used by the legal historians when studying 
the derecho indiano to severe criticism.20 Even if he recognized Rafael Alta-
mira’s and Ricardo Levene’s centrality and their importance for the disci-
pline, the approach of the two scholars, with their openness towards history, 
19 See Tau Anzoátegui (1992b); about García Gallo’s beginning as an Americanist historian 
see the critical analysis of Clavero (2007).
20 The articles are: La ley como fuente del derecho en Indias en el siglo XVI (1951); Panorama 
actual de los estudios de historia del derecho indiano (1952), and El desarollo de la historiografía 
jurídica indiana (1953), all published in García Gallo (1972a). In the following years he 
often turned to treating methodological problems reaffirming the already expressed theses 
or refining his positions. Particularly useful: García Gallo (1967); García Gallo (1971); 
García Gallo (1972b).
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sociology and politics, had inexorably jeopardized the subject of their stud-
ies. According to García Gallo they lacked legal sense, the recognition of the 
centrality of the legal dimension and the will to study it “con espíritu y 
técnica de juristas.”21 “La vocación histórica o sociológica de la mayor parte 
de los cultivadores estudiosos de la Historia del derecho indiano les lleva a 
atender a los fenómenos sociales con olvido de los propiamente jurídicos y a 
no valorar estos en su propio alcance sino con criterio extraño al derecho. La 
construcción dogmática, que constituye la tarea principal de los juristas 
científicos – se ocupen del derecho romano, medieval o del actual – apenas 
se ha intentado. […] El estudio dogmático perfectamente compatible con el 
histórico del derecho indiano, tarea que incumbe a los juristas y no a los 
historiadores está sin hacer […]. La Historia del Derecho debe ser para el 
jurista un modo de conocer el Derecho, y no la Historia o la sociología. Por 
ello ha de estudiarse con orientación, espíritu y técnica jurídica.”22
An historian of derecho indiano has therefore to engage in the discovery of 
his identity as well as the one of his discipline and contribute to build a 
national conscience by reconstructing the history of its “national positive 
law.” Also, since the law had its identity, it was necessary to read it being 
aware of its evolution, forgetting the historical and social concern and limit-
ing the attention to political, social and economic aspects.23 Consequently 
the history of the derecho indiano (too long entrusted to historians, at the 
expense of jurists’ attention) also had to be considered as a scientific disci-
pline since the law, being a subject more than a simple technique, was a true 
21 García Gallo (1967) 112. But already in García Gallo (1948) CX he reiterated Altami-
ra’s “sociological concern” that “relegated law to a secondary level” and that “he was no 
researcher of Hinojasa’s kind.” To this point Vallejo (1998) 778 writes “Un investigador 
del tipo de Hinojosa de García Gallo es lo que Altamira claramente no era. No es que 
relegase Altamira lo jurídico a un segundo plano, sino que defendía una posición meto-
dológica que entendía que hacer la historia del derecho implicaba bastante más que hacer 
la historia, estrictamente del Derecho; y no se trataba entonces de hacer sociología, sino de 
seguir haciendo historia del Derecho sin perder de vista sus manifestaciones y condicio-
nantes más diversos.”
22 García Gallo (1952) 55ff. He confirmed these positions nineteen years later: García 
Gallo (1967) 112.
23 García Gallo (1967) 107–119. The quoted paragraph is taken from García Gallo
(1972b) 1078. He confirmed these positions in the review of Paradisi (1973) and criticized 
the methodological opening it contained: García Gallo (1974) 741–752; a comparative 
lecture of the methodological positions of García Gallo and Paradisi in D’Ors (1977).
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science. Lawfulness, being a neutral and evaluating knowledge capable of 
translating general values into laws and juridical concepts, was based on the 
distance which separated it from the violent world of politics and socio-
economic struggles, and its capacity to build and represent itself as a unique, 
closed and self-referential system, capable of recognizing its own trueness. 
The derecho indiano was therefore essentially a legislative system.24
In a territorial organism that, just as it happened in 16th century in 
France, assumed the form of a state where the main theologians, jurists 
and political thinkers took an active part in the process of absolutistic and 
bureaucratic centralization, the law seemed the most apt instrument for the 
realization of the sovereign’s will. It also enabled the renewal of the sover-
eign’ s centrality and it was at the same time the clearest instrument of 
civilization.25 Thus, on the one hand the positivistic tension and the state 
aspirations introduced a functional legal paradigm to read, from a unitary 
point of view, any discourse on power and on political subjects as well as 
those not institutionally active in the Indies.
On the other hand the legalistic dimension in which the Conquista was 
absorbed allowed historiography to introduce a break between the desires of 
the monarchy for the defense of the rights of the natives and its constant 
insistence on their evangelization and the violent reality for the Indian 
population. The laws of Burgos and Valladolid, the Leyes Nuevas, the Orde-
nanzas of 1573 (to give only the most renowned examples) translated the 
religious concerns of the sovereigns, reflected Ferdinando and Isabella’s 
promises to Alessandro VI and initiated a virtuous network between three 
poles: the imperial chanceries and the jurists of the Crown, the universities 
and the theologians of Salamanca, the Indian territories and indigenous 
24 In the Indies the concept of law, after being initially identified with the norms in force in 
the Reign of Castile and automatically bestowed overseas, in the years immediately after 
the Conquista absorbed both the ordenanzas, le cedolas, le reales provisiones, le instrucciones
and the cartas issued with a general character for all overseas countries, those addressed to 
a province as well as to a certain place. In both cases, for García Gallo the Indian provi-
sions were a special law put on top of a hierarchic scale of sources that could be integrated 
in a unique system by a subsidiary Castilian law, defined general or common. García 
Gallo (1951); García Gallo (1967); on this issue see Tau Anzoátegui (1992d).
25 Pietschmann (1980). As regards Italian legal historiography, that up to the 1980s was not 
very attentive to the relationship between law and politics in 16th century Spain, see 
Piano Mortari (1987).
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populations. Christian yearnings, political reasoning and juridical logic com-
peted in the definition of their status allowing Morales Padrón to see in the 
Burgos laws “el primer cuerpo básico del estatuto indigena” and García Gallo 
to justify up until the 1970s the co-existence, in this fundamental prescrip-
tive body, of the recognition of human nature and freedom of the indige-
nous population while maintaining the system (of exploitation) of the enco-
mienda.26
3. Claiming an identity: Francesco Calasso and the system of
ius commune
The construction of a national legal identity and the project of a methodo-
logical renewal of the history of law followed by García Gallo demanded the 
recovery and the exaltation of the institutional profiles as well as the legis-
lative activity carried out by the sovereigns of Castile. Yet in order to achieve 
these objectives it was necessary to undertake a deep change in the mindset 
in the way the role performed by Roman law in Spain and its heritage was 
perceived.
Spain, under the dictator Franco, imposed a proudly different (legal) 
history from the European one. It was a Christian and nationalistic history 
focused on the primacy of legislation and of state; a history where the 
juridical literature had a secondary role and where only an echo of the ius 
commune could be heard. Through the ley de las sietes partidas, the great 
drawing up of Alfonso X in 1265, the Romanist and canonistic tradition 
had also entered the reign of Castile and from there the West Indies. But as a 
consequence of a precise political strategy aimed at the territorial unification, 
it had become a common law with national character
In Spain, as García Gallo maintained in a conference held in Rome in the 
middle of the 1950s and published in the Revista de studios politicos, the ius 
commune for the first time passed through a crisis highlighting its incapacity 
to offer appropriate answers to the new needs.The American experience then 
pitilessly revealed its inadequacy.27 Its principles, he continued, were used to 
26 Morales Padrón (1979) 308–310; García Gallo (1977) 755–756.
27 García Gallo (1955). The Revista de estudios politicos, at which García Gallo during the 
1940s collaborated assiduously, was the organ of the Instituto de Estudios Politicos, the 
ideological laboratory of the regime, founded in 1939 following the model of the Istituto 
italiano di cultura.
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incorporate the Indies into the Crown of Castile and to define the juridical 
titles which legitimized the dominions. But when the ius commune reached 
the Indian coasts, through the Requerimiento, its weakness became evident 
and the scornful answer of two Cenú caciques was enough to cause the whole 
system to be debated.28
As Fernandéz de Oviedo remarked, after reading the document, the two 
Caciques denied the validity of Alexander VI’s donation and consequently 
the legitimacy of the dominion claimed by the Spanish sovereigns and con-
firmed their inalienable rights on those territories. García Gallo imagined 
them and represented them to us as “firmes en sus convicciones jurídicas” 
and considered their answer “consciente y concluyente: la validez del dere-
cho común fue rechazada y a él opuso el propio derecho indígena.” The 
consequences of this gesture were enormous. “Por primera vez se negaba 
al derecho común su vigencia universal y se le rechazaba en la resolución 
de los problemas del Nuevo Mundo.”29
In the damp forests of Cenú and for an audience, as the Italian one, with 
little familiarity with the Indies, García Gallo put an inglorious end to a 
universal juridical knowledge, heavy with triumphs in Europe, and at the 
same time stressed that the insufficiencies of ius commune had also caused a 
beneficial “Spanish reaction.” And this time the answers were both adequate 
and immediate. On a doctrinal level Francisco de Vitoria had substituted the 
ius commune with the “system” of ius gentium and on a legislative level the 
Crown had issued important legislation inspired by systematic tensions and 
the Christian dimension of the old ius commune which had recognized the 
principles of freedom and independence of the autochthonous populations.
I am not sure whether Francesco Calasso, the legal historian of “La 
Sapienza University”, had also been invited to the meeting at the Spanish 
Institute of Rome that day and, if he had been sitting among the audience, 
what he might have thought about the sad destiny García Gallo reserved to 
ius commune or about his legislative approach to legal history. García Gallo’s 
28 The Requerimiento too had a state character. In fact García Gallo (1955) 157 writes that 
“este Requerimiento, pleno de amenazas a quien lo aceptase, tampoco era distinto del que 
cualquier Gobierno actual, antes de emplezar la fuerza, hace a cualquier grupo de sedicio-
sos para que acaten el poder establecido”; on the discursive strategies of the Requerimiento
see Nuzzo (2004) 13–85.
29 García Gallo (1955) 158.
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discourse (particularly his attention towards national identity and the exten-
sive use of the term system) enabled us to reconstruct the threads that 
connected the Spanish professor to the Italian legal culture and particularly 
the influence exercised by his system of ius commune. Even if the García 
Gallo’s project of methodological renewal had imposed the re-evaluation 
of the role played by ius commune or presupposed its complete nationaliza-
tion, it still needed the idea of a system introduced, by Calasso to endow the 
medieval juridical experience with a scientific character and to connect ius 
commune and iura propria.
Certainly the differences were not negligible. García Gallo’s theoretical 
construction, simply based on the binomial law and nation, was far from the 
refined doctrine of Calasso. Moreover, both shared the objective of redefin-
ing the identity of the discipline and using legal history as an instrument for 
the construction of a national juridical identity. Calasso’s historiographic 
proposal required the recovery of the historical authenticity of medieval 
law and the reconstruction of the economic, political and social relation-
ships in which the juridical texts and their authors were immersed. It was no 
longer the time for a “history of Roman law during Middle Age” as Savigny 
had done, for old contrapositions between Romanists and Germanists (or 
Italianists) nor for sterile exercises of dogmatic reconstruction. As a matter of 
fact, in the Middle Ages “a new spirit” had already taken possession of the 
old body of Roman law, and put new energies into it and determined a deep 
transformation unifying that law with “its own experience”, its needs and 
“rivivendolo ed esaltandolo come norma del proprio operare“.30 Roman law 
was no longer the hard core of the medieval juridical experience, but rather 
the ius commune and the historian of Italian law was its authorized cantor. It 
was not only a problem of discipline or an academic struggle aimed at 
achieving more room for the history of Italian law inside the law faculties. 
Examining the historicity of ius commune meant considering the existence of 
an Italian law free from the Italian state and recognizing an Italian juridical 
identity before the national unification.31
Following Santi Romano’s institutionalist theory, Calasso identified law 
with the legal system and sustained its plurality. “La constatazione della 
pluralità, però, come ha scritto Pietro Costa, non era per Calasso la conclu-
30 Calasso (1954) 33; Calasso (1939); see Conte (2009) 27–32.
31 Iglesia Ferreirós (2000).
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sione dell’indagine, ma la sua premessa; serviva a porre correttamente un 
problema, che per Calasso è il problema rispetto al quale le considerazioni 
‘istituzionalistiche’ sono strumentali: questo problema è il problema del-
l’unità.”32 As a matter of fact, according to Calasso, the construction of a 
national legal history required the reassembling of a plurality of norms 
inside a unitary system. The ius commune united the histories in one great 
Italian history seeming to be a system of systems. At the same time Croce’s 
idealism and Romano’s theory itself did not allow Calasso to break free from 
the images of state and law and led him to consider the system of ius 
commune as a legislative system, or at least to consider the legislative com-
ponent as the prevalent one.33 The history of ius commune was now the 
“storia di questo sistema unitario, e non soltanto del diritto romano 
comune, e meno ancora della scienza del diritto o della giurisprudenza. 
Chè infatti, scienza e giurisprudenza furono l’organo potentissimo della 
evoluzione del sistema: ma essendo questo un sistema legislativo, la posi-
zione dommatica dell’attività del giurista o del giudice vi rimase sempre ed 
esclusivamente quella di attività interpretativa, sul fondamento logico e 
giuridico, e quindi con tutte le norme e i limiti che ogni attività interpre-
tativa può avere in un sistema legislativo.”34
Thus Calasso understood the historicity of medieval law and stressed its 
specificity with regards the Roman law opposing at first the dogmatic 
approaches of Pandectistic school and then the neo-pandettistic revival of 
the 1950s. Moreover, in order to transform that “new” law into a scientific 
knowledge and into an instrument to legitimate a discipline in search of 
redemption inside the European academy, he needed to recover Savigny’s 
notion of system. Furthermore, Calasso could not but use the system. Inde-
pendently from its legislative and doctrinal connotation it was not identified 
with a logical principle necessary for the exposition and the organization of 
the subject matters, or with a historic product functional for a precise polit-
ical juridical project. On the contrary, it was on one hand a constitutive 
principle of law and it was impossible to set it aside without losing the 
scientific nature and the truth of one’s own discourse and of one’s own 
32 Costa (1999). Paradisi (1980) remains fundamental.
33 Paradisi (1980) 217ff.
34 Calasso (1939) 129; see also Calasso (1948). Costa (1999) 38 uses the above quoted 
paragraph.
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subject; on the other hand, it was an interpretative model good for selecting 
the heterogeneous prescriptive materials that it should be able to coordinate 
and build upon the reality it was to describe.35
In 1951 – the same year when some fundamental works that Calasso had 
dedicated in the 1930s to the problem of ius commune were collected in 
a well-known volume called Introduzione al diritto commune – an essay by 
García Gallo on the concept of law and its role inside the system of sources 
in 16th century Indies appeared. The Spanish scholar did not miss the Italian 
editorial novelty quoting it and recommending it to his pupils as a funda-
mental lecture.36 He needed those pages for the construction of a unitary 
and scientific concept of derecho indiano. They gave him the conceptual 
framework to keep the old Castilian law and the new law issued for the 
overseas territories together. As a matter of fact his theoretical representation 
did not need a ius commune neither as Roman law nor as law produced by 
the jurists’ interpretation. In the first case because the Roman law had 
already been nationalized; in the second case because Calasso himself had 
already streamlined its creative dimension. Moreover, the theoretical repre-
sentation of García Gallo was freed both from historicity and spirituality in 
which Calasso had instead immerged it because any historical and religious 
tension had already been selected and made positive. Thus, only two pre-
scriptive systems remained in opposition: Castilian and Indian, and with 
them the “old” problem of unity.37 This made Calasso’s work still useful. 
The solution was in those pages, in the idea of the system that he theorized 
and in the idea of the state he still evoked. Castilian laws and laws for the 
West Indies, like ius commune and ius proprium were the elements that inside 
a state framework, in a dialectic tension between the general and the partic-
ular, and between common and special, were able to intrinsically and organ-
ically connect in a unitary system.38
35 Mazzacane (1998).
36 “El primer libro que me hizo leer fue el Medioevo del diritto de Calasso” stresses Villapalos
(1996) 14 reminding the first teachings he got from García Gallo.
37 On the relationship between Calasso and the philosophic culture of idealist roots Ajello
(2002) 118ff., 400ff.; from a different point of view also Iglesia Ferreirós (1999b) insists 
on the problem of unity.
38 García Gallo (1951); García Gallo (1971) 177: “el ordenamiento juridíco no es tan sólo 
un conjunto de normas, sino uno auténtico sistema regido por principios y desarrollado 
de modo armónico.”
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4. Claiming an Identity: Carl Schmitt and the Discovery of
the New World
The end of Franco’s regime and the overcoming of the nationalistic 
approach of Spanish historiography made first the re-discovery of ius com-
mune possible and then enabled its projection onto the West Indies, imaging 
there the existence of a unitary and organic system. It was based on the 
dialectical relationship between the general and the specific, as it also seemed 
to happen in the respublica christiana.
Before following the ius commune during its transoceanic journey I think 
it is time to dwell upon the editorial news that was published in Europe at 
the beginning of the 1950s. While Calasso was re-writing the history of 
medieval legal thought through the concept of ius commune and García 
Gallo was including the Spanish Indies within a legislative, Christian and 
nationalistic system, the German jurist Carl Schmitt published Der Nomos 
der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum.39 In this book he turned 
again to international law and, following the same spatial approach to policy 
that had marked his work in the Twenties, traced the history of the ius 
publicum europaeum from its beginning to its dissolution.40 Schmitt’s history 
not only described Europe’s lost identity under the blows of Kelsen’s formal-
ism and legal universalism, whilst taking the relationship between Ordnung
and Ortung as a narrative archetype. It also expressed the desire for new amity 
lines and with them the desire for a new nomos and a new process of space 
subdivision.
The American claims of a new Western hemisphere, the equalization 
between colonial territories and national territories, the move (following 
the peace conference in Paris) from a European order to a universal one, 
the turn of a discriminatory concept of war and of the pre-modern identi-
fication between enemy and criminal, had produced the dissolution of the 
inter-European state system through which the international relationships 
had been juridically organized for four hundred years. It saw in territorial 
39 Schmitt (1950a).
40 See especially Schmitt (1940); Schmitt (2005). Schmitt’s interest in international law 
increased during the 1930s, see the articles Schmitt (1995) edited by Maschke; on the 
meaning of Großraum in Schmitt see Schmöckel (1994) 124ff.; Carty (2001); on the 
relationship between geopolitics and Schmitt’s Großraum see Losano (2010) 59ff.; Galli
(2010) 864–877.
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states its protagonists and in the discovery of a new world its pre-condition. 
The voyages of Columbus allowed Europe to know a free and unlimited 
space that was ready to be textualized and occupied. The Bulls of Alexander 
VI were the instruments for achieving these aims: they confined the Amer-
ican territories and the Ocean within a legal text and enabled the Landnahme
of the Catholic powers, Spain and Portugal. They ensured a konkrete Ordnung
with the acts of land taking and land distributing that was a founding 
principle for organizing the political communities and justifying the posi-
tivity of the law (Recht).41 As it is well known the pope gave the new lands to 
the Castilian sovereigns in order to spread the word of Christ and exposed 
the indigenous population to the Catholic religion. In this way he attributed 
a heavy moral obligation to Ferdinando and Isabella and established a legal 
title that legitimized the Spanish presence in America in front of the natives 
as well as the other European powers.
With another Bull he defined the spatial limits of the Spanish dominion. 
A line traced one hundred miles west from the Azores and running from the 
North Pole to the South Pole distinguished two different areas. One was 
reserved for the expansion of the Spaniards; the other could be occupied by 
the Portuguese, and, at the same time (by opposing to the space of the 
respublica christiana) demarcated the West Indies as an empty and non-quali-
fied spatial and territorial entity.
Europe needed that empty space for its own existence. “La civiltà europea 
– Carlo Galli wrote – esiste solo perché è in grado di impossessarsi del nuovo 
mondo, di occuparlo, di spartirlo, e di confinare là – nello spazio del non 
Stato – l’inimicizia assoluta, la limitazione della guerra nell’Europa degli 
Stati, che si riconoscono l’un l’altro come hostes aequaliter justi; è resa possi-
bile dalle guerre illimitate condotte contro i nativi in America (ma anche in 
Asia e in Africa) e anche fra le potenze europee tra di loro, fuori dal con-
tinente europeo.”42 But the rajas of Alexander VI were not enough for the 
definition of a new Nomos of the world. Marked on the Ocean, they ignored 
its alterity. They had only a simply distributive function and, presupposing 
the Pope’s superior authority, still affirmed the unity of the respublica chris-
tiana.
41 Schmitt (1950a) 81ff. (it. ed. 1991); see also Schmitt (1953).
42 Galli (2010) 877–889.
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The emergence of a new order needed, on the contrary, a real revolution 
with respect to the ordering of territorial spaces. It imposed the overcoming 
of that unity. According to Schmitt it was possible only when England, 
“l’isola che si fece pesce,” entered the debate thanks to a new “religione 
guerriera”: Calvinism.43 The amity lines between England and France that 
appeared for the first time in a secret clause of the Cateau Cambresis treaty, 
produced the definitive disappearance of a world and defined the structure 
of European international law. They ratified the existence of two opposite 
spaces: one, the European land, realm of law and peace; the other, the Ocean 
and the still unknown American territories. They were free from law and far 
from the international treaties, and appeared as real and permanent war 
theaters in which Western colonial impulses could be vented. Beyond the 
amity lines the possibilities became endless; there was no more peace and the 
agreements between European powers had no validity.44
Four hundred years later the dissolution of the ius publicum europeum and 
the deep crisis of the political subjects on whom it was based, ordered the 
search for a new Nomos. The perspective, nonetheless, remained a spatial one. 
In a conference entitled La unidad del mundo, held in Spain in 1951, Schmitt 
expressed his desire to bring about a “tercera fuerza,” India, Europe, the 
British Commonwealth, the Hispanic World, the Arabian System or one 
more force that had not yet been defined. It could break the “worrying 
dualism” – between East and West, communism and capitalism, enabling 
the opening of new macro-spatial perspectives and with them making it 
possible to single out a principle for their balance and the definition of a 
new international law.45 It was a new law but with a clear analogy with the 
19th and 20th centuries’ law of nations. In fact also this one “se basaba en un 
equilibrio de potencias, gracias al cual se conservaba su estructura. Tambien 
el ius publicum europaeum implicaba una unidad del mundo. Era una 
unidad Europeocéntrica, no era el poder político centralista de un único 
dueño de este mundo, sino una formación pluralista y un equilibrio de 
varias fuerzas.”46 Nevertheless, to reform the unity of the world, a new 
43 Schmitt (1954) (it. ed. 2002, 85).
44 A synthesis of the historiographical debate in: Cassi (2004) 102–114; a critical analysis of 
the conquest as a production of a new social space in Nuzzo (2004) 87ff.; Ruschi (2004–
2005) 407ff.
45 Schmitt (1950–1951), it. ed. 347.
46 Schmitt (1950–1951), it. ed. 348.
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Christian philosophy of history was also necessary. As a new katechon it could 
overcome the dualism between the Marxist philosophy of history and the 
weak historical relativism of the capitalistic West based on progress and 
technique. Thus it could offer, through an “irrupción concreta de lo eterno 
en el tiempo,” a firm answer to the advancement of dialectic materialism.47
Franco’s Spain was the geographical space from which it was possible to 
start the reconstruction of the European identity and the achievement of 
these aims. Everything began in Spain and in Spain everything could have a 
new beginning. The Spanish conquest of a New World and the doctrine of 
Francisco de Vitoria had brought the scientific and cultural foundation of a 
new law of nations, producing the first change of the structure of interna-
tional law.48 After the end of the Second World War (within a confused and 
divided Europe) the nationalistic and ultra-conservative Spain seemed to 
Schmitt the last bulwark. “È una coincidenza significativa – Schmitt wrote 
in a conference held in 1962 at the Instituto de estudios politicos of Madrid 
on the occasion of his appointment as a honorary member – che lo slancio 
sincero della ricerca mi abbia sempre condotto verso la Spagna. Vedo in 
quest’incontro quasi provvidenziale una prova in più del fatto che la guerra 
di liberazione nazionale in Spagna rappresenta una pietra di paragone. Nella 
lotta mondiale che si combatte oggi essa è stata la prima nazione a vincere 
con la propria forza e in maniera tale che ora tutte le nazioni non comuniste 
devono legittimarsi davanti alla Spagna sotto questo aspetto.”49
Spain repaid Schmitt’s interest.50 At the end of the Twenties Schmitt 
received his first invitation to hold a conference in Spain and his texts started 
to be translated. Franco’s seizure of power ten years later and the necessity 
for a stronger theoretical legitimation of the regime made Schmitt a con-
stant presence within the political and legal Spanish debate.51
47 Schmitt (1950–1951), it. ed. 354; see also Schmitt (1950b) ed. by G. Agamben.
48 Schmitt (1943) (ed. it.).
49 Schmitt (1962) 218–219.
50 In addition to the friendly relations with Álvaro d’Ors, Herrero (2004), the relationship 
between Schmitt and Spanish intellectuals are testified by Becchi (1998) 185, n. 14. The 
marriage of his daughter Anima with Alfonso Varela Otero, a legal historian who taught 
at the University of Santiago de Compostela, strengthened Schmitt’s bond with Spain, see 
Mehring (2009) 509–510.
51 The conference was held in 1929 at the Centro de Intercambio Intelectual Germano-Hispano, 
Madrid and was devoted to Donoso Cortes.
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The historiography reconstructed the relationship between Schmitt and 
Spain and underlined the reception and uses of Schmitt’s legal theory in the 
Iberian Peninsula.52
Recently Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, reconstructing the “zero years 
of the Spanish international law,” showed the effect of Schmitt’s article, 
El concepto de imperio en el derecho international, published in the first volume 
of the Revista de estudios politicos, on the representation of a new Franchist 
Order and underlined how an “endogamous line of continuity” ran through 
the German jurist, connecting the intellectual as Legaz Lecambra and Fran-
cisco Conde with the international lawyers of the post war years.53
In these subsequent pages I will not mention the relevance of Schmitt in 
the cultural debate of Franco’s Spain. I will, instead, attempt to highlight 
evidence of omissions.
As a matter of fact he was never cited by García Gallo or by the historians 
of derecho indiano, even though in Spain Schmitt was a highly demanded 
lecturer, his texts were translated in Castilian, his reflections on the history of 
the ius publicum europaeum assumed the Spanish conquest as starting point, 
Vitoria was one of his protagonists, a legal historian, Otero Varela, was his 
son in law and Álvaro d’Ors, the most important Spanish professor of 
Roman law, had friendly relations with him.54
Why? I will put forward two assumptions and leave the reader to choose 
the one he or she might like best.
The omission could be either the spontaneous fruit of the shabby nation-
alism of the legal historians of Franco’s Spain that were not really interested 
in what was happening outside the borders of their country and their dis-
cipline, or the consequence of their scientific limitation of understanding 
the theoretical force of Schmitt’s construction. Otherwise this omission 
could be the consequence of a historiographic strategy that was targeted at 
the anti-formalist approach of Schmitt or it could be the consequence of his 
interpretation of Vitoria free from the common universalistic stereotypes. 
52 See especially Beyneto (1983); López García (1996).
53 Rasilla del Moral (2012). I would like to thank Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral for 
sending me his article.
54 It is interesting to underline the absence of any references to Schmitt in the work of 
García Gallo (1957–1958) 467–476 on Alexander’s Bulls that is opened with a biblio-
graphical recognition.
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It could also be due to the refusal to recognize in the conquest or in the 
violence of the Landnahme the qualifying factor of the Spanish presence in 
the West Indies or the starting point of the international law’s constitutive 
process.55
5. Claiming an Identity: Víctor Tau Anzoátegui and
the New Horizons of the derecho indiano
During the 1970s the legal historiography started to become aware of the 
need for a deep methodological renewal under the pressure of the social and 
economic transformations that were sweeping through Europe. In addition, 
the more sensitive Spanish jurists took part to this debate.56 In 1977 the 
Peset brothers and two years later Bartolomé Calvero harshly criticized the 
methodology of García Gallo and revisited the image that Hinojosa’s school 
had imposed.
They came back to highlight the historical dimension of the law, under-
lining its relationship with social reality and economic structure, locating 
the most relevant reasons for Spanish historiographic backwardness and 
indifference towards a European historical phenomenon as ius commune
and the constitutional history of 19th century Spain in the nationalistic 
glorification of the Hispanic diversity.57 And while García Gallo still in 
1979 held fast to his dogmatic approach and ascribed the little attention 
given by Spanish jurists to ius commune to the importance of the German 
component of Spanish law in the early Middle Ages, Francisco Tomás y 
Valiente took the last step toward overcoming García Gallo’s method.58
He closed a revisionist process he started in 1976 in an article with the same 
55 Der Nomos der Erde was translated into Spanish only in 1979, but the guidelines of the 
book already appear from the conferences and the article translated into Spanish that I 
have quoted in these pages.
56 Scholz (1980).
57 Peset José Luis y Mariano (1977); Peset (1978); Clavero (1979). The first signs of the 
Spanish methodological renewal are already in Clavero (1974). The same Sevillan Review 
Historia, Instituciones, Documentos directed by Martínez Gijón was one of textual space 
where the new themes and the treatment of methodological problems could be afforded 
freedom within the pages of the Anuario that was not possible in Madrid at the time. 
Almost twenty years later Petit (1993b) 407 defined it as “último recurso al alcance de 
disidentes”.
58 García Gallo (1980). But see also García Gallo (1986) and (1988).
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title as the famous conference García Gallo held in Rome.59 According to 
Tomás y Valiente the article affirmed that it was no longer possible to con-
ceive legal history as García Gallo did in 1952, but also that “la dirección 
hacia la que García Gallo había orientado teóricamente la Historia del de-
recho en España, vista sobre todo desde la triple perspectiva del Manual, de 
sus propios fundamentos y de la caracterización global del Anuario, no 
parecía convincente.”60
When Spain joined the European Community in 1986, Helmut Coing 
presented at the I Simposio Internacional del Instituto de Derecho Común a 
paper meaningfully entitled España y Europa, un pasado jurídico común. He 
recognized the end of Spanish diversity and the belongings of the Spanish 
culture to European history. The director of the most important European 
institute of legal history, the Max Planck Institute in Frankfurt am Main, 
enabled Spain to gain access to the shared memory of the old ius commune, 
and affirmed the role played by the 16th century Spanish theologians in the 
process of the transformation of law as a legal science.61 Unquestionably, the 
history recited by the director of Max Planck was nothing more than “the 
old translatio studii with a few superficial patches to cover its nakedness, a 
few sops to the peddlers of unstable legal currency.”62 That is an umpteenth 
version of the myth of the history of European law: it was conceived in Italy, 
developed in France, improved in Holland and apexed at the Pandectistic 
school in Germany. Coing, nevertheless, introduced for his Spanish public 
an important variant: he certified the existence of the ius commune in the 
juridical Spanish inheritance, legitimizing the work carried out by the Iber-
ian legal historians, and admitted the champions of the Second Scholastic in 
the European legal history.
Three years later, in 1989, in a conference organized by the Centro di studi 
per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, Spanish historiography was ready 
to go on stage, and submitted itself to a kind of ‘group psychotherapy’ in 
front of the Italian colleagues.63 In the introductory paper Tomás y Valiente 
59 Tomás y Valiente (1976a); see also Tomás y Valiente (1976b).
60 Tomás y Valiente (1981) 3640.
61 Coing (1986).
62 Osler (1997).
63 Clavero / Grossi / Tomás y Valiente (1990) 633–654, see the review by Serrano Gonzá-
lez (1990).
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definitively denyed the representation of the escuela de Hinojosa offered by 
him. Tomás y Valiente disclosed the ideological manipulation of García Gallo 
and challenge the very existence of a school of Hinojosa and later of García 
Gallo.64 This was not the only thing. The organizers were conscious that a 
conference on Hispania had to investigate the legal projection of its image on 
the overseas dominions. Thus they entrusted Víctor Tau Anzoátegui with the 
task of explaining the exoticism of the derecho indiano and its relationships 
with the ius commune and the Castilian law. And Tau Anzoátegui (not for-
getting the paper presented by Coing in Murcia, first quotation), further-
more claimed that it was impossible to understand and describe the ius 
commune in Spain “sin tener debidamente en cuenta ese singular fenómeno 
de expansión jurídica en el espacio Atlántico.”65
Subsequently the derecho indiano and its protagonists as well as Castilian 
law and its jurists were knocking at the door of European legal history. 
There were “un único sistema jurídico de raíz europea continental”, and 
“una única unidad de estudio” into which ius commune, Castilian law and 
derecho indiano merged. García Gallo and his innumerable works kept offer-
ing Tau the methodological coordinates and the irreplaceable portrait of a 
centripetal system. The object of those methodological coordinates and of 
that system, however, appeared to be much more complex in the paper 
presented by Tau Anzoátegui than it seemed if one read the texts of García 
Gallo or those legal historians that in the same years also saw in the West 
Indies the European systemic relationship between ius commune and iura 
propria imagined by Calasso for medieval Italy, and used the Christian values 
of ius commune for reading the Crown’s engagement in favor of the natives 
and for justifying their submission.
Víctor Tau Anzoátegui kept on declaring his debt to García Gallo, but at 
the same time proudly remembered his affiliation to the school of Ricardo 
Levene and, following the historiographic tradition inaugurated by Levene 
and Altamira (that García Gallo had always criticized because of their lack of 
legal disposition), sought to restore the complexity of the derecho indiano.66
64 Tomás y Valiente (1990); Tomás y Valiente (1993–1994); see also Sánchez-Arcilla Ber-
nal (2003) 7–19, 48–68.
65 Tau Anzoátegui (1990); Martiré (2001) and (2003).
66 The great attention devoted by the Argentinean school towards history had already been 
testified by Martiré (1969); on Argentinean legal history see Abásolo (2008).
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Within a common history the derecho indiano was a different type of knowl-
edge and its identity could not easily be bridled by the idea of legislative or 
jurisprudential system. Besides, the system of García Gallo was not an his-
torical reality, but a projection of his positivistic and nationalistic theory.67
Tau Anzoátegui recognized the merits of the Spanish professor and under-
lined his timid approach to the new methodological proposals during the 
1980s, but he did not fail to keep distance from him. Some years later, for 
example, in a methodological work on the prospects of the derecho indiano, 
he not only recognized that “persiste en la historiografía, en dosis muy altas, 
la fuerza modeladora de la cultura legalista,” but also invited the legal histor-
ians to reconstruct the (broken?) relationships between law and the social 
net and to substitute “a cultura legalista con una cultura jurídica.”68 Only a 
juridical culture could have truly enabled the “situar la ley dentro del orde-
namiento en su verdadero lugar, según la materia y las épocas, y habría hecho 
posible una ‘lectura inteligente’ – que no es ingenua ni maliciosa – de los 
textos legales, interrogándolos a la luz de una concepción amplia del fenó-
meno jurídico.”69 The awareness of this complexity made it possible to 
devote attention to the other sources of law: customs, doctrine, and juris-
prudence.70 It was something of a desire that Tau Anzoátegui himself 
attempted to satisfy with two important books published in 1992. The 
first, La ley en Hispanoamérica, was in fact devoted to the different sources 
of the derecho indiano, and the second, meaningfully titled Casuismo y siste-
ma, was a historical investigation on its espíritu.71
Moreover, Tau Anzoátegui was searching for the identity of the derecho 
indiano, but the discovery or the re-discovery of the legal pluralisms to which 
its research was leaning, was no longer a problem that had to be overcome, 
nor was it the starting point of an investigation necessarily addressed at 
focusing a superior unity. The system had not disappeared and hanged dan-
gerously with its German rigor over the unordered world of the Spanish 
Indies. Similarly, the idealistic tension that sustained his project could have 
reproduced the dream of a spiritual and legal unity, making it again possible 
67 Tau Anzoátegui (1992b) 63.
68 Tau Anzoátegui (1997b) 41.
69 Tau Anzoátegui (1997b) 43.
70 See Tau Anzoátegui (1986) and (1989).
71 Tau Anzoátegui (1992c) and (1992a).
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to tell the old story of a conquest without conquest nor conquered popula-
tions in which the radical native alterity could be dissolved without resid-
uals.
Nevertheless, in the theoretical representation of Tau Anzoátegui the 
system had an element that counter balanced it. Beyond and against the 
system there was another category of interpretation, the casuismo. It was 
too an “anachronistic” concept, as Tau Anzátegui himself underlined. It 
was a word that once again had nothing to do with facts but that rather 
dealt with interpretations, helping us to enter into a “cultura común refrac-
taria a la idea de sistema.”72 The derecho indiano was an ordenamiento casuista, 
a pluralistic order that reflected the pluralism of the political world of 
Spanish Indies and was able to bravely resist attempts to rationalize the 
system
Setting the “creencia casuistica” against “idea sistematica,” Tau Anzoátegui 
took back the texts to their contexts and brought back the law into the social 
world, enabling the critics of a idealistic approach to share his “under-
ground” explorations “debajo de la legislación, la jurisprudencia o la activi-
dad judicial.”73 “El derecho indiano – Tau Anzoátegui wrote in the epilogue 
– aparece como un ordenamiento abierto a distintos modos de creación – 
normas legales, costumbres, jurisprudencia de los autores, práctica judicial, 
ejemplares, equidad, etc. – con ciertos principios rectores y leyes generales, 
pero con vastos espaciós para disposiciones particulares, privilegios, excep-
ciones y dispensas. La materia, las personas, el tiempo y las circustancias eran 
atendidas preferentemente en la solución de los casos dentro una sociedad 
que lucía sus estamentos o estados.”74
At the five hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America (within a 
solid historiographic tradition and for the readers with fairly conservative 
tastes) he offered a deeply innovatory lecture on the American world that, I 
72 Petit (1993a) 676. “A riesgo de sorprender al mesurado Víctor Tau con formulaciones 
radicales – Carlos Petit wrote, 669 – situaré Casuismo y sistema en el terreno así acotado 
de una historíografia de creación que, siendo jurídica, encuentra además implicaciones en 
la experiencía de derecho presente y aún puede proyectarse hacia el futuro.” This brings 
Petit to conclude (671): “la formación que acredita Víctor Tau es sólidamente tradicional, 
mas ya lo sería menor su mismo pensamiento; Casuismo y sistema, a despecho de la nutrita 
bibliografía que lo acompaña, sería entonces un libro radicalmente (post)moderno.”
73 Petit (1993a) 668.
74 Tau Anzoátegui (1992a) 570.
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like to think, could have caused doubts and perplexities in García Gallo and 
in his numerous scholars.
In Casuismo y sistema Víctor Tau Anzoátegui did not directly face the 
problem of the natives. However, the construction of the legal indigenous 
order as a casuistic order that was open to the diversities and to the neces-
sities of praxis, allowed a more conscious reflection on the role of the indige-
nous populations in the Hispanic American society and at the same time 
encouraged reflection on the control strategies used by the jurists to deny 
native diversity. The legal pluralism did not anticipate postmodern feelings 
nor did it arrange them in an ordered and constitutional plan for rights and 
different subjects that were destined to be sacrificed on the altar of legal 
formalism of modernity. On the contrary, through different means swinging 
between protection and repression – the application of some old legal status 
to indigenous, their introduction into Spanish procedural law, the imposi-
tion of the Castilian language, forced urbanization and obviously their con-
version to the Catholic faith – it had the aim of one day overcoming the 
diversity of indigenous populations and erasing their memory.
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Marta Lorente Sariñena
More than just Vestiges
Notes for the Study of Colonial Law History in Spanish America 
after 1808*
I. Introduction
On 19 March 2007, a Chilean citizen filed an appeal challenging as uncon-
stitutional a Court Regulation issued by the Court of Appeals in and for the 
city of Santiago in October 1995. The details of the proceedings are irrelevant 
here; what is noteworthy is that the judgment that put an end to the pro-
ceedings has been considered a true historic landmark. Indeed, not only was it 
the first time that an action against the interference with fundamental rights 
was admitted before the Constitutional Court, but it was also the first time 
that the Chilean High Court had declared partly unconstitutional a Court 
Regulation issued by the courts of justice.1
Although this development sparked great interest among specialists and 
lay people, I am aware that it is unrelated to the topic of this publication; 
furthermore, readers could wonder: What relevance to the renewal of legal 
historiography might a topic of debate about American or European con-
stitutional case law have? What relation is there, if any, between the labor of 
constitutional courts and the history of Spanish colonial law on which this 
book is focused? Or, lastly, has Víctor Tau ever addressed the study of the 
concentrated control of constitutionality?
Firstly, in reply to the last question, I must admit that I am not familiar 
with any work by the Argentine legal historian on the creation of the control 
of constitutionality,2 the multiplication of constitutional courts,3 or finally 
* DER2014-56291-C3-1-P. I would like to thank Javier Barrientos and Alejandro Agüero for 
their comments and information, which helped me develop this work.
1 Aldunate (2007).
2 Cruz Villalón (1987).
3 Von Bogdandy / Cruz Villalon / Huber (2007).
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the transformation of the sources within the system caused by the fore-
going.4 In fact, I could only attest to the opposite.5 However, I believe that 
the judgment rendered by the Chilean High Court is not only of great 
interest to those who study the ways in which law is created,6 but also 
intended for the study of legal historians who have avoided contaminating 
the interpretation of the legal past with legalism and / or statism, in work-
shops such as those conducted by Víctor Tau.7
The foregoing is not the only reason that can be provided to justify the 
use of the Chilean judgment as a starting point for this paper. I also believe 
that its analysis may lead to the formulation of proposals aimed at the 
renewal of legal historiography as regards the study of colonial law. It is 
well-known that opening up new thematic and methodological horizons has 
been a constant concern for Víctor Tau;8 yet, I will quote one of his earliest 
thoughts, from an interview almost twenty years ago:
“I believe that one of the major topics deserving the attention of scholars is what can 
be called the Law of the Indies at the transitional stage towards the formation of 
national law systems.”9
Víctor Tau himself has developed some aspects of his proposal,10 but his 
works will not be analyzed in the following pages; instead, the aim is simply 
to try to draw attention to some problematic aspects of the study of transi-
tional law. The first aspect is evident: is it appropriate to include the Chilean 
case within the Law of Transition? It should be borne in mind that answer-
ing this question in the affirmative suggests that not even at the time when 
“national law systems were formed,”11 was an end put to what historians 
have called the vestiges or remnants of the Law of the Indies in national laws.12
It is not necessary to be a specialized linguist to realize that the preceding 
terms somehow convey the idea of a residual. Therefore, this work is chiefly 
aimed at questioning the use of such terms in the study of transitional law 
4 Otto (1987).




9 Enciso Contreras / Del Conacyt (1993).
10 Tau (1977b); Tau (2007–2008).
11 Tau (1977a).
12 Guzmán (2010).
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history, which forces me to start from the very beginning, that is, by trying to 
prove that the Chilean case must be included in the list of well-known 
vestiges or remnants.
II. Colonial Remnants in the 21st Century? From Formal Constitution 
to Material Constitution in the Republic of Chile
For a legal historian, the following paragraph of the Chilean judgment is 
worthy of attention:
“This ample reference hampers the accurate definition of the scope of economic 
powers since, on the one hand, the reference is too vague: ‘manner of operation of 
the courts.’ The manner of proceeding in disciplinary matters is, for certain, a 
manner of operation (…) The absence of further examples impedes defining the 
scope given by lawmakers to these powers. The narrow regulatory scope intended by 
the applicant for Court Regulations is not in line with the tradition of the important 
matters which have been thus regulated since Colonial times, by the Real Audiencia first, 
and by the Supreme Court later. Therefore, it is necessary to define the scope of this power at 
the constitutional level.”13 (Emphasis added.)
The Chilean High Court has given constitutional hierarchy to the continuity 
between the Reales Audiencias of the Indies and the republican courts, in the 
understanding that the latter must be seen as an institutional reformulation 
of the former institutions. Nonetheless, by reading the paragraph tran-
scribed, something that may concern legal historians can be inferred, since 
even if the Court acknowledges that the boundaries delimiting the regula-
tory scope of Court Regulations issued by Chilean courts are blurry, it 
immediately goes on to affirm that tradition, rather than the very confusing 
current norms, must set the boundaries of such regulatory scope. The fact 
that the scholarly debate sparked by the judgment has been partly expressed 
in historicist terms is no coincidence. Having set the groundwork, I believe 
that the Chilean case helps legal historians free themselves from the endemic 
loneliness inherent in their work,14 ensuring them a place in this topical 
debate.
13 Aldunate (2007) 229.
14 Caroni (2005).
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1. Terminological considerations: domestic power,
immemorial practice and, finally, Court Regulations
The Chilean Constitutional Court ruling partly agrees with the academic 
sector that identifies the regulatory scope of Court Regulations with the 
power of self-organization of state organs, a power often called domestic. 
However, it is worth recalling that this term has quite a strong connotation. 
In fact, any legal historian would stress that domestic power has a historical 
meaning that greatly hinders its current use. As is widely known, the histor-
ical roots of domestic power can be traced back to ancient times.15 None-
theless, this concept managed to survive by integrating and reformulating 
itself within the culture of ius commune, which dominated Western legal 
thinking at least until the revolutionary crises.16
To simplify, it could be stated that for such a culture, domestic power was 
not subject to the law, but rather a direct and largely arbitrary power of the 
father of a family, which based on love, did not exclude violence.17 Undoubt-
edly, the phrase domestic power sheltered for centuries the most obscure 
sector of the government of men on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, for 
instance, in her study on the “populated house” in San Miguel de Tucumán, 
Romina Zamora highlighted the operability that such corpus of texts on 
oeconomics – so interesting for the great Austrian historian18 – had in the 
Hispanic world in the late 18th century. The conclusions drawn by Zamora’s 
study and other similar pieces of research show that there was no reduction 
in the scope of the ancient domestic power of the 19th century.19 Accord-
ingly, it cannot be exclusively identified with the power granted to Spanish 
and American judiciaries,20 given that the survival of domestic power within 
the sphere theoretically pertaining to individual rights was very common 
throughout the 1800s.21 In short, there is nothing natural, if I may say so, in 





19 Tío Vallejo (2001).
20 Solla (2011).
21 Agüero (2010); Tío Vallejo (2010).
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Another point to consider is the fact that a wide sector of the Chilean 
academia insists on underlining the regulatory nature of Court Regulations 
by focusing more on form than on substance, provided it is understood that 
the latter means quantity and quality of the contents said Court Regulations 
may govern. This has considerable effects on the control of constitutionality 
of such provisions. In any case, what must be emphasized is that a sector of 
academia has contended that such regulations are rooted on immemorial 
practice.22 While it is true that for some people such practice incorporates 
traditional elements into the Chilean source system impregnating it with 
irrationality,23 it is also true that, beyond this kind of criticism, the mere use 
of the phrase immemorial practice suggests specific thoughts to legal histor-
ians.
Thus, for example, one could wonder: What connection can be estab-
lished between the word “immemorial” and the ancient constitution? Even 
though this term has had a prominent place in many legal systems, history 
offers some representative examples of its usage in the constitutional terrain. 
As Pocock rightly demonstrated many years ago, it was certainly English 
constitutionalism that used it more effectively for the purposes of placing 
common law outside the scope of political power(s).24 Later on, American 
revolutionaries resorted to a similar discursive strategy, which would have 
tremendous consequences for constitutional history. As expressed by an 
expert:
“The British who opposed the American version of the constitution were ‘looking 
ahead,’ away from the ancient constitution, to government by consent, to a con-
stitution of parliamentary command, in which government was entrusted with 
arbitrary power and civil rights were grants from the sovereign. The Americans were 
‘looking backward,’ not to government by consent but to government by the rule of 
law, to a sovereign that did not grant rights but was limited by rights.”25
It is true that not many parallelisms can be drawn between the current 
Chilean constitutional issues and the political conflicts that confronted the 
English Monarchy with its Parliament during the 17th century. However, it 




25 Reid (2005) 52.
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quite another is to transfer that idea to the realm of constitutional powers. 
It is in this sense that we might point out that insofar as Chilean legal 
practice does not go back beyond the creation of the Real Audiencia,26 the 
power granted to its successor institutions does not stem from the dark and 
indefinite mists of time, but rather from the political will of some very 
determined men. The term “immemorial” is not used in an attempt to 
protect the rights of individuals; it is only an institutional practice directly 
linked to a way of understanding the law and its management which comes 
from a world where the Audiencias of the Indies identified with the source of 
all jurisdiction, id est, with the King.27
Nonetheless, this widely known story about the political uses of the 
ancient Constitution, coincident with the immemorial practices that were 
so deeply rooted in the Hispanic world, does not concern the most classical 
Chilean constitutional scholars at all. Not only do they accept the existence 
of Court Regulations naturally, they also contend that they make up a body 
of general and abstract rules generally issued by collegiate courts aimed at 
imposing measures or giving instructions for the most expeditious and effi-
cient operation of the judiciary.28 In short, the new Audiencias into which 
the republican courts turned have further reinforced their self-government 
power, extending it beyond that of the Audiencias of the Indies, since the 
current system of distribution of competencies is based on regulation and on 
the predominance of a formal Constitution.
There is little doubt that keeping ancient legal terminology contributes to 
the legitimacy of continuity. However, while the phrase “Court Regulations” 
currently has high standing in Chile, the same does not occur in other states 
that once shared Chile’s legal tradition.29 The Chilean continuity is striking, 
because it makes it clear that the political gap opened in 1808 did not affect 
the survival of the legal tradition in the Spanish American territories.30 This 
can be proved with a single piece of information: the Dictionaries published 
throughout the 1700s in the Peninsula defined the term “Court Regulation” 
26 Barrientos (2003).
27 Garriga (2004a).
28 Silva Bascuñán (2005) 156.
29 Tau (1990).
30 Agüero (unpublished).
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in the old sense.31 Nevertheless, the latest edition of the Diccionario de la 
Lengua Española [Spanish Language Dictionary] published by the Real Aca-
demia Española [Royal Spanish Academy] states that the meaning of the term 
is:
“In ancient Law, a decision taken as a general point by a supreme court or council 
with the attendance of all of its divisions.”32
Such ancient law was kept alive in the colonial Spain of the 19th century, but 
not in the present one, governed by the Constitution of 1978.33 Conversely, 
Chile has undergone a rare metamorphosis that has enabled it to become 
part of the regulatory typology determined by the Constitution in force. As 
some Chilean authors have been claiming, there are still many legal mech-
anisms created at the core of the Law of the Indies that still survive there, 
besides Court Regulations. This is the case, by way of example, of the ancient 
‘consultation’ process, consisting of the ratification by an upper court of 
those resolutions deemed too important to be decided just by a lower court, 
even without a party’s request. Although this consultation process was com-
monplace in times of the Spanish Monarchy,34 it does not have any parallel 
in Comparative Law.35 Legal historians cannot be indifferent to this partic-
ular terminological continuity; furthermore, I believe that understanding 
and explaining it is one of their most important duties. Court Regulations, 
consultations, visits … These are all words that have survived in some places, 
but disappeared in others. Their mere existence or inexistence indicates a 
31 The term Court Regulation was not included in the well-known Diccionario de Autori-
dades, but in the following one: http://buscon.rae.es/ntlle/SrvltGUILoginNtlle. Rafael Al-
tamira largely analyzed the term regulation, but said nothing about the expression Court 
Regulation: Altamira (1987) 26–28 »Autos«.
32 http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=auto.
33 Autos acordados de la Real Audiencia de la Isla de Cuba, Habana 1840; Autos acordados 
de la Audiencia Chancilleria Real Establecida en Santo Domingo y trasladada a Puerto 
Principe, suprimida por Real Decreto de 21 de Octubre, cumplimentado en 12 de diciem-
bre de 1853, a la letra, en extracto ó solamente mencionados, según su importancia y 
vigor, recopilados y anotados por Don José Medina Rodríguez, Puerto Príncipe 1854; 
Colección de Autos acordados de la Real Audiencia Chancillería de Filipinas y de las 
soberanas y superiores disposiciones que reúnen a la vez el carácter de gobernadores de 
provincia, I–V, Manila 1861–1866.
34 Barrientos (1990).
35 Carocca (1998) 197.
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departure from a common tradition,36 and also highlights the different value 
of history as a constitutive element of the law in force, which, undoubtedly, 
concerns both historians and jurists.
I am aware that these assertions are not innovative. Many decades have 
passed since Paolo Grossi called for collaboration between historians and 
jurists,37 but I firmly believe that there are not many opportunities for this 
as offered by the analysis of the Chilean case. Indeed, the complex combi-
nation of tradition and will, or, if preferred, between Court Regulations and 
constitutional normativity, has stimulated a very interesting debate on the 
adequacy or inadequacy of history to a constitutional order based on the 
recognition of fundamental rights.38 While part of the academia insists that 
the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile does not include a single 
article expressly empowering the Supreme Court to issue Court Regulations, 
another part maintains that such power is the most important manifestation 
of the traditional economic superintendence entrusted to said Court, which 
is currently found in Article 82 (amended text of the previous Article 79 of 
the Constitution).39 This latter sector of academia repeatedly resorts to his-
toricist legitimation in order to justify the attribution of an important reg-
ulatory power to the judiciary,40 regardless of the framework of the well-
known superintendence granted to the Court and understood as a legacy of 
the ancient Real Audiencia, which, in addition, is also said to be shared by 
other Supreme Courts.41
We should recall that it was not Chilean legal scholars but the Constitu-
tional Court itself that decided that both the Supreme Court and the Courts 
of Appeals have jurisdiction to issue Court Regulations.42 By way of simpli-
fication, it could be argued that the Court has empowered courts to con-
tinue acting as they did before and after Chilean independence. In the words 
of another author:
36 E. g.: Autos, acuerdos y decretos de gobierno del Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias, 
Madrid 1658.
37 Grossi (1972) 2.
38 Silva (2009); Pfeffer (2010); Usen Vicencio (2010); Vásquez Márquez (2010).
39 Delgado (2010) 802.
40 Aldunate (2009b).
41 Zúñiga (1998).
42 Sentencia Rol Nº 783 (2007): “Si el artículo 93 nº 2 de la Carta fundamental otorga a esta 
Magistratura competencia para revisar la constitucionalidad de estas normas, es evidente 
que valida esta competencia”.
200 Marta Lorente Sariñena
“What turns out to be inconsistent in the precedents of the Constitutional Court 
analyzed herein is that the abstract control of constitutionality finally protects the 
regulatory powers of the high courts of justice, anchored in the independence of this 
branch of Government, and especially of the Supreme Court, boasting of a decision 
on legal policy of absolute deference to the Judiciary; although this is hard to 
reconcile with the Rule of Law, which requires observance of the principle of 
legality and of the distribution of regulatory power that places legislation at the 
top of the hierarchy of the sources of Law; this priority is protected by the principle 
of democracy.”43
For an observer outside the Chilean constitutional debate, the regulatory 
power granted to the courts conflicts with the concepts of national sover-
eignty, formal legislation and separation of powers, which are supposed to be 
fundamental for modern constitutionalism.44 This imaginary observer is 
further taken aback when finding out, in addition, that from the dissolution 
of the Real Audiencia of Santiago de Chile in 1817 to the present time, Court 
Regulations issued by Chilean courts have addressed very general and sig-
nificant issues, such as the formal aspects of judgments, protection or amparo
proceedings [summary proceeding for the protection of constitutional rights 
or guarantees] and the action for compensation for miscarriage of justice. 
Moreover, several Court Regulations issued by the ancient Real Audiencia of 
Santiago maintained full force and effect in the Republic of Chile until the 
early 20th century.45 So, notwithstanding the task of jurists is the analysis of 
whether Court Regulations are constitutional or not, the historical concepts 
used by the Constitutional Court to legitimize the existence and the scope of 
Court Regulations raise manifold doubts regarding their compliance with 
the basic principles of what we have come to understand as the Rule of 
Law.46
This is the point where legal experts should pay attention to legal histor-
ians, who face a task full of challenges, especially that of trying to recreate 
the complex history of Court Regulations in order to understand what they 
were and what they currently are. In order to undertake this task reasonably, 
the role played by Court Regulations must be contextualized during the 
different stages of legal tradition, where casuistry and system coexisted for 
many years.
43 Zúñiga (2011) 415.
44 Grimm (2006).
45 Barrientos (2014) Título preliminar.
46 Costa (2002).
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2. Jurisdictionalism v. statism. The Real Audiencia of Santiago, its Court 
Regulations and, ultimately, the power of custom in the present-day 
Republic of Chile
The history of the Real Audiencia of Santiago, meticulously narrated by Javier 
Barrientos,47 is not very clear on the intersection between the economic 
and / or domestic functions of the Real Audiencia relative to superintendence 
and the issuance of Court Regulations; furthermore, what Barrientos has 
described is precisely the opposite. Up to its dissolution in 1817, the Real 
Audiencia of Santiago felt no limitation whatsoever to issue Court Regula-
tions, and these actually dealt with all kinds of matters.48 Later on, the Court 
of Appeals, which replaced the Real Audiencia in the first constitutional 
interregnum, did exactly the same.49 I refer readers to Javier Barrientos’ 
thorough analysis on this matter, and I will only point out that to determine 
the regulatory scope mentioned by the Constitutional Court, which attrib-
utes it to the traditional operation of the Real Audiencia, a careful reading of 
all the Court Regulations it issued is required. Nonetheless, challenges 
remain ahead; as I believe Víctor Tau would say, the Court Regulations issued 
by Councils and Reales Audiencias responded to these casuistic beliefs that 
dominated the legal arena until the late 18th century.
The following question can be posed based on the foregoing: How can 
we expect to make systemic abstractions today on historic material that 
completely ignored them at the time?50 Once again, projecting current legal 
categories in an attempt to fill the well-known superintendence attributed 
to the Supreme Court distorts the history of that government of justice that 
differed so much from what we now know as statism.51 Indeed, it was this 




50 Ventura Beleña (1789). The first volume of this work is a reprint of the second part of 
Montemayor’s Sumarios, while the second volume contains royal orders for New Spain or 
instructions issued by New Spanish authorities not collected in the Sumarios). For more 
information on this jurist, see two contributions: Barrientos (2001a) 125–208; (2001b).
51 Clavero (1986); Hespanha (1989).
52 Barrientos (2004).
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repeating old and creating new problems.53 I will not summarize once again 
the academic controversy related to the term “Modern State,”54 which has 
divided legal historians for decades,55 but I cannot resist transcribing a para-
graph from one of the greatest Chilean historians.56 Góngora endeavored to 
maintain a very particular concept of state,57 which was bellicose and Spen-
glerian at the same time,58 but this paragraph contains a rather contradictory 
message:
“What we call State is, in the Castilian 16th century, the supremacy of jurisdiction 
and other royalties, concentrated in the King and exercised through bureaucracy, 
but also capable of delegations and grants of concession, wider or narrower, under 
the strictest confidence; privileges so wide that they can be legally defended against 
the King.”59
It is hard to find a better description of what a part of legal historiography 
qualifies as jurisdictional culture,60 a culture that helped design a series of 
institutional devices that were implemented throughout the Hispanic Mon-
archy.61 Despite the efforts of some authors to disregard the most recent 
contributions of European legal historiography,62 the idea of dividing the 
government of justice into functions entrusted to Reales Audiencias was alien 
to the basic premises of such culture. In this same vein, it is worth mention-
ing a subtle warning by Víctor Tau:
“This prevailing criterion of the so-called legal business in the sphere of legal deci-
sions also covered government affairs. A writing of 1714, regarding the management 
of such affairs, stated that in the Consejo de Indias [Council of the Indies], ‘it is 
unusual to find a file or business which, though denominated governmental, does 
not contain a great deal of civil, canonical or municipal precedents, laws of the 






58 Góngora Escobedo (1990).
59 Góngora (1951) 301.
60 Agüero (2007).
61 Garriga (2006b).
62 Malagón (2005). It is evident that this author has not read the major work by Mannori /
Sordi (2001). A documentary analysis of the issues dealt with by Malagón can be found 
in Barrientos (1990–1991).
More than just Vestiges 203
the Indies, synodal decrees, and decisions in dubio, for consultation with his Majesty 
or the Holy See …’ (…) We are in the presence of various legal elements – chiefly 
compiled into laws and authors – which supported and provided grounds for the 
decisions to be made.”63
At present, some jurists suggest it does not appear sufficient to invoke eco-
nomic powers to replace lawmakers in matters reserved to legislation, since 
this is in breach of the Constitution and results in a null and void act. 
Certainly, this sector of academia may share solutions with legal historiog-
raphy, although not necessarily arguments, given that understanding, appre-
ciating and even criticizing the special regulatory power granted to the 
Chilean courts – which, based on tradition, allows them to issue Court 
Regulations – requires a very special background that, when trying to con-
textualize the different historical values of the term Constitution,64 will get 
rid of the categories that had no place in the pre-revolutionary universe.65
Those trying to nurture this particular legal historiography, called critical
by others, could clarify the following matters.66 Firstly, that colonial tradition
cannot be blithely invoked given that by reading the collections of Court 
Regulations one may notice that the Audiencias in the Indies issued a series 
of provisions, generically termed court regulations, “dealing with internal 
matters and appropriate operation of the judiciary, but there was also a 
considerable amount of orders regarding matters generically classified with-
in the concept of ‘good government,’ and there are no records that the 
Crown limited this regulatory activity.”67 Secondly, that such power pre-
vailed during most of the 1800s in Chile under the different Constitutions 
that enshrined the principle of separation of powers, to the point that the 
matter was not only addressed in the debates that eventually resulted in the 
enactment of the Court Organization and Powers Act of 1875, but it was also 
done incidentally by resorting to a generic tradition to (re)found continuity. 
Such continuity was strengthened with the adoption of the Codes of Civil 
and Criminal Procedure of 1902 and 1906, respectively. A further step was 
taken in 1971 with the enactment of a law ordering that a subsection be 
63 Tau (1992a) 509.
64 Hespanha (2000) 5–18.
65 Tau (1997).
66 Hespanha (1984); Hespanha (2005) 33–35.
67 Barrientos (unpublished) 37.
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included into Section 96 of the Organic Code of Chilean Courts, which 
stated that “all court regulations of a general application and nature issued 
by the Supreme Court shall be published in the Official Gazette.”68 And, 
lastly, that even when the Chilean Constitutional Court has exercised control 
over Court Regulations, it has in turn given constitutional value to a pre-
constitutional regulatory power.
It is possible to attempt to integrate this special example of colonial 
survival, if it can be defined as such, within the Chilean legal order; as is 
widely known, judges and jurists have displayed and continue to display 
great imagination.69 However, it could be said that such power either pur-
ports to have a certain originary nature or, as I believe Víctor Tau would say, it 
forces us to acknowledge the strength of the power of custom in Chile in the 
21st century.70 At this point, the spirit of Andrés Bello holding his famous 
Code appears before historians, who, rather surprised, can only wonder: 
What has happened with the strong assertion according to which “following 
the example of almost all modern Codes, custom has been deprived of the 
force of law”?71
To sum up, since the existence of Court Regulations has gained ratifica-
tion in constitutional precedents,72 it can certainly be stated that if some 
aspects of the ancient constitution remain,73 the only possible conclusion is 
the following: the long-standing struggle between formal Constitution and 
material Constitution still continues in the Republic of Chile in the 21st 
century.74
3. From Court Regulations to legal historiography
The question that accordingly follows is: When and how were the founda-
tions of such a confrontation laid in the Hispanic universe? And, more 
68 All this information in Barrientos (2014) 2–3.
69 Weinstein (1971).
70 Tau (2001).
71 Message from the Executive to Congress proposing the adoption of the Civil Code, San-
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specifically, what relationship can be established between the possible 
answers to the preceding question and the formulation of proposals to open 
up the horizons of colonial legal historiography? My aim is to answer both 
questions briefly henceforth; but since it is not possible to encompass the 
study of these matters, I will stick to the study of certain issues. Neither of 
them is unknown to historiography but, in my opinion, they require a 
modern approach in two senses. On the one hand, I refer to the relationship 
between fundamental laws and the Constitution after the disaster of 1808 
and, on the other hand, to the origins of the hurdles faced by the codifica-
tion process both in Spain and in different states in the Americas. Both are 
key issues for comprehending the origin and nature of the persistence of a 
material understanding of Constitution in the ancient territories of the 
Monarchy once the revolutionary / independence movements covered the 
American space with written Constitutions. Without the history of this 
persistence, I firmly believe that it is not possible to understand the current 
controversy on the control of constitutionality of Court Regulations in the 
Republic of Chile.
III. The Starting Point: from Fundamental Laws
to Hispanic Constitutions.75
It is widely known that we owe Ricardo Levene the first delimitation of the 
Law of the Indies’ history, regardless of the fact that his proposals were not 
accepted peacefully.76 Even though I will not attempt to study the history of 
legal historiography here, I will, in fact, deal with one of its more relevant 
subject matters: the laws of the Indies. Víctor Tau has warned us against read-
ing them with a legalist view;77 he has recently offered a careful description 
of the condition of the legal order of the Indies before the crisis of 1808:
“That order was not confined to the laws issued by the Court. It had to be extracted 
from the varied present reality and from the roots of the past. For such purpose, it 
was necessary to resort to briefings, to critical and historical writings, to the most 
significant legal instruments, to a varied and changing legislation of both royal and 
75 This title belongs to a collective work that has been awarded the Bicentenario de las Cortes 
de Cádiz Prize promoted by Congress of Deputies: Lorente / Portillo (2012).
76 Tau (2006) 357–417.
77 Tau (2007).
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local laws that, to a great extent, remained outside the scope of the Recopilación
[Compilation], and to the experience described by viceroys in their memoirs, etc. 
This is the foundation of the Collection, to which he (Benito de la Mata Linares) 
added the results of his work, his professional experience, throughout his years in 
the magistracy.”78
One of the most relevant features of this legal order was uncertainty, which 
was part of its own physiology then. However, throughout the final decades 
of the 18th century, it began to be perceived as a true pathology.79 In the 
words of one of its most fierce critics:
“Royal laws that expressly abolish civil law maxims are commented and twisted so as 
to reconcile them with the ius commune to which they should conform, as if they did 
not include any new decision. Gómez and the others, on the basis of the axiom that 
the abolishment of laws is terrible and must be avoided even against the voices and 
provisions of law, in order to reconcile them, under the assumption that Roman 
laws are the genuine ones, will use any fiction or extravagant meaning to render our 
laws futile.”80
It should be noted that criticism had scarce incidence in the forum practice, 
which was marked by unmanageable and unstoppable partitioning.81
Despite some data which could prove otherwise – Nueva Planta Decrees, 
the decline of Councils and the surge of Secretarios del Despacho (Dispatch 
Secretaries), the creation of the Intendencias of the Indies, etc. – we must not 
be misled by appearances. Far from adopting a rationale tending to unify the 
Law, the Monarchy increased the number of corporations in the last decades 
of the 1700s, which entailed the multiplication of jurisdictional spheres and 
their conflicts.82 In short, uncertainty reached unprecedented levels, so that 
many called for a legal reform, which, expressed in political terms, could 
well be translated into a constitutional reform.
After the crisis of 1808, however, some dared to suggest that the ancient
American constitution was rooted in the laws of the Indies.83 It was Fray 
Servando Teresa de Mier who wrote this proposal that has attracted the 
attention of historians,84 some of whom are convinced that this clergyman 
78 Tau (2011) 163.
79 Martínez Marina (1965).
80 Mora y Jaraba (1748) 218.
81 Scholz (1981).
82 Martínez (2007) 11–96.
83 Mier (1990).
84 Góngora (2003).
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was the last criollo.85 But beyond the political weight of Fray Servando’s 
proposal, what remains true is that it was not shared by the most prominent 
political personalities of his time, which suggests that the traditional criollo
discourse had fallen into decline.86 I have used some thoughts of Teresa de 
Mier with the intention of presenting a well-known issue from an American 
standpoint, an issue that could be formulated as follows: Did the Catholic 
Monarchy have a Constitution? And, if so, which one was it?87
1. The Monarchy and its constitution(s)
To the present day, historians agree that the question about the constitution 
was not the cause but the consequence of the crisis of the Monarchy.88 This 
approach has further reinforced the long-dated thesis put forth by Halperín 
Donghi, which states that the events at the time rather than the willingness 
of Spanish Americans led to independence in Spanish America.89 Indeed, it 
could be summarized that not only independencies, but also Hispanic con-
stitutionalism itself, may be considered the legitimate offspring of the fall of 
the Catholic Monarchy. I must clarify that by Hispanic constitutionalism I 
mean the array of texts that appeared in all the territories of the old Mon-
archy since 1811. In short, I believe that despite the endeavors of the advo-
cates of history understood as the history of progress – if there are any left at 
this stage – the truth is that rather than the French invasion, it was the 
shameful resignations of Bayonne and the Constitution granted /adopted 
there,90 that took the then subjects of the Monarchy to wonder whether it 
had a Constitution.91
The mere existence of this question inspired others of greater complexity. 
With the exception of afrancesados (Francophiles), by 1808 everyone recog-
nized Ferdinand VII as the legitimate Monarch irrespective of the fact that 
some began to ask a thorny, long-standing question: How many constitu-
tions were there in the Hispanic territories? The history of the Monarchy 
85 Annino (2008).
86 Brading (1991); Garriga (2003); Garriga (2006a).
87 Portillo (1998).
88 Portillo (2008).
89 Donghi (1985). A similar approach in Rodriguez O. (2008); Portillo (2006).
90 Busaall (2011); Busaall (2009).
91 Tomás y Valiente (1995); Coronas (1995).
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offered very useful elements to answer this question, given that the Catholic 
Monarchy was identified with a Republic of Republics, where many of them 
had a “corporative” constitution. This is exactly what the Marquis of Bajamar 
expressed in 1785 before the members of the Consejo de Indias he chaired:
“We live (…) in a Christian Republic (…) The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Prelates, 
Dignitaries, Town Councils, Priests for Souls, Religions, Monasteries, Prelacies and 
Communities have been established. They all live in our House: the Sovereign is its 
owner, and as such sets forth disciplinary and external governance rules in all 
matters leading to harmony (…).”92
The resignations of Bayonne gave rise to an endless discussion on how to 
substitute vacatio regis.The volatilization of the physical body of the Monarch 
was lethal to the ancient corporeal metaphor that had dominated western 
political theory for centuries; however, many discursive possibilities 
remained.93 The King’s escape did not dissolve the traditional corporative 
structure of Hispanic society(ies) as if by magic,94 so that although the 
Catholic Monarchy had been a Christian Republic, other corporations 
understood they could claim a similar condition. The miniaturization of 
the Republic / Monarchy and its embodiment in other republican entities, 
understood as perfect societies, could not shock anyone given that this 
notion was one of the chief pillars of the official political culture at the time. 
As the extremely conservative public law expert Dou y Bassols, who would 
later sign the Constitution of Cádiz, stated as late as in 1800:
“What cannot be left unnoticed is that it is not detrimental for the absolutely 
monarchical constitution of a State to contain democratic and aristocratic entities, 
regarding the powers of the members of such entities, as long as the head of the 
nation is entrusted to the superiority and sovereignty of the King above all.”95
It was in this cultural context that the beloved subjects of the Catholic King 
were faced with the famous question on whether there was a Constitution or 
not. Just as it had happened a couple of years before in the French kingdom, 
this type of questioning signaled that a profound shift in the legal-political 
paradigm could break with many centuries of history.96 If the existence of a 
92 Bajamar (1785).
93 Primo de Verdad y Ramos (1808).
94 Lempérère (2004); Rojas (2007).
95 Dou y de Bassols (1974).
96 Furet / Halévi (1996).
More than just Vestiges 209
historical constitution was not accepted, then efforts should be made to draft 
one or more new constitutions, which threatened to create a new constitu-
tional cycle. As widely known, both in the U.S. and in France, the Consti-
tution was no longer considered the result of history: “A constitution is not 
the act of government, but of a people constituting a government, and a 
government without a constitution is power without right,” said Thomas 
Paine (The Rights of Man (1791–92) in his famous debate with Edmund 
Burke (Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790).
Something similar took place in the Hispanic world. At first, various 
Peninsular and American public law experts tried to make convincing argu-
ments on the existence of countless historical constitutions, whose revital-
ization was identified with the recovery of private liberties that had been 
quashed by centuries of despotism.97 Nevertheless, the different territories of 
the Monarchy underwent a relentless process of drafting written constitu-
tions. Readers interested in Hispanic legal plurality may imagine that the 
examples of the Kingdom of Navarra or the Basque provinces must have 
played an important role in the constitutional construct of the time,98 which 
is only partly true because the constitutional diversity that emerged after 
1808 was not limited to the well-known ›foral‹ speeches.99 Valencian, Cata-
lan, Majorcan, Aragonese people … took advantage of what historians have 
called the “orphanhood of the Hispanic kingdoms” to claim lost liberties,100
as rightly stressed by the ultraconservative Borrull in a paper published in 
1810, that is, almost one hundred years after the Kingdom of Valencia had 
suffered the enforcement of its Nueva Planta Decree, which abolished Valen-
cian law.101
The historical constitutional framework that began to be shaped in 1808 
was not exclusively peninsular; in fact, the Spanish perspective prevented 
contextualizing the interpretation of a key time for the entire Hispanic 
world. The study of the famous Consulta al País [Country Consultation] 
stands out among hundreds of examples that could be used as grounds for 
this assertion. The leading scholars who analyzed this particular initiative 
97 Peiró (1985).
98 Portillo (1991); Garcia Pérez (2008).
99 Busaall (2005).
100 Hocquellet (2011).
101 Borrull y Vilanova (1810).
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limited its scope to the Peninsula, and failed to consider the American 
responses to the Consulta al País.102 At the same time, this stance was shared 
by American historiography, which did not endeavor to study the Spanish 
American aspect of the Consulta al País either. In summary, for decades 
historiography either concealed or ignored a series of transcendental writ-
ings as responses to the Consulta al País.103 Nonetheless, recent research has 
shown that the referred Spanish American responses were incorporated into 
the Instructions to the representatives appointed to the Junta Central [Cen-
tral Board],104 where the political impulse resulting from the organization of 
the first elections held on Spanish American soil was consolidated.105 In 
other words, too many historians have already incorporated a bi-hemispheric 
perception of the famous Consulta al País into their research.106
In any case, the history of the crisis of the Monarchy and its consequences 
still requires research not only on discursive uses in the ancient constitu-
tion,107 but also on those questioning its effective essence.108 No matter how 
hard liberal historiography may strive to prove otherwise,109 most of the first 
representatives of the different Hispanic territories – both in the Junta Cen-
tral and in the Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias – shared a material percep-
tion of what a Constitution was or should be. Thus, the ancient Constitution
could be broken down into as many constitutions as territories were repre-
sented, and actually all provincial constitutions included both privileges 
accumulated over the years and new claims, mostly Spanish American, 
now understood as rights.110 In fact, there was a novelty, given that these 
rights were based not only on their ancient privileges and / or customs, but 
on the geographical and human elements – topography, climate, fauna, 
102 Artola (1959); Suárez (1982).
103 Among these instructions there is the Memorial de Agravios [Memorial of Grievances] 
drafted by Camilo Torres. On this matter, readers may refer to the superb documentary 
collection published by Almarza / Garnica (2007).
104 Rojas (2005).
105 Demelas-Bohy / Guerra (1993).




110 It is worth recalling that from early times, several petitions for the acknowledgment of the 
rights of the trans-Atlantic provinces reached the Peninsula, Garrido (1993).
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flora, condition of the inhabitants, etc. – that had been revealed by the 
scientific explorations made during the last decades of the 1700s.111
Hence, there are wide territories to be discovered by means of research 
showing what elements of the ancient constitution survived beyond the new 
political horizon that opened up after 1808. Although we know that the 
Hispanic universe set aside the traditional discourse when the written con-
stitutions were drafted, this fact does not shed any light as to how much of 
the historic constitution remained in force in the framework created by a 
new (?) constitutionalism in the ancient territories of the Catholic Mon-
archy.112
2. Political historiography, constitutional historiography
It would be presumptuous of me to assert that historiography has not delved 
into this complex research field.113 Moreover, as I have mentioned above, the 
celebration of the different Bicentennials has not only made available to 
experts a myriad of sources of potentially unmanageable proportions, but 
it has also contributed to center much of the debate on independence on 
constitutional matters.114 Thus, legal historians might become the main 
players of a debate that does not only affect the knowledge of our past, 
but also the understanding of our present.
However, I believe the following diagnosis is not an overstatement: 
although non-legal historiography has experienced great changes in recent 
decades, this has not been the case of legal historiography. At present, polit-
ical history holds the predominant place that economic history held for 
years. Led by recognized authors such as François Xavier Guerra,115 this 
new political historiography has adopted two different stances, namely: It 
either calls for the specialized knowledge of legal historians,116 or directly 
competes with it, insofar as it puts forward new values without resorting to 
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though the basic sources for the study of the period are of a constitutional 
nature and, accordingly, chiefly legal, the value of a legal historian’s knowl-
edge in the historiographical field is far from guaranteed. The present state 
of affairs suggests that a wide gap, caused by a special type of deafness, is 
dividing historians. In my opinion, the main consequence of this situation 
is that the interpretation of similar sources (minutes of Town Councils or 
Assemblies, constitutional regulations, documents on elections, court re-
cords, and the like) has become endlessly multiplied and increasingly contra-
dictory.118
In this state of affairs, I believe it can be stated that if a new horizon for 
colonial law history exists, it will need to face a three-fold challenge. In the 
first place, legal historiography must set aside any nationalist conceit. We 
might not understand the process that started in 1808 in unitary terms, 
which means peninsular or American. Nor can we affirm that the first 
manifestations of written constitutionalism were Spanish, Ecuadorian, 
Colombian or, Argentine, because none of this political entities existed at 
that time. Accordingly, the origin of national laws (derecho patrio) cannot be 
rooted in any of these constitutions, irrespective of the fact that the institu-
tions which started drafting these new texts and establishing new political 
and institutional practices were not those of the peaceful (?) times of the 
Catholic Monarchy. In the second place, legal historiography must attempt 
to explain how terms such as law / legislation, government, justice, represen-
tation, responsibility, and so on must be interpreted within their context and 
not in isolation, ultimately deprived of legal background. If not, our com-
prehension of the past will be irreparably distorted by virtue of the projec-
tion of present categories. Curiously, the foregoing is a defect mostly found in 
the writings of non-jurist historians, who frequently appear to lack sensitiv-
ity regarding the localization of continuities / discontinuities in the language 
of the law. Lastly, legal historiography must undertake the difficult task of 
defining the foundations of legal modernity. Within this task, however, the 
existing difficulties do not stem that much from misunderstandings arising 
in discussions with other historians but from its own core. The plain truth 
is that many legal historians have accepted, somewhat uncritically, the 
methodological options advocated by jurist-historians, who usually pretend 
to make a genealogy of their own knowledge. Admittedly, this state of affairs 
118 Álvarez Junco / Luzón (2006).
More than just Vestiges 213
has changed considerably in recent times, though not enough so as to main-
tain that Spanish and American legal historiography have completely rid 
themselves of the burden of the past, let alone to certify that a new legal 
history of constitutional modernity has managed to introduce new historio-
graphical conventions beyond the very limited scope of the discipline.119
This brief outline of the history of historiography is aimed at giving 
context to a historiographical argument that broke out against the backdrop 
of the celebration of the Bicentennials. Focused on the conflict between the 
ancient and the new constitutions, and deeply marked by artificial territorial 
determinations, the argument was provoked by the existence of two con-
tradictory versions of the history of the Monarchy crisis. While the first 
version describes the consequences of the crisis as a rupture, the second 
version attempts to stress that the continuity of ancient institutional devices 
and understandings reduced considerably the modern components of new 
political ideas. This serves to answer not only the usual question of how 
revolutionary the Hispanic revolutions really were,120 but also another ques-
tion that concerns legal historians to a large extent, namely: How inclined to 
statism were those determined to build new worlds? It must be noted that 
the term “statism” unconsciously refers us to other terms such as “unity,” 
“generality,” “territoriality,” “hierarchy,” etc. In sum, it refers us to all the 
elements that make up the photographic negative of a society structured 
in corporative terms and a political power expressed in jurisdictional 
terms.121
3. By way of conclusion: an interpretative proposal
At this point, I will outline the key elements of my proposal, but before I do 
so, I must admit that they have changed throughout the years. At first, I was 
lured by the most radical discourses, id est, those that understood Hispanic 
constitutional power or powers as a departure from the ancient discourse of 
the corporative Monarchy. However, I later understood that the drafting of 
written constitutions did not imply a transformation as radical as usually 
contended.
119 Lorente (2004).
120 Di Meglio (2008).
121 Lempérière (2003).
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In my opinion, the first Hispanic constitutions shared a common ele-
ment: all of them gave constitutional validity to a panoply of ancient conceptions 
and old institutional mechanisms. This meant that large segments of the 
ancient legal order of the Monarchy were given constitutional hierarchy in 
their Peninsular and Spanish American versions.122 I do not mean that there 
was nothing new under the sun; quite the contrary, Hispanic constitution-
alism could not better itself in some aspects considered essential for the 
establishment of a new constitutional order in other regions. Thus, for in-
stance, the new legal devices, purportedly born from the inclusion of the 
principle of separation of powers in all constitutional writings, did not 
undergo major practical reforms on either side of the Atlantic.123 Something 
similar holds true for the “revolution of voting,”124 since although historiog-
raphy has highlighted how swiftly the Hispanic world adopted new electoral 
practices, it has also stressed that accepting the multiplication of electoral 
ranks125 reinforced the corporative nature of the Hispanic institutional fab-
ric.126
In a nutshell, if it is assumed that the first Hispanic constitutionalism 
voluntarily incorporated a series of elements from the ancient state of affairs, 
the so-called vestiges or remnants can easily be considered components of 
the new legal orders that gradually developed both in the Peninsula and in 
the Americas after the fall of the Catholic Monarchy. There is little doubt 
that the number of such elements was large, although it is worth focusing on 
one of them in particular because it is closely related with colonial law 
vestiges, namely: the establishment within the Hispanic sphere of a new 
notion of law and, consequently, of Code.
IV. From Casuistry to System
Víctor Tau has often stated that one of the most fruitful fields for the history 
of the Law of the Indies is the one that emerged after American independ-
ence. Because the interpretations on derecho de transición (Law of Transition) 
122 Garriga / Lorente (2007); Lorente (2010).
123 Martínez (1999).
124 Ternavasio (2002); Paniagua (2003).
125 Muñoz de Bustillo (1998).
126 Annino (1995).
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are so numerous, it is impossible to offer a list of relevant works here.127
Nonetheless, I believe the approach that both Peninsular and Spanish Amer-
ican legal historiography share in general is not wholly convincing when 
placing into perspective the complex background of this Law of Transition. 
Even at the risk of offering unfair criticism, I will outline what I have come 
to consider insufficiencies. The first one is clearly evident: For decades, the 
history of 19th-century law has too often been identified with the history of 
codification; thus, documents such as government directions, private initia-
tives, drafting of projects, other foreign documents, parliamentary proceed-
ings, comments on new collections, etc. have made up the basic material of 
the history of Codification, which has also been governed by the binomial 
legal modernization = Codes. Scholars have agreed that both Peninsular and 
Spanish American legal scenarios were dominated by slow Codification for 
many decades, which means that despite political breakup, legal issues 
remained very similar on both sides of the Atlantic.
So why do I assert that this strategy is insufficient? Simply because rather 
than interpreting, it merely describes a known fact, which, in turn, can only 
be appreciated when contrasting it with the example offered by Napoleonic 
France. However, if we listen to some contemporaries, the problem did not 
reside in the inability to draft texts but in transforming a political and 
juridical culture. By way of example:
“Will our laws be observed hereinafter just because we say so? If nothing is missing 
in our constitution, how come they have been so neglected? (…) What purpose does 
it serve for the people that the nation established in its general Congresses that the 
Kings would abide by them, and that they would undertake this as a sacred obli-
gation (…)? Have we unfortunately not always seen them do precisely the oppo-
site?”128
Flórez Estrada’s fears were well-grounded. It was not by chance that the 
forefathers of the early Hispanic constitutionalism gave constitutional hier-
archy to the legacy composed of documents and practices that only pro-
longed that casuistic manner of determining and managing the legal order 
beyond the crisis of the Catholic Monarchy. Thus, the early Hispanic con-
stitutionalism did not only favor the reproduction of a crepuscular ius com-
mune, but also supported it so that its domination of the different Spanish 
127 Some of them are excellent: González (1988).
128 Flórez Estrada (1810) 5.
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American and Peninsular scenarios continued throughout much of the 
1800s. It was at the core of this constitutionalism that the first hurdle 
appeared for the establishment of general legislation on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Let’s analyze this:
1. “Taking constitutions seriously”
The foregoing argument only makes sense if the history of codification is 
assumed to be part of the history of constitutionalism, which, even if it may 
appear evident at first, has not had a relevant place in Spanish historiography. 
In my country, it has been possible to study the history of codified texts 
without aligning it to constitutional history, so that the chronology of the 
legal history of the 1800s and 1900s has been almost exclusively marked by 
different codification landmarks. This kind of understanding of our most 
recent past has practically disappeared at the heart of modern legal histor-
iography, but it still causes severe damage in the work of many jurists inter-
ested in fashioning the history of their own disciplinary fields.
I suggest that the history of Codification needs to finally assimilate Tar-
ello’s old proposal, which, as widely known, did not distinguish Constitu-
tions from Codes. In historiographical terms, this long-standing proposal 
entails the permanent eradication of a dichotomy that for decades has been 
expressed as follows: Given that Constitutions contained vague political 
statements deprived of legal value, the true law was embodied in the Codes, 
which, at the same time, abrogated the ancient casuistic culture that had 
prevailed in the Christian Western world for centuries. I must stress that if 
these conceptions are maintained, legal historiography is likely to remain in 
the same place it was, that is, preserving the history of the Constitution as an 
exclusive field of research for constitutionalists, political scientists and his-
torians of ideas. It is worth mentioning that I have nothing against their 
work; my criticism is only aimed at the traditional absence of legal histor-
iography in the area denoted by the history of new Constitutions.
Thus, I believe that there is a first link between Codes and Constitutions 
that cannot be ignored; it simply requires a close reading of Constitutions. 
This proposal can be explained as follows: Besides analyzing the main state-
ments contained in Constitutions, it is necessary to do the same with their 
small print. Here is an example to illustrate this idea: Several historians have 
commented on the famous declaration of the Cadiz Constitution, and have 
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identified it with the clearest precedent of the policy for the unification of 
law: “The Civil, Criminal and Commercial Codes shall be the same for the 
entire Monarchy, without prejudice to variations that the Courts may intro-
duce under specific circumstances” (Section 258). The truth is that the inten-
tion of the Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias (Constituent Assembly) to unify 
the law is undeniable; nonetheless, historians tend to forget to relate to the 
first paragraph of the Section with the second one, although it contains a 
provision pointing out that the delegates to the Constitutional Conventions 
of Cadiz were aware of the diversity of territories and peoples.129 What the 
Cadiz Constitution defined as “specific circumstances” looks familiar to 
those who study the history of colonial law, which for centuries tried to 
adjust to very different circumstances by using a series of specific mecha-
nisms, among which the recognized obey but do not comply stands out.
Anyway, since the vehemence of the Code did not resist any peculiarities, 
it was necessary to design instruments to enforce it.130 Without them, the 
idea of a Code, rather than the Code itself, resulted in a dead-end idea, or, 
otherwise, maintained the limitations already in place during the 1700s in 
the Hispanic world.131 Being autonomous, such instruments were deter-
mined by a familiar premise: the maintenance of the regulatory legacy of 
the Catholic Monarchy on both sides of the Atlantic. As was the case with 
the Cadiz Constitution, almost all Hispanic constitutions included two 
rather contradictory ideas. On the one hand, they committed to renew the 
regulatory order and, on the other, they deemed that the ancient order 
should remain in force until those commitments were made effective. His-
panic constitutionalism, which at the outset had been legitimized here and 
there with the purported recovery of monarchic laws, finally understood that 
all of them – king, kingdoms, local corporations, various jurisdictions, etc. – 
continued to coexist under the new constitutional order as long as they did 
not conflict with it. It shall suffice to recall that the insurgent Constitution of 
Apatzingán had to acknowledge that “(…) as the Sovereignty of the Nation 
adopts the set of laws that shall replace the ancient laws, these shall remain 
in full force and effect, except those repealed herein and in other decrees” 
129 Clavero (2000a).
130 Caroni (1996).
131 Clavero (1978a); Clavero (1978b): Clavero (1982).
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(Section 211). In other terms, the first Hispanic constitutionalism was one of 
the causes – if not the first – for the maintenance of the casuistic rationale 
that for centuries had managed the legal order of the Catholic Monarchy.
2. The force of casuistry and the difficulties of the system
On both sides of the Atlantic, formalizing the constitutions of the regulatory 
legacy of the Catholic Monarchy brought about a series of effects, among 
which the accumulation of regulations stands out. Thus, it can well be 
affirmed that the system continued to be threatened by casuistry for decades. 
It may seem that the accumulation of regulations is a mere technicality just 
for the use of legal experts; however, repeals directly affected a new way of 
conceiving political power, which determined the design of instruments 
needed to exercise it. Once all Hispanic constitutions had adopted the 
ancient legacy, they must have undoubtedly pondered this question: in the 
face of so many texts, from different times and contradicting one other, who 
decided what law was and how was this done?
The combination of two antithetical notions on how to identify legisla-
tion opened the door to a series of widely known issues that dominated the 
legal scenario in the Hispanic world throughout the 1800s. Firstly, the long-
standing idea that law was not exclusively legislation passed by the assembly, 
but also the ancient privileges and, of course, the opinions of jurists re-
mained.132 Secondly, the absence of determination of the regulatory order 
prevented the establishment of a “normative typology” arranged according 
to a hierarchical order. Given that a law, order, regulation, ordinance … 
were absolutely interchangeable, the rules adopted by Parliament could 
not prevail over those issued by the other branches of government, which 
retained a significant normative power. Thirdly, the absence of determina-
tion of the regulatory order ensured a wide margin of activity to anyone 
considered a “judge”, whether legal experts or laymen. In this respect, we 
should not be surprised by the great difficulties faced by those committed to 
implementing mechanisms for the defense of law, such as the establishment 
of the duty of judges to provide grounds for their judgments, or the estab-
lishment of appeals to Courts of Cassation. However, both measures had 
132 Lorente (2011).
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been adopted in France in 1790, that is, a year before the National Assembly 
approved the first French Constitution.133
The first Hispanic constitutionalism created an overwhelming and inde-
terminate collection of texts and interpretations thereof that did not only 
coexist with ancient regulatory bodies, but also determined the relationship 
between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, since it forced the 
reformulation of a set of ancient practices. This had dire consequences inso-
far as it hindered the unification of the law. Many years after the independ-
ence movements, Andrés Bello described some of them:
“For this reform to be truly useful, it must be radical. In no other part of the social 
order we inherited from Spain is the axe so necessary. As regards political reforms, 
we are not inclined to dismantling everything; but our trial system merits its total 
removal and substitution for another. Maybe, it would not be an exaggeration to 
affirm that this system lacks all guarantees embraced by experience to limit arbi-
trariness and protect the Law. What sometimes makes us wary of their presence is 
the concern that exists against some of them, even within the respectable class of 
magistrates and legal experts. For instance, almost no one recognizes the advantages 
of having judges and courts ground their decisions, a practice in line with the 
principle of general responsibility that it is the soul of a republic, or, rather, of 
any government. In a country where the executive branch cannot make a decision, 
unless pursuant to a law and by invoking it, on the smallest investment of public 
monies, can a court have the power to adjudicate disputed property that may be 
worth hundreds of thousands of pesos without stating pursuant to what law or 
principle the adjudication has been made, or without explaining why one of the 
titles invoked must prevail over the other? This seems outrageous.”134
The new law, allegedly consisting only of the rules adopted by legislative 
bodies or of exceptional rules issued by executive bodies, continued to be 
interpreted from the standpoint of forensic practices, which understood that 
their main objective was to establish “concordances” among normative texts 
to display the justice in the regulations. Blatantly and briefly put: Bártolo 
may not have been mentioned any longer in the peninsular forum,135 but 
the advice of Gómez y Negro – whose Elementos de práctica forense [Elements 
of Forensic Practice] originally published in 1806, was re-published on several 
occasions with its corresponding forms136 – would be adopted. The afore-
133 Lorente (1989).
134 El Araucano N° 197, Santiago, 20 de junio de 1834.
135 Tormo (2001).
136 Gómez y Negro (1838).
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mentioned work advocated what should be deemed law: el arte de la litiga-
ción (forensic practice) must be based on the search for the rule within the 
history of national law. Continuity prevailed in an editorial market almost 
entirely dominated by the presence of works written mostly before 1808, 
which were criticized, corrected, enlarged, or updated by a succession of 
authors throughout the never-ending 1800s.137 The best example that shows 
the success of this particular technique is the well-known Librería de escriba-
nos [Library of Notaries] by Joseph Febrero, published in 1769, which was re-
used, or rather (re-)ordered, commented, annotated, etc. not only by various 
Spanish authors,138 but also by some important Spanish American ones,139
who for decades replicated the same technique on the other side of the 
Atlantic.140 Laura Beck has stressed that the “curse” against this type of 
literature uttered by Savigny and developed by the Historical School, also 
necessary for the process of structuring the canon of history of legal liter-
ature, has created a dramatic gap between historiography and its own sour-
ces; in fact, this does not allow us to assess the constituent value such 
literature had for legal thinking in the Hispanic world of the 19th cen-
tury.141 As Beck has asserted, “while kings and queens came and left, minis-
ters and governments fell, Vinnius, Heineccius and Sala remained unmoved 
from their 19th-century lawyers’ offices”.142 Briefly, it may be stated that the 
19th-century legal-political class nurtured a cult for totally hypocritical legal-
ity on both sides of the Atlantic.
In the 19th-century newly formed states, both the Code and its culture 
were ignored,143 which was meant to reformulate and assimilate a new 
conception of the principle of legality, taking steps for its implementa-
tion.144 The inexistence of the foregoing enabled the literature of the well-
known concordancias (concordances) between Roman Law and the new 
Spanish, Mexican or Chilean Laws to continue determining the mindset 
of jurists and informing the practice of judges and courts. This failed to 
137 Torres Campos (1897).
138 Reseña crítica (1852).
139 Pascua (1834–1835).
140 González (1998).
141 Beck Varela (2008).
142 Beck Varela (2008) 193.
143 Petit (1995); Petit (1996).
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contribute to expedite the emergence of a new concept of general law that 
threatened to depart, once and for all, from the ancient casuistic culture of 
ius commune.
V. Conclusions
What is the value of history? There are few professional historians who have 
not asked themselves this question during their life. As is widely known, the 
answers cover the shelves of well-stocked libraries, so readers need not fear 
that I expand on this matter. However, I would like to recall some thoughts 
of Tomás y Valiente, who once asserted: “legal historians play a significant 
role: to contribute their legal experience of the past for the understanding 
and improvement of our present world.”145 Tomás y Valiente, as many 
others, was concerned with the relation between historical times,146 but 
he simplified the matter by affirming that if history has a purpose, such 
purpose is to understand the present (“anyone who does not make this 
use of history will write dead books”).147
To this day, I am not quite certain whether some of the objectives of legal 
history in general, or of colonial law history in particular, are similar to those 
in the works of Francisco Tomás y Valiente. My intention has been to follow 
his advice in this contribution as a tribute to Víctor Tau, in an attempt to 
relate current issues with the historiographical treatment of what can be 
considered their origins. In my opinion, the former comes not only from a 
tradition that started at the time of the Conquest, which served to extend the 
imprint of European legal culture in the Americas, but from the inclusion of 
many old notions in the new (?) legal systems following the independencies. 
Nonetheless, the treatment of this issue may eventually end as the content of 
dead books if it is not related to a further question I consider essential: Why 
did the Hispanic world offer so much resistance to the state-building process 
that dominated the Western world throughout the 19th century? I am aware 
that before answering this question, its own hypothetical nature may be 
challenged. Yet, I believe that the Chilean debate over the legitimation of 
the existence and scope of Court Regulations issued by courts can only be 
145 Tomás y Valiente (1997b) 4773.
146 Koselleck (1993).
147 Tomás y Valiente (1997c) 5062.
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explained if we accept that the weakness of general legislation was a key 
feature of the Spanish and American nations.
This weakness might be verified through the analysis of 19th-century legal 
practices, which were really old. The creation of laws remained encased in 
ancient formalities; petitions or claims against the unfairness of ancient laws 
that once paralyzed their enforcement in the entire Hispanic sphere contin-
ued to be in force and proved to be effective as well. At the same time, 
courts, as well as civil and military administrators, continued to enjoy free-
dom to determine what should be used in court or executed in each case. 
A crucial question must be added to the foregoing: Against this backdrop, 
where the impossible assimilation of a formal concept of law prevailed, who was 
actually in charge of executing the law? It is in this regard that another excep-
tion becomes evident: Hispanic constitutionalism preferred to create corpo-
rate, non-hierarchical institutions. In brief, individualism had no room in 
Spanish-American legal culture.
The adventure that began in 1808 with the separation of powers ended 
almost where it had begun, since general legislation continued to face sim-
ilar obstacles for many decades both in Spain and in the different American 
nations. At this stage, several questions may be posed: When was an end put 
not so much to the vestiges of the legal order of the Monarchy but to its 
structuring nature of the new 19th-century orders in both hemispheres? Was 
there enough room within the new legal orders for outstanding metamor-
phoses, as was the case of the renowned Mexican amparo? Finally, I am 
convinced that the comparative study of Transition Law is a real challenge 
for legal historiography. It may well be included in the list of appealing 
issues for the development of New Horizons for the study of Colonial 
Law, which, inter alia, may explain the causes for the high standing that 
Court Regulations still enjoy in the Republic of Chile.
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Víctor Tau Anzoátegui
Provincial and Local Law of the Indies
A research program
I. The Established Point of View and the New Approach
The historical study of local and provincial derecho indiano examined across a 
regional situation peripheral to the Spanish monarchy pertains to the dis-
ciplinary field of legal history and is socio-legally oriented. It extends to any 
experience or knowledge related to the legal phenomenon. Therefore, inter-
est lies not only in the normative and doctrinal system, but also in the set of 
habits of mind and style that encompasses both the actions of legal operators 
and the expressions found in daily practice due to the action and behavior of 
different social groups. Socio-legal experiences should be incorporated with-
in the framework of what may be termed local legal culture.
Most legal historiographical studies on the derecho indiano have rested on 
the assumption that power was established or that law was created at the 
upper and central levels of a consolidated order. The image of a unitary 
derecho indiano imposed from the Peninsula, which was perceived to have 
one general normative power, was accepted by an ample section of the 
American historiography and spread through cultural spheres. This image 
met the aspirations of the Enlightenment and, later, those of the liberal 
political theory of the 19th century, according to which power resided in 
the State as the central body bringing together other institutions and law 
was general and uniform. Most historians and jurists read and interpreted 
ancient texts as well as historical events under this paradigm, and hence 
reaffirmed that model.
This was the approach that prevailed during most of the 20th century. 
Historians applied the contemporary state model when studying the past, 
which implied viewing the law as a normative system created by its exclusive 
legislative power, evidenced mainly by uniform and complete bodies of law 
upon which a dogmatic legal system was constructed. From this perspective, 
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the derecho indiano was recreated as a legal system established by the central 
bodies of the monarchy which culminated in the Recopilación de Leyes de 
Indias of 1680 [Compilation of the Laws of the Indies], a compilation of the 
entire body of basic law to be applied in the Americas. Underneath this 
compiling normative system, a particular, changing and casuistic local or 
“creole” law was hidden. It was issued by the authorities residing in the 
Indies by virtue of the power delegated to them by the Metropolis, and it 
was subject to the mechanism of royal assent.
The most salient academic writings of the mid-20th century traditional 
legal historiography of the Indies have always reflected awareness that the 
legal complexity of the Indies was not circumscribed to dogmatic forms. 
Hence, early experts - Rafael Altamira and Ricardo Levene, and more mod-
ern ones Alfonso García Gallo, Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, José M. Mariluz 
Urquijo and Ismael Sánchez Bella - perceived such interest in studying the 
local legislation, and even set it as a future research goal, signaling some of 
the most valuable sources for the task. However, local rules that they iden-
tified were regarded as merely supplementary and of lesser relevance.
This view started to change gradually and decisively as the initiative to 
revise those paradigms was set in motion in the last decades of the century. 
New historiographical approaches emerged, some placing high value on the 
political-legal autonomy of the peripheral regions from the central power 
(Antonio M. Hespanha). Consequently, the centralized and uniform con-
ception of the derecho indiano started to weaken while an image of multi-
plicity started to gain strength. It stemmed from the diverse geographical 
and human realities bundled in the Americas, which obviously could not be 
reflected in a uniform legal body. Cities began to assume a major role in the 
creation and application of a system of their own (Bartolomé Clavero). On 
the basis of variety and Spanish American casuistry, it was necessary to attend 
to the realities and interplay of a multiplicity of jurisdictional and normative 
powers that contributed to the development of a peculiar and local provin-
cial system.
Thus began to open a new path of theoretical studies and fieldwork, in 
which local law was neither merely supplementary nor limited to an isolated 
area of the derecho indiano: rather is has adquired a level of importance 
undreamt-of before, to the extent that it has come to offer a novel approach 
to study the whole legal system in force in Spanish American. Furthermore, 
in this approach this local law is a core element in the continuity of the legal 
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culture of the Indies after the emancipation, during the so-called period of 
derecho patrio or national law of Spanish American countries, until the time 
of codification.
Aided by the new theories of recent times and the decline of the former 
political paradigm, other images are emerging nowadays that depict a multi-
ple and boundless derecho indiano born in different places of the New World, 
respondent to the diverse geographical and human realities bundled in the 
vast continent, and which make it possible to recognize the existence of 
diverse local and provincial normative systems.
A new approach (based upon Antonio M. Hespanha’s model criterion) 
posits as a hypothesis the inversion of those terms, addressing the possibility 
that local areas might be genuine sources of power and creation of law. This 
inescapably leads to the reconsideration of old assumptions and to the awak-
ening of brand-new ideas about the ‘center-periphery’ axis and the existence 
of multiple jurisdictional and normative powers which sometimes work 
simultaneously at different levels (Tamar Herzog). This encourages the com-
parison of the mechanisms operating in different local contexts. This oper-
ation highlights the structure and dynamics of this vast political entity, as 
well as the nature of the different laws (socio-legal systems) that were present 
in it, with diverse margins of autonomous expression and centralized impo-
sition according to time and circumstances.
The local legal phenomenon arises as a new instrument to learn more about 
the derecho indiano and, in a broader sense, to deeply understand the mech-
anisms of articulation in that political entity of great territorial dimensions: 
the Hispanic monarchy of Spain and the Indies during the Modern Age. 
Despite the considerable historical-political and historical-legal bibliography 
on the topic, some issues and questions remain unanswered. These are real 
legal historiographical problems that call for new light to be shed in order to 
reach a satisfactory and comprehensive understanding of both its structure 
and historical development throughout the three long centuries of its exis-
tence. In this sense, the approach suggested approach here may contribute to 
a deeper understanding.
The specific framework of this approach is limited to a particular space 
and time: the provinces of the Río de la Plata, Tucumán and Cuyo from the 
16th to the 18th centuries. During this period, the foregoing provinces were 
viewed as peripheral to the centers of political power – Madrid, Lima and 
Charcas – until the creation of the Viceroyalty in 1776, when their status was 
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put on a par with that of other peripheral regions of higher rank within the 
monarchy.
The matter will be addressed in key areas or subjects of that local law. This 
approach will help revise, adjust and modify, if applicable, the conceptual 
framework. It will also pave the way for future research in other areas, and 
for a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the areas considered here, 
so that local law will progressively achieve scientific consistency.
II. Research Design. Research Work Areas
The legal culture of the Indies cannot be conceived as the mere normative 
reflection of a Spanish America geographically integrated with a monarchy 
based in Europe, nor can it be identified with passive acceptance of metro-
politan directives. On the contrary, it is essential that we understand that 
derecho indiano was still in force far beyond political emancipation, and that 
while its structure had general characteristics perceivable across the whole 
Indies, specific regional and local varieties emerged that were the result of 
different geographical, social and economic realities. In other words, it has 
come the time to consider outdated these old historiographical tendencies, 
under which the study of the derecho indiano was limited to its normative 
system and questions almost exclusively related to legal creation by an 
almighty political authority residing in the metropolis. This retrospective 
view now gives way to the image of a more flexible and multiple derecho 
indiano, which emerged from a diversity of geographical and human real-
ities. Hence, it is convenient to limit the scope of the research program to a 
particular geographical area, without precluding its broader placement with-
in the legal culture of the Indies and its focus on comparative history across 
different regions.
The central premise consists in placing focus on an area which, conceived 
as a natural formation, served as a setting for the display, on various levels 
and by a multiplicity of peripheral powers – often difficult to identify – of 
genuine legal autonomy. Such a situation would be a result of a multi-
layered combination of mechanisms of action and the simultaneous resist-
ance to royal authority, which was indifferent to being placed within canons 
derived from rationalistic hierarchical conceptions. Its constant display sug-
gests that those in charge of the administration of provincial and local law, 
rather than mere recipients of graciously delegated power, acted as real 
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guardians of alternative authority. This image undermines the credibility of 
the classic reductionist views, under which the monarchy would appear as 
the sole power vested with legitimate authority to make laws.
The areas to be studied in particular must be carefully selected taking into 
consideration the nature of the topic, its local roots, and the availability of 
experts in the field recognized for their previous knowledge of the subject, 
who might allow the conclusions of their research to be integrated to the 
common project.
In order to advance in the knowledge of this provincial and local law, six 
key study topics have been set as specific objectives. The goal is to detect 
elements in them through which local features can be verified and analyzed. 
These topics are: (1) the political condition in the city and the province; (2) 
the local normative fabric; (3) jurisdictional culture and justice; (4) family 
and household order; (5) the concept of property and the exploitation of 
natural resources; and (6) the relation between the universal and the partic-
ular in canon law. Some of these topics are now being examined in a 
number of research projects, whose findings reveal the value of delving into 
the material and disseminating the analysis so that new elements shaping the 
local legal culture begin to emerge.
1. The political condition in the city and the province
The root of the local system lay in the city – city meaning “republic” and 
“corporation” – with its own entity and exclusive law. Both the urban region 
and the contiguous rural area were under its jurisdiction. Among the con-
stituents of the population center, houses and families, convents and mon-
asteries, unions and associations, schools, universities and consulates stood 
out at the lower level, each with their rules and regulations, benefits and 
exemptions, customs and traditions, chiefs, prelates and governors. When 
Castillo de Bovadilla stated that “houses are small cities and cities are big 
houses,” he was picturing the basic layers constituting that local system. The 
political, economic, and judicial authority was vested in the Cabildo and the 
royal official, which acted as guardians of corporations and people. Their 
normative activity extended mainly over the public sphere, more or less 
intensely depending on time and place.
Working from more general layouts of the political condition (R. Zorra-
quín Becú), texts and testimonies depicting characteristic situations can be 
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gathered that may help refine the way the issue is addressed and verify 
whether or not there is a correspondence with those layouts, and to what 
an extent they should be modified or nuanced.
Most importantly, this process will go hand in hand with new historio-
graphical approaches that, without ignoring the existence of a strong ten-
dency towards centralization and uniformity during those centuries, regard 
the Spanish monarchy as a balanced, complex order, whose powers were 
spread among recognized centers of authority and their peripheries, and 
where the monarch played a preeminent yet not dominant role. This new 
view seems to be in better accordance with the analysis of a reality where the 
vastness, variety, and specificity of its elements, together with the distance 
that lay between the provinces and the Crown, precluded the everyday 
exercise of government from the Peninsula.
This new approach leads us to consider different mechanisms of power, 
from the one present in clientelism and corporatism to that produced by 
bureaucracy itself, all this intertwined by subtle links that changed depend-
ing on the circumstances. It is thus more proper to talk about a horizontal, 
rather than a vertical, order in the conception of power, and recognize the 
existence of fields of action reserved to each sphere of power.
This can be verified by the relation between the local authorities in the 
provinces of the Río de la Plata and Tucumán with the king and the Pen-
insular bodies. As I have observed while studying the consultations of the 
Consejo de Indias [Council of the Indies], the Cámara [Chamber of the 
Indies] and the Junta de Guerra [Board of War] during the 17th century, 
the matters they addressed revolved around the following: appointment of 
royal and ecclesiastical officers, concession of grants and graces, treatment 
and evangelization of native people, leaves of absence for travel, foreign 
trade control, and defense and fortification of the territory. A strong inter-
vention in judicial affairs can also be observed, when serious cases of vio-
lence, abuse or excess of power by magistrates and governors were reported. 
The practical exercise of authority by the monarch can thus be limited to 
certain areas and situations, and it becomes selective and eminent. The 
remaining power is distributed between the Spanish American centers and 
peripheries (Lima, Charcas, Santiago de Chile for Cuyo, etc.). The city wields 
considerable normative and jurisdictional power.
A description of what fell under the charge of the Cabildo is recorded in a 
Buenos Aires council minute of the year 1674, during the course of a power 
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dispute. The passage is very suggestive and requires an extensive study, impos-
sible to carry out in this paper for reasons of space. Its first part reads: 
“Cabildos (…), under their royal laws and ius commune, are vested with the 
power to rule the city and hear matters pertaining to it, by governing each 
and every part of it, paying attention to the protection of its fruits and crop 
fields, its sustenance and that of its people, peacefulness, price, amounts, and 
better distribution, in such way as they may agree at any time, and deciding 
whatever they may deem convenient (…).”
New examples and texts can contribute to the treatment of this matter.
2. The local normative fabric
When we consider that prior to the nineteenth century there was a world of 
diverse and autonomous powers – supernatural, natural and human –, in 
which norms were created in processes carried out at different levels (Hes-
panha, Cultura Jurídica), it is easier to understand how law was classified in 
the principal Castilian vocabularies of the early modern age. Two of the 
seven categories, specifically concerned the local sphere, which thus 
appeared as a genuine source of power and of law, and not merely as a 
power delegated by another higher sphere. These two categories were the 
law ordained by the city or town for its private government and that intro-
duced by custom. However, the different levels of the legal system were 
implicitly articulated by overarching principles or values according to sub-
ject matter, people, and circumstances. Provincial and local law were far 
from being comprehensive and exclusive. On the contrary, they were open 
to laws and customs of other places and spheres of power.
It is difficult to define local law because there is no exclusive sector that 
may actually be so designated. The approach towards a notion of local law 
should emanate from each city, province or kingdom, analyzing the fabric of 
the legal system from the bottom up, watching its development and verify-
ing its possibilities to peak or decline. That is to say, a study of this kind is 
limited to certain geographical areas, and there should be no immediate 
intention of expanding the results obtained to all the Spanish Indies.
In his research of the city as a general concept, and Seville in particular, 
between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Bartolomé Clavero notes the 
absence of what might be termed “a general system” or “communal organ-
ization.” Nor was there a legislative power that could establish the rules to 
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govern the city. What did stand out as an organic whole was the intellectual 
power of ius commune and moral theology case law, which “laid down 
principles, formulated guidelines and enabled modulation.” It was an effec-
tive construction. In addition, there were other normative levels, some closer 
to what we now understand as law, other levels of a decidedly moral nature, 
and some that we could classify as socio-legal practices, with separate legal 
entity and binding. Within this normative fabric lies a customary back-
ground that “calls for historiographical creative space.” This same universe 
of multiple norms – laws, customs and practices –, both written and oral, is 
a topic deserving patient and intelligent research. Seville can be used as a 
model for a Spanish American city. And indeed, over the centuries under 
review this model was frequently referred to.
What was the attitude adopted by the central government of the mon-
archy towards the mass of norms that was continuously being created in the 
different local spheres of its vast territory? The question is part of a funda-
mental issue, which is the articulation of the different levels of power and, 
obviously, the possibility to control the legal production of the peripheries. 
The Consejo de Indias suffered from an information gap regarding this issue 
and although there were attempts to fill it, little could be done to make local 
authorities in the New World send the required information on a perma-
nent basis. Despite the basic interest behind that question, we lack an 
adequate response today, one with the necessary supporting documents. A 
working hypothesis could be the following: according to the governing style 
that can be noted in other matters, and given the material impossibility to 
control all the corners of its political domains, the Crown consented or 
surreptitiously permitted, and even approved, local or provincial self-man-
agement and the subsequent legislative production in the understanding 
that kingdoms, provinces and cities enjoyed jurisdictional and regulatory 
powers that could not be ignored as long local or provincial authorities 
continued to recognize and maintained their loyalty toward the supreme 
political authority in the monarch.
This is the issue that deserves the undivided attention of researchers today 
to grasp the way in which such implementation of law was understood in 
local life, such implementation being an intertwined fabric of case law/legal 
knowledge and solutions arising from the local socio-legal experience.
242 Víctor Tau Anzoátegui
3. Jurisdictional culture and justice
In the research design of a program of this nature, a thematic approach to the 
issue stated in the title is essential. It is perhaps convenient to attempt such an 
approach by resorting to a recent work by Alejandro Agüero , in which he sets 
out the conceptual bases of a study on the topic, whose working hypothesis 
may be applied to our provinces. By “jurisdictional culture,” Agüero means “a 
form of power organization and management which can be observed with 
sparse variations in every European political space from the late Middle Ages 
until the end of the eighteenth century.” Underpinning that concept are the 
basic assumptions that social order rests on the idea of a divinely created 
universe beyond the will of humans (transcendent order), and the idea of 
the supremacy of a community over its individuals that is applied in various 
associative expressions (corporation). There are other key elements, such as 
the primacy of religion in the discourse of knowledge, the relationship 
between words and things, and the validity of a topical reasoning. The legal 
culture of the time was thus structured on “a discourse of political power 
exclusively linked to its concept of justice.” The legitimate exercise of power 
was tied to the theological notion of justice that gave everyone what, as of 
right, belonged to them. In charge of said exercise was an authority that 
enjoyed iurisdictio, that is, it was vested with some degree of jurisdiction. 
It followed certain rules of procedure and led to the resolution of the issue, 
based on procedural rigor and the virtues of the magistrate.
Among the various facets of justice, criminal justice is worth noting. 
Mario Sbriccoli laid out for the European world of the early modern period 
a slow transition, entwined by multiple archaistic and modernistic lines, 
from a “negotiated criminal justice” to a “hegemonic institutional justice,” 
which narrowed the room for negotiation and imposed the idea that no 
justice could exist without punishment of the guilty. The state started 
monopolizing punitive power by taking over the duty to apply the punish-
ment rigorously on the basis of four technical presuppositions: the law, the 
act, the evidence, and the sentence. This model can be used as a working 
hypothesis to study the world of the Indies in the early modern period.
By way of example, we will refer to Alejandro Agüero’s recent work: a 
study on these forms of criminal justice in Córdoba del Tucumán in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This author points out the difference 
between the punitive severity of laws and known practice. Agüero finds 
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discursive strategies and social practices that helped settle conflicts without 
resorting to the formal rigor of laws. Clemency, pardon, and complicity by 
judges and by the parties involved (victims and perpetrators) were proce-
dures that could be seen in practice. This view of criminal justice attempts to 
overcome a more unilateral view of that past itself, a consequence of the 
strong mark left by the Enlightenment.
Another issue that can be addressed in this area is the one regarding the 
imposition that several local texts – particularly manifest in the bands of 
good government of the late eighteenth century – made on city dwellers: to 
act as assistants of justice in reporting or detecting different violations of 
legal and moral norms that were committed in the city and in the country-
side.
4. Family and household order
In a study that has become a classic, Otto Brunner discussed with unmatched 
finesse the meaning given in Europe until the eighteenth century to the “big 
house” ruled by its master, who had power over economic activity and to 
protect and control all those living in it, including a broad right to punish 
his people and the domestic service. It was precisely at that time when – he 
adds – “the absolute State, which had concentrated in its hands the protec-
tion of peace and the police, penetrated the house.” But thanks to the theory 
of natural law peace in the house was enshrined as one of the fundamental 
rights, and only by means of a court order could the power of the state 
penetrate its sphere.
This is the same concept developed in the Siete Partidas, that “this word 
family” – it reads – “denotes the master and his wife, and all the other 
individuals living in the household under his command, as well as the 
children and servants and the other servants.” The father of the family was 
at the top of the small power pyramid sustaining the house, a situation that 
can be framed within a pyramidal relation as compared to the prince, the 
“father” of the territory. Alejandro Agüero states: “Disciplined by religion 
and guided by the Económica, the power of the father of the family was 
withdrawn from the rules of jurisdictional discourse to the extent that his 
function was performed within an organic unity where subjective plurality 
was as inconceivable as the smallest otherness, required by a balancing game 
dealing with disparate interests implicit in the notion of justice (...). Instead 
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of mediating between various subjective interests, the function of the father 
of the family was to guardthe interests of his home, ‘manage’ the assets to 
ensure the economic viability of the family unit and thus ensure the welfare 
of its members.”
This family scheme prevailing in Europe was transferred to the New 
World, where it underwent changes and adaptations as required by the 
new conditions and by the transformations brought about by the diverse 
processes of colonization which characterized the typical Spanish and Creole 
family of the Indies. A detail worth mentioning is the relevant role played by 
women when leading the family on some occasions, as stated by Dougnac, 
due to the frequent absence of their husbands.
Mario Góngora explains that “in a socio-historical sense, a house com-
prises a considerable number of inhabitants: the head of the household, his 
wife, their unmarried sons and daughters, and often their married children 
with their own spouses and children; other relatives, including children 
born out-of-wedlock; servants and those ‘added’ to the household, who also 
used to have offspring.” Góngora concludes that “this is, properly speaking, a 
family in the traditional sense.” The head of the household had a wide and 
strong authority that allowed him to exercise the government and supreme 
direction of the house, while women, children and the other members of the 
domestic community owed obedience and submission. He ruled over the 
family and enjoyed free administration of assets and corrective powers over 
his children, etc.
It is possible to learn about the rich and secretive world of the family and 
the domestic order, as it operated before the nineteenth century, by reading 
some passages from the bands of good government. Though their provisions 
are not too explicit, they are always suggestive. They are isolated or minor 
expressions because the power of the legislature only actually reached the 
gates of the “big house.” It is rare to find such provisions recorded before the 
last quarter of the 18th century.
The late appearance of certain precepts regarding the domestic order, 
resulting from the silence of the previous era, probably serves to prove the 
condition of the “big house,” exempt from any jurisdiction alien to it in 
everyday life, where the civil authority could not enter.
Texts of a different nature evidence the privileged position enjoyed by the 
big house or casa de señores. The question arises as to whether these texts are 
remnants or traces of a previous situation or whether they signal the begin-
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ning of a transformation combining (or rejecting) the intervention of the 
civil authority and the protection and guarantee of the rights of the individ-
ual. Such contradictory combination of ideas or purposes would not be 
strange at a time as troubled as that of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the issue offers different working 
hypotheses. Researcher Romina Zamora has already conducted significant 
research into the topic in one of the major cities of the region, San Miguel de 
Tucumán, in the last decades of the 18th century, which may serve as a 
starting point to further study or to extend it to other cities. Moreover, to 
the traditional figure of the “big house” or “noble house” Zamora has added 
the “plebeian house” whose presence and role is less visible in documents 
due to the existence of a hierarchical society; perhaps it is mentioned only in 
passing in some documents, these mentions being derogatory at times, but 
deeply ingrained through customs and social practices.
5. The concept of property and the common exploitation
of natural resources
Whoever embarks on the task of venturing further into local law will 
unavoidably be faced with this key issue. European scholars of legal history, 
politics and social history (such as Paolo Grossi, Bartolomé Clavero, José 
Antonio Maravall and E.P. Thompson) have written clarifying theoretical 
and empirical articles that receive special treatment in every research paper 
on the subject.
According to Maravall, “the concept of property underwent a dramatic 
transformation” during the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. It evolved 
“restrictively to mean the free individual disposition of assets,” deviating 
from medieval criteria which imposed a set of connections, prescribed com-
mon uses, and ordered assistance to the poor and needy. This preface can 
only introduce us to a very complex issue full of nuances and contradictions, 
as may be corroborated by resorting to the suggestive pages in which Paolo 
Grossi deals with the study of the historical forms of property and the big 
cultural debate on that matter in the 19th century Europe, or to the ones 
written by Clavero on the matter in the French Revolution. Both provide 
food for thought and an opportunity for the exchange of ideas.
The referred pages written by European scholars do not include the dis-
tinctive features of this matter in Spanish America so we need to resort to 
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local texts. Our aim is to attempt an empirical approach to that complex and 
sometimes contradictory world, where more than one line or path can be 
discerned, and where together with a Modern-Age process of innovation, 
persistent medieval traces can still be detected. They can be found in the 
wording of local legal texts but mainly in their background. The matter 
appears repeatedly in almost every place, but there are also specific cases that 
ought to be singled out.
A point worthy of mention is the one regarding the community of wild 
woods, quarries, and rivers. General regulations such as those issued in 1514 
were coupled with royal decrees addressed to the Río de la Plata in 1696, 
1708 and 1711, in which natives and residents of the Indies were granted the 
common use of pastures, woods and waters, and the residents of the city of 
Buenos Aires were allowed the enjoyment thereof, and could even cross the 
river to Colonia del Sacramento, for the exploitation of wood and firewood 
without limitation (Mariluz Urquijo). This generalized system started to 
encounter weak or open resistance depending on how advanced the con-
ceptions proclaiming the individual and absolute nature of property – which 
excluded all forms of collective exploitation – were.
The common exploitation of various natural resources began to be 
restricted by the eighteenth century, as much to establish their exclusive 
use by the city residents – and exclude outsiders without a license – as to 
declare illegal formerly accepted practices or customs of common use, which 
were now defined as “abuse,” “ theft” or “robbery”. These texts must be read 
carefully and between the lines. In a chapter of the band of Buenos Aires 
Governor Bermúdez, of 1715, it is stated: “none be bold to commit wrongs 
in the city or in the field by taking horses, oxen, cows, fruit or any other 
thing for, though trivial as it may seem, it will be declared theft as the taking 
was against the owner’s will ...” It seems here that theft was being introduced 
as a criminal offence to make a sharp distinction between the thing subject 
to the exclusive will of its owner and what could fall within the scope of an 
eventual common use in practice or, at least, tolerated common use.
In these blurred boundaries between what can be defined as an object of 
individual property or common exploitation, it is worth resorting to another 
text of the band of Santa Fe, written in 1709, in which the deputy governor 
expressed that “because I am aware of the very serious chaos and lack of fear 
when it comes to the theft of mules, horses, oxen, cows, calves and other 
service animals because it is not yet considered a venial crime, and that not even 
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indoors can said animals be safe, I hereby order that …” no person “under 
any circumstances may take livestock or animals of this kind without the 
express authorization of their owners …” The text recognizes, by means of 
certain idiomatic turns – highlighted in italics –, the existence of a practice 
or use not typified as a crime that the new rule purports to change, by 
considering it theft and prescribing an express penalty. This was an attempt 
to sketch out an order in which the individual property of things was 
becoming more clearly defined. The idiomatic turn used in the provision 
to establish the requirement to obtain express authorization from the owner 
to take a livestock leads us to infer that the person did not have the intent to 
claim ownership over the livestock, but rather to use it temporarily as some-
thing available for common use.
A very clear example can be found in an order issued by the Cabildo of 
San Luis in 1779, which reads: “All individuals shall refrain from the common 
practice of stealing branches and firewood from stubbles and fences … and 
those burglarizing farms or stealing fruit shall be subject to the same penalty.” 
This is neither the place nor the time to engage in certain digressions, but 
this order to refrain from a “common practice,” which is then treated as 
stealing and later extended to cover other acts of burglary of farms or theft 
of fruits, seems suggestive. It gives the impression that we are faced with a 
text pinpointing, by means of highlighted words, transitional moments 
between the common exploitation of certain natural elements and a stricter 
privacy and exclusivity in the use of individual property.
6. The relation between the universal and the particular
in canon law
There are few areas of law that have been as significant to the everyday lives 
of the men and women of the Old Regime as canon law. Its rules governed 
life and death, accompanying people from baptism to extreme unction. On 
the periphery of the Empire in particular, the priest was often the only 
lawyer, and law was taught solely at the seminary. Notwithstanding this 
great significance to daily life, which historians of various fields have increas-
ingly detected, the norms of canon law applied locally were based on nor-
mative corpora dating from the Middle Ages, intended for the faithful as a 
whole. This relation between the universal conception of these norms, de-
signed to govern the whole Catholic world, and their particular scope of 
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application, with the required adaptations and adjustments, makes the study 
of canon law an enlightening experience for the program described.
Among the various sources that can be studied in this context, so far we 
have analyzed, firstly, some problems based on the provisions of diocesan 
synods (Martini, Dellaferrera). Another highly interesting source consists of 
texts emerging from university teaching that reveal conscious and uncon-
scious adjustments, the use of ius communesources and the changes intro-
duced in an attempt to select and present the required material for jurists in 
a certain place. Some of the classes taught in courses of canon law at the 
University of Córdoba del Tucumán are particularly enriching in this context 
and have been published recently, among them a treatise on impediments to 
marriage, the fruit of classes taught during the year 1734 (Silvano GA Benito 
Moya/Guillermo de Santis). This treaty contains disputationes on key aspects 
of the canonical doctrine of marriage – violence and fear; clandestine mar-
riage; impediment of relationship (cognatio) – and offers the possibility to 
analyze the abovementioned aspects about the modus operandi of the jurist in 
the Cordoba of the 18th century, comparing the explanation with other 
contemporary sources (such as Ius canonicum universum by Reiffenstuel). 
Furthermore, it allows a comparison between university education and for-
ensic practice.
Thomas Duve has posed questions regarding the local application of 
derecho canónico indiano, including to what extent the particular experiences 
of the implementation of norms in the Indies impacted upon the Old 
World. Thus, he states that “the dialectic between the realization of authority 
in the transplant of the canon law tradition to the Indies on the one hand, 
and pluralization within this legal culture might even contribute to discover 
a true Atlantic dimensionof Legal History, beyond the studies on the unilat-
eral reception of the European legal culture in the Indies.”
III. Research Methodology
The program falls within the discipline of legal history and, therefore, fol-
lows its methodological guidelines, which were amended throughout the 
20th century. The long-standing debate over whether this is historical or legal 
science – often settled with eclectic criteria – has been overcome. The posi-
tion of the discipline between History and Law generated interest and was 
scientifically sound when Dogmatics was highly regarded in the legal field, 
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and the legal dimension was dismissed by historians. Both situations have 
changed.
That relation progressively changed as a stronger link between law and 
society was sought, and broader “methodological freedom” was introduced 
that sought to incorporate other disciplines – sociology, anthropology, liter-
ature, linguistics, theology, political science, etc. – and open up possibilities 
for the development of interdisciplinary work, while still acknowledging 
that Legal History has an individuality and a scientific observatory of its 
own, which offers its findings to other areas of knowledge.
A very noticeable consequence of this change has been an improved 
articulation between normativity and social reality. To achieve this, it is 
necessary to move out of the narrow scope in which Dogmatics enclosed 
the notion of law, ignoring any other normative sphere than that established 
by the positive law of the State. In Antonio M. Hespanha’s words,“The most 
relevant criticism against traditional Legal History is not so much its formal-
ism as its dogmatism. The former may constitute a positive attitude in that it 
safeguards legal institutional autonomy and avoids reductive determinism; 
the latter prevents any historical contextualization, because institutions or 
doctrinal dogmas are found to be necessary models (and therefore ahistor-
ical) derived from the nature of things or rational evidence. In contrast, the 
proposed orientation, in relativizing legal institutional models, draws us to 
consider the study from a historical perspective, placing these models in the 
context of the history of cultural forms and, consequently, their insertion in 
practical contexts” (European legal culture).
There is a tendency to set aside the firm conviction that considered of 
scientific interest to the historian only those matters that the dogmatic legal 
scholar defined as pertaining to the legal field. From these new standpoints, it 
is interesting to admit the existence of normative orders outside the one 
officially recognized and, generally, this helps expand the researcher’s horizon.
This also leads to a more frequent use, with true methodological root, of 
the phrase “legal culture of the Indies” – virtually unknown in the past – 
instead of “Castilian-Indian legislation” (as has hitherto been usual), since it 
is a deeper and more comprehensive phrase alluding to a phenomenon that 
cannot be restricted to the legal sphere. It is useful to bear this in mind when 
analyzing local issues.
Pursuing a research program of this nature, which falls squarely into the 
specific discipline of Legal History, requires looking into and incorporating 
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conceptual tools and documentary and bibliographic material of other sci-
entific disciplines that foster the study of humankind and society.
IV. Recommended Bibliography
Given the nature of this article, I have omitted the inclusion of a most comprehen-
sive range of scholarly works; instead, this list includes works used in the text and 
others that may lead to further consideration and information of the matters dis-
cussed herein.
Agüero, Alejandro, Espacio local y jurisdicción criminal en el Antiguo Régimen. 
La justicia penal en Córdoba del Tucumán siglos XVII y XVIII. Tesis doctoral 
laureada en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2003, Inédita
Agüero, Alejandro, Las categorías básicas de la cultura jurisdiccional. Capítulo I 
del libro: De justicia de jueces a justicia de leyes: hacia la España de 1870, 
Madrid 2006, 21–58
Agüero, Alejandro, Clemencia, perdón y disimulo en la justicia criminal de Anti-
guo Régimen. Su praxis en Córdoba del Tucumán, siglos XVII y XVIII, en: 
Revista de Historia del Derecho 32 (2004) 33–81
Agüero, Alejandro, Ley penal y cultura jurisdiccional. A propósito de una Real 
Cédula sobre armas cortas y su aplicación en Córdoba del Tucumán, segunda 
mitad del siglo XVIII, en: Revista de Historia del Derecho 35 (2007) 13–45
Agüero, Alejandro, Ciudad y poder político en el antiguo régimen. La tradición 
castellana, en: Cuadernos de Historia 15 (2005) 237–310
Aspell, Marcela, Los factores de distorsión de los mecanismos del control social de 
la población rural en la jurisdicción de Córdoba del Tucumán. Asperezas, 
conflictos, soluciones, en: Revista de Historia de Derecho 30 (2002) 87–147
Benito Moya, Silvano G. A. y Guillermo de Santis, Fabian Hidlago SJ (1697–
1770): Tratado acerca de los impedimentos de Matrimonio. Estudio, transcrip-
ción paleográfica y versión española, Centro de Estudios Históricos “Profesor 
Carlos A. Segreti”, Córdoba 2005
Brunner, Otto, La ‘casa grande’ y la ‘oeconomica’ de la vieja Europa, en: idem, 
Nuevos caminos de la historia social y constitucional, Buenos Aires 1976, 
87–123
Clavero, Bartolomé, Tantas personas como Estados. Por una antropología política 
de la historia europea, Madrid 1986
Clavero, Bartolomé, Antidora. Antropología católica de la economía moderna, 
Milano 1991
Clavero, Bartolomé, Del Estado presente a la familia pasada, en: Quaderni Fioren-
tini 18 (1989) 583–605
Provincial and Local Law of the Indies 251
Clavero, Bartolomé, Les domaines de la propriété 1789–1814: Propiedades y pro-
piedad en el laboratorio revolucionario, en: Quaderni Fiorentini 27 (1998) 
269–378
Clavero, Bartolomé, Sevilla, Concejo y Audiencia: invitación a sus Ordenanzas de 
Justicia, Introducción al volumen Ordenanzas de la Real Audiencia de Sevilla 
(1603), Edición facsimilar, Sevilla 1995
Dellaferrera, Nelson, Mónica Martini, Temática de las constituciones sinodales 
indianas. Arquidiócesis de la Plata, Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del 
Derecho, Buenos Aires 2000
Dougnac Rodríguez, Antonio, Esquema del derecho de familia indiano, Santiago 
de Chile 2003
Duve, Thomas, La condición jurídica del indio y su consideración como persona 
miserabilis en el Derecho indiano, en: Losano, Mario (Ed.), Un giudice e 
due leggi. Pluralismo normativo e conflitti agrari in Sud America, Milano 
2004, 3–33
Duve, Thomas, Los privilegios de los Indios: ¿derecho local?, en: Actas del XV Con-
greso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano (Córdoba, 
España 2005), Cordoba 2008, t. I, 111–130
Frigo, Daniela, Il padre di famiglia. Governo della casa e governo civile nella tradi-
zione dell ‘Economica’ tra cinque e seicento, Roma 1985
Gacto, Enrique, El marco jurídico de la familia castellana. Edad Moderna, en: 
Historia. Instituciones. Documentos 11 (1984) 37–66
García-Gallo, Alfonso, Metodología de la historia del derecho indiano, Santiago 
de Chile 1970
Garriga, Carlos, Orden jurídico y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen, en: 
Garriga, C., M. Lorente, Cádiz 1812. La Constitución jurisdiccional, Madrid 
2007
Gongora, Mario, Estudios de historia de las ideas y de historia social, Valparaíso 
1980
Grossi, Paolo, Il dominio e le cose. Percezioni medievali e moderne dei diritti reali, 
Milano 1992
Hespanha, Antonio M., Cultura jurídica europea. Síntesis de un milenio, Madrid 
2002
Hespanha, Antonio M., Vísperas del Leviatán. Instituciones y poder político. Portu-
gal siglo XVII, Madrid 1989
Herzog, Tamar, Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y resi-
dencias en las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650–1750), en: Gallego, 
José Andrés (coord.), Nuevas Aportaciones a la Historia Jurídica de Ibero-
américa, Madrid: Fundación Histórica Tavera. Digibis Publicaciones digitales, 
2000
Maravall, José Antonio, Estado moderno y mentalidad social. Siglos XV a XVII, 2 
vols., Madrid 1972
252 Víctor Tau Anzoátegui
Mariluz Urquijo, José M., La comunidad de montes y pastos en el derecho india-
no, en: Revista del Instituto de Historia del Derecho Ricardo Levene 23 (1972) 
93–121
Martini, Mónica Patricia, Las constituciones sinodales indianas: entre la adecua-
ción y la originalidad, en: Revista de Historia del Derecho 28 (2000) 377–400
Martiré, Eduardo, El derecho indiano, un derecho propio particular, en: Revista de 
Historia del Derecho 29 (2001) 331–362
Pihlajamäki, Heikki, Lo europeo en Derecho: Ius Politiae y el Derecho indiano, en: 
Barrios, Feliciano (coord.), Derecho y Administración Pública en las Indias 
Hispánicas, Actas del XII Congreso Internacional de Historia del Derecho 
Indiano, t. 2, Cuenca 2002, 1363–1375
Pugliese, María Rosa, El Derecho Indiano: perspectivas de lo local en el Virreinato 
del Río de la Plata. Con especial referencia a Buenos Aires y Montevideo, en: 
Actas y Estudios del XIV Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del 
Derecho Indiano (Lima 2003), Lima 2008, t. 2, 337–352
Pugliese, María Rosa, Derecho local y gobierno local: la experiencia de Montevi-
deo como gobierno periférico de Buenos Aires. Tensiones y relaciones en la 
formulación del derecho local en el Río de la Plata en la época indiana, en: 
Actas del XV Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho 
Indiano (Córdoba, España 2005), Cordoba 2008, tomo I, 197–230
Pugliese, María Rosa, Apuntamientos sobre la aplicación del Derecho Indiano 
local en el Río de la Plata. Una creación jurídica empírica, en: Revista de 
Historia del Derecho 33 (2005) 219–295
Sanjurjo de Driollet, Inés, Muy Ilustre Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento. El cabildo 
de Mendoza en el siglo XVIII. Estudio institucional, Mendoza 1995
Sanjurjo de Driollet, Inés, La organización político administrativa de la campaña 
mendocina en el tránsito del Antiguo Régimen al orden liberal, Buenos Aires 
2004
Sanjurjo de Driollet, Inés, Las continuidades en el gobierno de la campaña men-
docina en el siglo XIX, en: Revista de Estudios Históricos Jurídicos, Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile, 26 (2004) 445–468 (Versión impre-
sa: ISSN 0716 5455; Versión electrónica: ISSN 0717 6260)
Sanjurjo de Driollet, Inés, Juan Bautista Alberdi: su visión de los cabildos india-
nos, en: Actas y Estudios, XIII Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Histo-
ria del Derecho Indiano, San Juan de Puerto Rico 2000, t. 1, 217–230
Sanjurjo de Driollet, Inés, Nuevas perspectivas en la Historia del Derecho y de las 
Instituciones, en: Revista de Historia Americana y Argentina 41 (2007) 
151–172
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Casuismo y Sistema. Indagación histórica sobre el espíritu 
del Derecho Indiano, Buenos Aires 1992
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La Ley en América Hispana. Del Descubrimiento a la 
Emancipación, Academia Nacional de la Historia, Buenos Aires 1992
Provincial and Local Law of the Indies 253
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Nuevos horizontes en el estudio histórico del Derecho 
Indiano, Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, Buenos Aires 
1997
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, El poder de la costumbre. Estudios sobre el Derecho con-
suetudinario en América hispana hasta la Emancipación, CD-Rom, Ediciones 
DIGIBIS, Madrid 2000. Edición en papel: Instituto de Investigaciones de His-
toria del Derecho, Buenos Aires 2001
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Los bandos de buen gobierno del Río de la Plata, Tucumán 
y Cuyo (época hispánica) (Edición y estudio). Instituto de Investigaciones de 
Historia del Derecho, Buenos Aires 2004
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La variedad indiana, una clave en la concepción jurídica de 
Juan de Solórzano, en: Actas del II Congreso Iberoamericano de Academias de 
Historia, Madrid 1993, 475–488
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La Monarquía: poder central y poderes locales, en: Aca-
demia Nacional de la Historia, Nueva Historia de la Nación Argentina, t. II, 
cap. 7, Buenos Aires 1999
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Ordenes normativos y prácticas socio-jurídicas. La justicia, 
en: ídem, t. II, Cap. 9, Buenos Aires 1999
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Las Indias ¿provincias, reinos o colonias? A propósito del 
planteo de Zorraquín Becú, en: Revista de Historia del Derecho 28 (2000) 
77–137
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La disimulación en el Derecho Indiano, en: Derecho y 
Administración pública en las Indias hispánicas. XII Congreso del Instituto 
Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, Cuenca 2002, vol. II, 
1733–1752
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Poderes y Normas a través de un ejercicio de casuística 
indiana (Buenos Aires, 1714–1717), en: XIII Congreso del Instituto Interna-
cional de Historia del Derecho Indiano. Actas y Estudios, San Juan de Puerto 
Rico 2003, t. I, 87–117
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, El Reino de Nápoles ¿un modelo de estudio para el De-
recho indiano?, en: “Panta Rei”. Studi dedicati a Manlio Bellomo, t. V, Roma 
2004, 333–348
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, Una visión historiográfica del Derecho indiano provincial 
y local, en: XIV Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho 
Indiano (Lima 2003), Lima 2008, 309–336
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La potestad normativa en la ciudad durante la coloniza-
ción española, en: Congreso Internacional “Mundus Novus. América Sistema 
Giurídico Latinamericano”, Roma 2003, 193–203
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, El Estudio del Derecho indiano provincial y local. Su base 
documental, en: Latin America in the Atlantic World c. 1500 – c. 1850. Essays 
in honor of Horst Pietschmann, Köln 2005, 83–96
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor, La configuración del Derecho indiano Provincial y Local. 
Problemas terminológicos e históricos, en: XV Congreso del Instituto Interna-
254 Víctor Tau Anzoátegui
cional de Historia del Derecho Indiano. Córdoba (España), 2005. Manuel 
Torres Aguilar (coord.), t. I, 231–253
Thompson, E.P., Costumbres en común, Barcelona 1995
Vassallo, Jaqueline, Mujeres Delincuentes. Una mirada de género en la Córdoba 
del siglo XVIII. Centro de Estudios Avanzados, Córdoba 2006
Vassallo, Jaqueline, El discurso de la domesticidad en los alegatos judiciales de la 
Córdoba dieciochesca, en: Ghirardi, Mónica (comp), Cuestiones de Familia 
a través de las fuentes, Córdoba, Argentina 2005, 199–237
Zamora, Romina, Las mercedes de solares y la ocupación del espacio. San Miguel de 
Tucumán, 1745–1800, en: Boletín de la Junta de Estudios Genealógicos, dic 
2004
Zamora, Romina, Los Autos de Buen Gobierno y el orden social. San Miguel de 
Tucumán, 1780–1810, en: Revista de Historia del Derecho 32 (2004) 443–470
Zamora, Romina, El vecindario y los oficios de gobierno en San Miguel de Tucumán 
en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, en: Revista de Historia del Derecho 35 
(2007) 457–477
Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, La condición política de las Indias, en: Revista de His-
toria de Derecho 2 (1974) 285–380
www.scielo.cl
Provincial and Local Law of the Indies 255

Contributors
Ezequiel Abásolo is Director of the History Department of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences at the Universidad Católica Argentina in Buenos Aires and 
2nd Vice Director of the Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho 
(INHIDE). His latest publication is Bastante más que ‘degradantes andrajos de 
nuestra pasada esclavitud’. Fragmentos sudamericanos de la pervivencia de la 
cultura jurídica indiana durante el siglo XIX (2015). His main research interests 
focus on the transition from early Modern Latin American legal culture to 
that of the codification era. Further research areas include the circulation of 
ideas, normative experiences and products in Latin America during the 
20th century, especially between Brazil and Argentina.
Thomas Duve is the Managing Director of the Max Planck Institute for 
European Legal History and Professor for Comparative Legal History at the 
Goethe University Frankfurt. His research focuses on the legal history of the 
early Modern Age and the Modern Era with particular interest in Ibero-
American legal history and the history of legal scholarship in the 20th century.
Rafael D. García Pérez is Associate Professor of Legal History and Research-
er at the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Navarra. He is 
author of “Antes leyes que Reyes”. Cultura jurídica y Constitución política 
durante la Edad Moderna, Navarra, 1512–1808 (2008) and El Consejo de Indias 
durante los reinados de Carlos III y Carlos IV (1998). García’s current research 
interests include colonial law from the Old Regime to the 19th century as 
well as law and religion during the Atlantic Revolutions. He is member of 
the Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano.
Tamar Herzog is Monroe Gutman Professor of Latin American Affairs at 
Harvard University and is an affiliated faculty member in the Harvard Law 
School. Among her publications are the following books: Frontiers of Posses-
sion: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (2014), Upholding Justice: 
State, Law and the Penal System in Quito (2004, published in Spanish 1995 
Contributors 257
and French 2001); Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern 
Spain and Spanish America (2003, Spanish translation 2006); Ritos de control, 
prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias (2000, French translation 
2014); and Mediación, archivos y ejercicio: los escribanos de Quito (1996).
Marta Lorente is Professor of Legal History at the Autonomous University 
of Madrid. Her research has focused on the history of the Hispanic world, 
particularly on justice, constitutionalism and colonial issues. One of her 
latest works has been a book honoured by the Spanish Congress of Deputies 
(Lorente, Portillo, eds, El momento gaditano. La constitución en el orbe hispá-
nico, 2012). Currently, she works on the history of international law.
Luigi Nuzzo is Professor of Legal History at the Law Faculty of the Uni-
versity of Salento (Lecce). In addition to having received several research 
grants at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History (Frankfurt am 
Main), he was also Senior Robbins Research Fellow at the University of 
California at Berkeley, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow and Hauser Global 
Research Fellow at the New York University. He has published extensively on 
the history of international law, colonial law, the ‘Spanish Indies’ (16th –
17th centuries) as well as the German and Italian legal culture between the 
19th and 20th centuries.
Brian P. Owensby is Professor in the Corcoran Department of History and 
Director of the Center for Global Inquiry and Innovation at the University of 
Virginia. He served as chair of the History Department from 2009 to 2013. 
He is the author of Intimate Ironies. The Making of Middle Class Lives in 
Modern Brazil (Stanford, 1999) and Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Co-
lonial Mexico (Stanford, 2008). His current research interests include Jesuit 
juridical and political thought in the 18th century, the indigenous New 
World, and the challenges of historical imagination from a Latin American 
perspective.
Heikki Pihlajamäki is Professor of Comparative Legal History at the Uni-
versity of Helsinki. His research interests include the history of colonial law, 
commercial law and procedural law.
258 Contributors
Richard J. Ross is Professor of Law and History at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana/Champaign. His research interests center on the development of 
early American law in an Atlantic world and comparative early Modern 
framework. Work in this vein includes: “Legal Communications and Impe-
rial Governance: British North America and Spanish America Compared,” in 
The Cambridge History of Law in America,Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2008); and Legal 
Pluralism and Empires, 1600–1850, co-edited with Lauren Benton (NYU 
Press, 2013). With Steven Wilf, he is at work on The Beginnings of American 
Law: A Comparative History (under contract, Yale University Press).
Víctor Tau Anzoátegui is an Honorary Researcher of The Argentinian Na-
tional Research Council (CONICET) and head of the Instituto de Investiga-
ciones de Historia del Derecho (INHIDE). He was a senior lecturer in legal 
history at the University of Buenos Aires. His research focus is on derecho 
indiano and Argentinian national law. Among his publications are Casuismo 
y Sistema. Indagación histórica sobre el espíritu del Derecho Indiano (1992) and 




The volume contains essays on the modernization of private law in Europe 
and Latin America from the viewpoint of legal history. Through a comparison 
between different forms of legal development in various normative und cultural 
contexts, the papers seek to open up new research perspectives on the concept of 
modernization in the field of private law. 
Contributors 
Alfons Aragoneses | Thomas Duve | Alfredo de J. Flores | Agostina Gentili |  
Thorsten Keiser | Mario Losano | Daniela Marino | Marcelo Neves |  
María Rosario Polotto | Maria Rosa Pugliese | Gustavo Silveira Siqueira |  
Alessandro Somma | Yolanda de Paz Trueba
María Rosario Polotto, Thorsten Keiser,  
Thomas Duve (eds.)
Derecho privado y modernización
América Latina y Europa en la primera 
mitad del siglo XX
Global Perspectives on Legal History 2
Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute  
for European Legal History 2015.  
VI, 315 S., € 16,61 D 
ISBN: 978-3-944773-01-8 




América Latina y Europa en la 





ON LEGAL HISTORY 2
Global Perspectives on Legal History is a book series edited and published by the  
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
As its title suggests, the series is designed to advance the scholarly research of  
legal historians worldwide who seek to transcend the established boundaries  
of national legal scholarship that typically sets the focus on a single, dominant  
modus of normativity and law.  
The series aims to privilege studies dedicated to reconstructing the historical  
evolution of normativity from a global perspective.  
It includes monographs, editions of sources, and collaborative works. All titles in  
the series are available both as premium print-on-demand and in the open-access  
format.
Released volumes
2 | María Rosario Polotto, Thorsten Keiser, Thomas Duve (eds.)
Derecho privado y modernización.  
América Latina y Europa en la primera mitad del siglo XX
1 | Thomas Duve (ed.)
Entanglements in Legal History: Conceptual Approaches
More information on the series and forthcoming volumes: http://global.rg.mpg.de

Max Planck InstItute 



































Derecho indiano, Spanish colonial law, has been a vigorous subdiscipline of 
legal history since the early 20th century. In 1997, in his Nuevos horizontes en 
el estudio histórico del derecho indiano, Argentinian legal historian Víctor Tau 
Anzoátegui considers some hitherto neglected perspectives. What has been 
achieved since then ? What issues are being dealt with today ? In this volume, 
scholars from different parts of the Western world address several of the  
current challenges confronting derecho indiano.
                                                                                 http://global.rg.mpg.de  
